
»s< 




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Class. 
Book. 



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BEQUEST OF 
ALBERT ADSIT CLEMONS 
(Not available for exchange) 




THOUGHTS 
OF THE 
EMPEROR 



r A^niJm 







HBNRY ALTEMUS, MANUFACTURER 

I'HILAUklfHlA. 



THE THOUGHTS 

OF 

THE EMPEROR 

MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 




MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS 



Q, j C&Czc* 



/- . •/ ~ t-')j£~L- 




THOUGHTS 



or 

Marcus 

Aurelius 

Antoninus 

GEORGE 
LONG 



PHILADELPHIA 
HENRY ALTEMUS 




2)580 

3 



Albert Adsit Clem 
Aug. 24, 1938 
(Not available for exchange) 





3 



CONTENTS. 



PAGE 

Biographical Sketch 9 

Philosophy of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus - 45 

The Thoughts 99 

Index of Terms 3°5 

General Index .311 



PREFACE. 



I have carefully revised the Life and Phil- 
osophy of Antoninus, in which I have made a 
few corrections and added a few notes. 

I have also made a few alterations in the 
translation where I thought I could approach 
nearer to the author's meaning; and I have 
added a few notes and references. 

There still remain difficulties which I cannot 
remove, because the text is sometimes too cor- 
rupt to be understood, and no attempt to restore 
the true readings could be successful. 

Gkorgk Long. 



BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 

OF 

MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 



M ANTONINUS was born at Rome, A. d. 
. 121, on the 26th of April. His father, 
Annius Verus, died while he was praetor. His 
mother was Domitia Calvilla, also named L,u- 
cilla. The Emperor T. Antoninus Pius mar- 
ried Annia Galeria Faustina, the sister of An- 
nius Verus, and was consequently the uncle of 
M. Antoninus. When Hadrian adopted An- 
toninus Pius and declared him his successor in 
the empire, Antoninus Pius adopted both L,. 
Ceionius Commodus, the son of Aelius Caesar, 
and- M. Antoninus, whose original name was 
M. Annius Verus. Antoninus then took the 
name of M. Aelius Aurelius Verus, to which 
was added the title of Caesar in A. d. 139: the 
name Aelius belonged to Hadrian's family, and 
Aurelius was the name of Antoninus Pius. 
When M. Antoninus became Augustus, he 
dropped the name of Verus and took the name 
(9) 



io JBio^rapbical Sftetcb* 

of Antoninus. Accordingly lie is generally 
named M. Aurelius Antoninus, or simply M. 
Antoninus. 

The youth was most carefully brought up. 
He thanks the gods (i. 17) that he had good 
grandfathers, good parents, a good sister, good 
teachers, good associates, good kinsmen and 
friends, nearly everything good. He had the 
happy fortune to witness the example of his 
uncle and adoptive father Antoninus Pius, and 
he has recorded in his word (i. 16; vi. 30) the 
virtues of the excellent man and prudent ruler. 
Like many young Romans he tried his hand at 
poetry and studied rhetoric. Herodes Atticus 
and M. Cornelius Pronto were his teachers in 
eloquence. There are extant letters between 
Fro n to and Marcus,* which show the great af- 
fection of the pupil for the master, and the 
master's great hopes of his industrious pupil. 
M. Antoninus mentions Fronto (i. 11) among 
those to whom he was indebted for his educa- 
tion. 

When he was eleven years old, he assumed 
the dress of philosophers, something plain and 
coarse, became a hard student, and lived a most 
laborious, abstemious life, even so far as to in- 
jure his health. Finally, he abandoned poetry 
and rhetoric for philosophy, and he attached 

*M. Cornelii Frontalis Reliquiae, Berlin, 1816. 
There are a few letters between Fronto and Antoni- 
nus Pius. 



Marcus Bureltus Bntoninus, n 

himself to the sect of the Stoics. But he did 
not neglect the study of law, which was a use- 
ful preparation for the high place which he was 
designed to fill. His teacher was L,. Volusianus 
Maecianus, a distinguished jurist. We must 
suppose that he learned the Roman discipline 
of arms, which was a necessary part of the edu- 
cation of a man who afterwards led his troops 
to battle against a warlike race. 

Antoninus has recorded in his first book the 
names of his teachers, and the obligations which 
he owed to each of them. The way in which 
he speaks of what he learned from them might 
seem to savor of vanity or self-praise, if we look 
carelessly at the way in which he has expressed 
himself; but if any one draws this conclusion, 
he will be mistaken. Antoninus means to 
commemorate the merits of his several teachers, 
what they taught, and what a pupil might 
learn from them. Besides, this book, like the 
eleven other books, was for his own use ; and 
if we may trust the note at the end of the first 
book, it was written during one of M. Anto- 
ninus' campaigns against the Quadi, at a time 
when the commemoration of the virtues of his 
illustrious teachers might remind him of their 
lessons and the practical uses which he might 
derive from them. 

Among his teachers of philosophy was Sextus 
of Chaeroneia, a grandson of Plutarch. What 
he learned from this excellent man is told by 
himself (i. 9). His favorite teacher was Q. 



12 astoflrapbfcal Sftetcb* 

Junius Rusticus (i. 7), a philosopher, and also 
a man of practical good sense in public affairs. 
Rusticus was the adviser of Antoninus after he 
became emperor. Young men who are destined 
for high places are not often fortunate in those 
who are about them, their companions and 
teachers ; and I do not know any example of a 
young prince having had an education which 
can be compared with that of M. Antoninus. 
Such a body of teachers distinguished by their 
acquirements and their character will hardly be 
collected again ; and as to the pupil, we have 
not had one like him since. 

Hadrian died in July A. d. 138, and was suc- 
ceeded by Antoninus Pius. M. Antoninus 
married Faustina, his cousin , the daughter of 
Pius, probably about A. d. 146, for he had a 
daughter born in 147. He received from his 
adoptive father the title of Caesar, and was as- 
sociated with him in the administration of the 
state. The father and the adopted son lived 
together in perfect friendship and confidence. 
Antoninus was a dutiful son, and the emperor 
Pius loved and esteemed him. 

Antoninus Pius died in March, A. d. 161. 
The Senate, it is said, urged M. Antoninus to 
take the sole administration of the empire, but 
he associated with himself the other adopted 
son of Pius, L,. Ceionius Commodus, who is 
generally called L,. Verus. Thus Rome for the 
first time had two emperors. Verus was an in- 
dolent man of pleasure, and unworthy of his 



,flbarcu0 Burelfua Bntoninus* 



13 



station. Antoninus however bore with him, 
and it is said Verus had sense enough to pay 
to his colleague the respect due to his charac- 
ter. A virtuous emperor and a loose partner 
lived together in peace, and their alliance was 
strengthened by Antoninus giving to Verus for 
wife his daughter L,ucilla. 

The reign of Antoninus was first troubled by 
a Parthian war, in which Verus was sent to com- 
mand; but he did nothing, and the success that 
was obtained by the Romans in Armenia and 
on the Euphrates and Tigris was due to his 
generals. This Parthian war ended in A. d. 
165. Aurelius and Verus had a triumph (a. d. 
166) for the victories in the East. A pestilence 
followed, which carried off great numbers in 
Rome and Italy, and spread to the west of 
Europe. 

The north of Italy was also threatened by the 
rude people beyond the Alps, from the borders 
of Gallia to the eastern side of the Hadriatic. 
These barbarians attempted to break into Italy, 
as the Germanic nations had attempted near 
three hundred years before; and the rest of the 
life of Antoninus, with some intervals, was em- 
ployed in driving back the invaders. In 169 
Verus suddenly died, and Antoninus adminis- 
tered the state alone. 

During the German wars Antoninus resided 
for three years on the Danube at Carnuntum. 
The Marcomanni were driven out of Pannonia 
and almost destroyed in their retreat across the 



14 aBfograpbfcal Sfcetcb* 

Danube; and in A. d. 174 the emperor gained a 
great victory over the Quadi. 

In a. d. 175, Avidius Cassius, a brave and 
skilful Roman commander who was at the head 
of the troops in Asia, revolted, ai?d declared 
himself Augustus. But Cassius was assassi- 
nated by some of his officers, and so the rebel- 
lion came to an end. Antoninus showed his 
humanity by his treatment of the family and 
the partisans of Cassius; and his letter to the 
Senate, in which he recommends mercy, is ex- 
tant. (Vulcatius, Avidius Cassius, c. 12.) 

Antoninus set out for the East on hearing of 
Cassius' revolt. Though he appears to have 
returned to Rome in A. d. 174, he went back to 
prosecute the war against the Germans, and it 
is probable that he marched direct to the East 
from the German war. His wife Faustina, who 
accompanied him into Asia, died suddenly at 
the foot of the Taurus, to the great grief of her 
husband. Capitolinus, who has w r ritten the life 
of Antoninus, and also Dion Cassius, accuses the 
empress of scandalous infidelity to her husband, 
and of abominable lewdness. But Capitolinus 
says that Antoninus either knew it not or pre- 
tended not to know it. Nothing is so common 
as such malicious reports in all ages, and the 
history of imperial Rome is full of them. An- 
toninus loved his wife, and he says that she 
was ' ' obedient, affectionate, and simple. ' ' The 
same scandal had been spread about Faustina's 
mother, the wife of Antoninus Pius, and yet he 



/Hbarcu6 Burelius Bntonfnus. 15 

too was perfectly satisfied with his wife. An- 
toninus Pius says after her death, in a letter to 
Fronto, that he would rather have lived in exile 
with his wife than in his palace at Rome with- 
out her. There are not many men who would 
give their wives a better character than these 
two emperors. Capitolinus wrote in the time 
of Diocletian. He may have intended to tell 
the truth, but he is a poor, feeble biographer. 
Dion Cassius, the most malignant of historians, 
always reports, and perhaps he believed, any 
scandal against anybody. 

Antoninus continued his journey to Syria 
and Egypt, and on his return to Italy through 
Athens he was initiated into the Eleusinian 
mysteries. It was the practice of the emperor 
to conform to the established rites of the age, 
and to perform religious ceremonies with due 
solemnity. We cannot conclude from this that 
he was a superstitious man, though we might 
perhaps do so if his book did not show that 
he was not. But that is only one among many 
instances that a ruler's public acts do not al- 
ways prove his real opinions. A prudent gov- 
ernor will not roughly oppose even the super- 
stitions of his people ; and though he may wisli 
they were wiser, he will know that he cannot 
make them so by offending their prejudices. 

Antoninus and his son Commodus entered 
Rome in triumph, perhaps for some German 
victories, on the 23d of December, A. d. 176. 
In the following year Commodus was associated 



1 6 ^Bioflrapbical Sfcetcb. 

with his father in the empire, and took the 
name of Augustus. This year A. d. 177 is 
memorable in ecclesiastical history. Attalus 
and others were put to death at L,yon for their 
adherence to the Christian religion. The evi- 
dence of this persecution is a letter preserved 
by Eusebius (E. H. v. 1 ; printed in Routh's 
Reliquiae Sacrae, vol. i, with notes). The 
letter is from the Christians of Vienna and 
Lugdunum in Gallia (Vienna and Lyon) to 
their Christian brethren in Asia and Phrygia ; 
and it is preserved perhaps nearly entire. It 
contains a very particular description of the 
tortures inflicted on the Christians in Gallia, 
and it states that while the persecution was go- 
ing on, Attalus, a Christian and a Roman citi- 
zen, was loudly demanded by the populace and 
brought into the amphitheatre ; but the gover- 
nor ordered him to be reserved, with the rest 
who were in prison, until he had received in- 
structions from the emperor. Many had been 
tortured before the governor thought of ap- 
plying to Antoninus. The imperial rescript, 
says the letter, was that the Christians should 
be punished, but if they would deny their 
faith, they must be released. On this the 
work began again. The Christians who were 
Roman citizens were beheaded ; the rest were 
exposed to the wild beasts in the amphithe- 
atre. Some modern writers on ecclesiastical 
history, when they use this letter, say nothing 
of the wonderful stories of the martyrs' suffer* 



iRarcue Surettus Antoninus, 17 

ings. Sanctus, as the letter says, was burnt 
with plates of hot iron till his body was one 
sore and had lost all human form ; but on being 
put to the rack he recovered his former appear- 
ance under the torture, which was thus a cure 
instead of a punishment. He was afterwards 
torn by beasts, and placed on an iron chair and 
roasted. He died at last. 

The letter is one piece of evidence. The 
writer, whoever he was that wrote in the name 
of the Gallic Christians, is our evidence both 
for the ordinary and the extraordinary circum- 
stances of the story, and we cannot accept his 
evidence for one part and reject the other. We 
often receive small evidence as a proof of a 
thing we believe to be within the limits of 
probability or possibility, and we reject exactly 
the same evidence, when the thing to which it 
refers appears very improbable or impossible. 
But this is a false method of inquiry, though 
it is followed by some modern writers, who se- 
lect what they like from a story and reject the 
rest of the evidence; or if they do not reject 
it, they dishonestly suppress it. A man can 
only act consistently by accepting all this letter 
or rejecting it all, and we cannot blame him for 
either. But he who rejects it may still admit 
that such a letter may be founded on real facts; 
and he would make this admission as the most 
probable way of accounting for the existence of 
the letter; but if, as he would suppose, the 
writer has stated some things falsely, he can- 
2 



1 8 ffitoflrapbical Sfcetcb* 

not tell what part of his story is worthy of 
credit. 

The war on the northern frontier appears to 
have been uninterrupted during the visit of 
Antoninus to the East, and on his return the 
emperor again left Rome to oppose the barba- 
rians. The Germanic people were defeated in 
a great battle A. d. 179. During this campaign 
the emperor was seized with some contagious 
malady, of which he died in the camp at Sir- 
mium (Mitrovitz), on the Save, in Lower Pan- 
nonia, but at Vindebona (Vienna), according to 
other authorities, on the 17th of March, A. d. 
180, in the fifty-ninth year of his age. His son 
Commodus was with him. The body, or the 
ashes probably, of the emperor were carried to 
Rome, and he received the honor of deification. 
Those who could afford it had his statue or 
bust; and when Capitolinus wrote, many peo- 
ple still had statues of Antoninus among the 
Dei Penates or household deities. He was in a 
manner made a saint. Commodus erected to 
the memory of his father the Antonine column 
which is now in the Piazza Colonna at Rome. 
The bassi rilievi which are placed in a spiral 
line round the shaft commemorate the victories 
of Antoninus over the Marcomanni and the 
Quadi, and the miraculous shower of rain 
which refreshed the Roman soldiers and dis- 
comfited their enemies. The statue of Antoni- 
nus was placed on the capital of the column, 
but it was removed at some time unknown, and 



/Iftarcus Burelius Bntonfnus. 19 

a bronze statue of St. Paul was put in the place 
by Pope Sixtus the fifth. 

The historical evidence for the times of An- 
toninus is very defective, and some of that 
which remains is not credible. The most curi- 
ous is the story about the miracle which hap- 
pened in A. D. 174, during the war with the 
Quadi. The Roman army was in danger of 
perishing by thirst, but a sudden storm drenched 
them with rain, while it discharged fire and 
hail on their enemies, and the Romans gained 
a great victory. All the authorities which 
speak of the battle speak also of the miracle. 
The Gentile writers assign it to their gods, and 
the Christians to the intercession of the Chris- 
tian legion in the emperor's army. To confirm 
the Christian statement it is added that the 
emperor gave the title of Thundering to this 
legion; but Dacier and others, who maintain the 
Christian report of the miracle, admit that this 
title of Thundering or Lightning was not given 
to this legion because the Quadi were struck 
with lightning, but because there was a figure 
of lightning on their shields, and that this title 
of the legion existed in the time of Augustus. 

Scaliger also had observed that the legion was 
called Thundering (Kepawofiotog, or Kepawo^opog) 
before the reign of Antoninus. We learn this 
from Dion Cassius (Lib. 55, c. 23, and the note 
of Reimarus), who enumerates all the legions 
of Augustus' time. The name Thundering of 
Lightning also occurs on an inscription of the 



20 3BiO0rapbfcal Sftetcb. 

reign of Trajan, which was found at Trieste. 
Eusebius (v. 5), when he relates the miracle, 
quotes Apolinarius, bishop of Hierapolis, as 
authority for this name being given to the 
legion Melitene by the emperor in consequence 
of the success which he obtained through their 
prayers; from w T hich we may estimate the value 
of Apolinarius' testimony. Eusebius does not 
say in what book of Apolinarius the statement 
occurs. Dion says that the Thundering legion 
was stationed in Cappadocia in the time of 
Augustus. Valesius also observes that in the 
Notitia of the Imperium Romanum there is 
mentioned under the commander of Armenia 
the Praefectura of the twelfth legion named 
" Thundering Melitene;" and this position in 
Armenia will agree with what Dion says of its 
position in Cappadocia. Accordingly Valesius 
concludes that Melitene was not the name of 
the legion, but of the town in which it was 
stationed. Melitene was also the name of the 
district in which this town was situated. The 
legions did not, he says, take their name from 
the place where the}^ were on duty, but from 
the country in which they were raised, and 
therefore what Eusebius says about the Melitene 
does not seem probable to him. Yet Valesius, 
on the authority of Apolinarius and Tertullian, 
believed that the miracle was worked through 
the prayers of the Christian soldiers in the 
emperor's army. Rufinus does not give the 
name of Melitene to this legion, says Valesius, 



jflRarcus BureliuB Bntonlnus. 21 

and probably he purposely omitted it, because 
he knew that Melitene was the name of a town 
in Armenia Minor, where the legion was sta- 
tioned in his time. 

The emperor, it is said, made a report of his 
victory to the Senate, which we may believe, 
for such was the practice; but we do not know 
what he said in his letter, for it is not extant. 
Dacier assumes that the emperor's letter was 
purposely destroyed by the Senate or the enemies 
of Christianity, that so honorable a testimony 
to the Christians and their religion might not 
be perpetuated. The critic has however not 
seen that he contradicts himself when he tells 
us the purport of the letter, for he says that it 
was destroyed, and even Eusebius could not 
find it. But there does exist a letter in Greek 
addressed by Antoninus to the Roman people 
and the sacred Senate after this memorable 
victory. It is sometimes printed after Justin's 
first Apology, but it is totally unconnected with 
the apologies. This letter is one of the most 
stupid forgeries of the many which exist, and 
it cannot be possibly founded even on the gen- 
uine report of Antoninus to the Senate. If it 
were genuine, it would free the emperor from 
the charge of persecuting men because they 
were Christians, for he says in this false letter 
that if a man accuse another only of being a 
Christian, and the accused confess, and there is 
nothing else against him, he must be set free; 
with this monstrous addition, made by a man 



22 3BiOGtapbical Sfeetcb* 

inconceivably ignorant, that the informer must 
be burnt alive.* 

During the time of Antoninus Pius and Mar- 
cus Antoninus there appeared the first Apology 
of Justinus, and under M. Antoninus the Ora- 
tion of Tatian against the Greeks, which was a 
fierce attack on the established religions ; the 
address of Athenagoras to M. Antoninus on be- 
half of the Christians, and the Apology of 
Melito, bishop of Sardes, also addressed to the 
emperor, and that of Apolinarius. The first 
Apology of Justinus is addressed to T. Antoni- 
nus Pius and his two adopted sons, M. Antoni- 
nus and L. Verus; but we do not know whether 
they read it.f The second Apology of Justinus 
is entitled "to the Roman Senate;" but this 

* Eusebius (v. 5) quotes Tertullian's Apology to the 
Roman Senate in confirmation of the story. Tertul- 
lian, he says, writes that letters of the emperor were 
extant, in which he declares that his army was saved 
by the prayers of the Christians ; and that he ''threat- 
ened to punish with death those who ventured to ao* 
cuse us." It is possible that the forged letter which 
is now extant may be one of those which Tertullian 
had seen, for he uses the plural number, " letters. " 
A great deal has been written about this miracle of 
the Thundering Legion, and more than is worth read- 
ing. There is a dissertation on this supposed miracle 
in Moyle's Works, London, 1726. 

t Orosius, vii. 14, says that Justinus the philosopher 
presented to Antonius Pius his work in defence of the 
Christian religion, and made him merciful to the 
Christians. 



Marcus Burelius Bntonfnus, 23 

superscription is from some copyist. In the 
first chapter Justinus addresses the Romans. 
In the second chapter he speaks of an affair 
that had recently happened in the time of M. 
Antoninus and i,. Verus, as it seems; and he 
also directly addresses the emperor, saying of a 
certain woman, "she addressed a petition to 
thee, the emperor, and thou didst grant the peti- 
tion. ' ' In other passages the writer addresses the 
two emperors, from which we must conclude that 
the Apology was directed to them. Eusebius 
(E. H. iv. 18) states that the second Apology 
was addressed to the successor of Antoninus 
Pius, and he names him Antoninus Verus, 
meaning M. Antoninus. In one passage of this 
second Apology (c. 8), Justinus, or the writer, 
whoever he may be, says that even men who 
followed the Stoic doctrines, when they ordered 
their lives according to ethical reason, were 
hated and murdered, such as Heraclitus, Muso- 
nius in his own times, and others; for all those 
who in any way labored to live according to 
reason and avoided wickedness were always 
hated; and this was the effect of the work of 
daemons. 

Justinus himself is said to have been put to 
death at Rome, because he refused to sacrifice 
to the gods. It cannot have been in the reign 
of Hadrian, as one authority states; nor in the 
time of Antoninus Pius, if the second Apology 
was written in the time of M. Antoninus; and 
there is evidence that this event took place 



24 asiograpbtcal Sfcetcb* 

under M. Antoninus and L,. Verus, when Rusti- 
cus was praefect of the city.* 

The persecution in which Polycarp suffered 
at Smyrna belongs to the time of M. Antoni- 
nus. The evidence for it is the letter of the 
church of Smyrna to the churches of Philotne- 

*See the Martyrium Sanctorum Justini, &c, in the 
works of Justinus, ed. Otto, vol. ii. 559. " Junius 
Rusticus Praefectus Urbi erat sub imperatoribus M. 
Aurelio et Iy. Vero, id quod liquet ex Themistii Orat. 
xxxiv Dindorf. p. 451, et ex quodam illorum rescripto, 
Dig. 49. 1. i, I 2" (Otto). The rescript contains the 
words "Junium Rusticum amicum nostrum Prae- 
fectum Urbi.'' The Martyrium of Justinus and others 
is written in Geeek. It begins, "In the time of the 
wicked defenders of idolatry impious edicts were pub- 
lished against the pious Christians both in cities and 
country places, for the purpose of compelling them 
to make offerings to vain idols. Accordingly the holy 
men (Justinus, Chariton, a woman Charito, Paeon, 
Liberianus, and others) were brought before Rusticus, 
the praefect of Rome." 

The Martyrium gives the examination of the ac- 
cused by Rusticus. All of them professed to be 
Christians. Justinus was asked if he expected to as- 
cend into heaven and to receive a reward for his suf- 
ferings, if he was condemned to death. He answered 
that he did not expect : he was certain of it. Finally, 
the test of obedience was proposed to the prisoners ; 
they were required to sacrifice to the gods. All re- 
fused, and Rusticus pronounced the sentence, which 
was that those who refused to sacrifice to the gods 
and obey the emperor's order should be whipped and 
beheaded according to the law. The martyrs were 
then led to the usual place of execution and beheaded. 
Some of the faithful secretly carried off the bodies 
and deposited them in a fit place. 



dftarcus fturelius Bntoninus* 



25 



Hum and the other Christian churches, and it 
is preserved by Eusebius (E. H. iv. 15). But 
the critics do not agree about the time of Poly- 
carp's death, differing in the two extremes to 
the amount of twelve years. The circumstances 
of Poly carp's martyrdom were accompanied by 
miracles, one of which Eusebius (iv. 15) has 
omitted, but it appears in the oldest Latin ver- 
sion of the letter, which Usher published, and 
it is supposed that this version was made not 
long after the time of Eusebius. The notice at 
the end of the letter states that it was tran- 
scribed by Caius from the copy of Irenaeus, the 
disciple of Polycarp, then transcribed by Socra- 
tes at Corinth; "after which I Pionius again 
wrote it out from the copy above mentioned, 
having searched it out by the revelation of 
Polycarp, who directed me to it," &c. The 
story of Polycarp' s martyrdom is embellished 
with miraculous circumstances which some 
modern writers on ecclesiastical history take 
the liberty of omitting.* 

In order to form a proper notion of the con- 

* Conyers Middleton, An Inquiry into the Miracu- 
lous Powers, &c. p. 126. Middleton says that Euse- 
bius omitted to mention the dove, which flew out of 
Polycarp' s body, and Dodwell and Archbishop Wake 
have done the same. Wake says, ' ' I am so little a 
friend to such miracles that I thought it better with 
Kusebius to omit that circumstance than to mention 
it from Bp. Usher's Manuscript," which manuscript 
however, says Middleton, he afterwards declares to be 
so well attested that we need not any further assur« 
ance of the truth of it. 



26 ffiio^rapbical Sfcetcb* 

dition of the Christians under M. Antoninus we 
must go back to Trajan's time. When the 
younger Pliny was governor of Bithynia, the 
Christians were numerous in those parts, and 
the worshipers of the old religion were falling 
off. The temples were deserted, the festivals 
neglected, and there were no purchasers of vic- 
tims for sacrifice. Those who were interested 
in the maintenance of the old religion thus 
found that their profits were in danger. Chris- 
tians of both sexes and all ages were brought 
before the governor, who did not know what to 
do with them. He could come to no other con- 
clusion than this, that those who confessed to be 
Christians and persevered in their religion 
ought to be punished; if for nothing else, for 
their invincible obstinancy. He found no 
crimes proved against the Christians, and he 
could only characterize their religion as a de- 
praved and extravagant superstition, which 
might be stopped if the people were allowed 
the opportunity of recanting. Pliny wrote this 
in a letter to Trajan (Plinius, Ep. x. 97). He 
asked for the emperor's directions, because he 
did not know what to do. He remarks that he 
had never been engaged in judicial inquiries 
about the Christians, and that accordingly he 
did not know what to inquire about, or how far 
to inquire and punish. This proves that it was 
not a new thing to examine into a man's pro- 
fession of Christianity and to punish him for it.* 

*Orosius (vii. 12) speaks of Trajan's persecution of 



Marcus Surelfus antoninus. 



27 



Trajan's rescript is extant. He approved of 
the governor's judgment in the matter, but he 
said that no search must be made after the 
Christians; if a man was charged with the new 
religion and convicted, he must not be pun- 
ished if he affirmed that he was not a Christian, 
and confirmed his denial by showing his rever- 
ence to the heathen gods. He added that no 
notice must be taken of anonymous informa- 
tions, for such things were of bad example. 
Trajan was a mild and sensible man; and both 
motives of mercy and policy probably also in- 
duced him to take as little notice of the Chris- 
tians as he could, to let them live in quiet if it 
were possible. Trajan's rescript is the first 
legislative act of the head of the Roman state 
with reference to Christianity, which is known 
to us. It does not appear that the Christians 
were further disturbed under his reign. The 
martyrdom of Ignatius by the order of Trajan 
himself is not universally admitted to be an 
historical fact.* 

the Christians, and of Pliny's application to him hav- 
ing led the emperor to mitigate his severity. The 
punishment by the Mosaic law for those who at- 
tempted to seduce the Jews to follow new gods was 
death. If a man was secretly enticed to such new 
worship, he must kill the seducer, even if the seducer 
were brother, son, daughter, wife, or friend. (Deut. 
xiii.) 

* The Martyrium Ignatii, first published in Latin by 
Archbishop Usher, is the chief evidence for the cir- 
cumstances of Ignatius' death. 



28 JBlograpblcal Sfcetcb* 

In the time of Hadrian it was no longer pos- 
sible for the Roman government to overlook 
the great increase of the Christians and the 
hostility of the common sort to them. If the 
governors in the provinces were willing to let 
them alone, they could not resist the fanaticism 
of the heathen community, who looked on the 
Christians as atheists. The Jews too, who were 
settled all over the Roman Empire, were as 
hostile to the Christians as the Gentiles were.* 
With the time of Hadrian begin the Christian 
Apologies, which show plainly what the popu- 
lar feeling towards the Christians then was. 
A rescript of Hadrian to Minucius Fundanus, 
the Proconsul of Asia, which stands at the end 
of Justin's first Apology, t instructs the gover- 

* We have the evidence of Justiuus (ad Diognetum, 
c. 5) to this effect: "The Christians are attacked by 
the Jews as if they were men of a different race, and 
are persecuted by the Greeks; and those who hate 
them cannot give the reason of their enmity." 

t And in Eusebius (E. H. iv. 8, 9). Orosius (vii. 
13 j says that Hadrian sent this rescript to Minucius 
Fundanus, proconsul of Asia after being instructed 
in books written on the Christian religion by Quad- 
ratic, a disciple of the Apostles, and Aristides, an 
Athenian, an honest and wise man, and Serenus 
Granius. In the Greek test of Hadrian's rescript 
there is mentioned Serenius Granianus, the prede- 
cessor of Minucius Fundanus in the government of 
Asia. 

This rescript of Hadrian has clearly been added to 
the Apology by some editor. The Apology ends with 
the words : 8 tyiliov rc3 CeQ, tovto yeveoOo 



/toarcus !HureUu0 Bntoninus* 29 

nor that innocent people must not be troubled, 
and false accusers must not be allowed to extort 
money from them; the charges against the 
Christians must be made in due form, and no 
attention must be paid to popular clamors; 
when Christians were regularly prosecuted and 
convicted of illegal acts, they must be punished 
according to their deserts; and false accusers 
also must be punished. Antoninus Pius is said 
to have published rescripts to the same effect. 
The terms of Hadrian's rescript seem very 
favorable to the Christians; but if we under- 
stand it in this sense, that they were only to be 
punished like other people for illegal acts, it 
would have had no meaning, for that could 
have been done without asking the emperor's 
advice. The real purpose of the rescript is that 
Christians must be punished if they persisted 
in their belief, and would not prove their re- 
nunciation of it by acknowledging the heathen 
religion. This was Trajan's rule, and we have 
no reason for supposing that Hadrian granted 
more to the Christians than Trajan did. There 
is also printed at the end of Justin's first Apol- 
ogy a rescript of Antoninus Pius to the Com- 
mune of (to kolvov T?jg 'Aoiao), and it is also in 
Eusebius (E. H. iv. 13). The date of the re- 
script is the third consulship of Antoninus 
Pius.* The rescript declares that the Chris- 

* Eusebius (K. H. iv. 12), after giving the beginning 
of Justinus* first Apology, which contains the address 



3o ^Biographical Sketcb, 

tians — for they are meant, though the name 
Christians does not occur in the rescript — were 
not to be disturbed unless they were attempt- 
ing something against the Roman rule ; and 
no man was to be punished simply for being a 
Christian. But this rescript is spurious. Any - 
man moderately acquainted with Roman his- 
tory will see by the style and tenor that it is a 
clumsy forgery. 

In the time of M. Antoninus the opposition 
between the old and the new belief was still 

to T. Antoninus and his two adopted sons, adds: 
44 The same emperor being addressed by other breth- 
ren in Asia, honored the Commune of Asia with the 
following rescript." This rescript, which is in the 
next chapter of Eusebius (E. H. iv. 13) is in the sole 
name of Caesar Marcus Aurelius Antoninus Augustus 
Armeuius, though Eusebius had just before said that 
he was going to give us a rescript of Antoninus Pius. 
There are some material variations between the two 
copies of the rescript besides the difference in the 
title, which difference makes it impossible to say 
whether the forger intended to assign this rescript to 
Pius or to M. Antoninus. 

The author of the Alexandrine Chronicum says that 
Marcus, being moved by the entreaties of Melito and 
other heads of the church, wrote an Epistle to the 
Commune of Asia in which he forbade the Christians 
to be troubled on account of their religion. Valesius 
supposes this to be the letter or rescript which is con- 
tained in Eusebius (iv. 13), and to be the answer to 
the Apology of Melito, of which I shall soon give the 
substance. But Marcus certainly did not write this 
letter which is in Eusebius, and we know not what 
answer he made to Melito. 



dlbarcus Burelfus Bntonfnue* 31 

stronger, and the adherents of the heathen 
religion urged those in authority to a more 
regular resistance to the invasions of the Chris- 
tian faith. Melito in his Apology to M. 
Antoninus represents the Christians of Asia as 
persecuted under new imperial orders. Shame- 
less informers, he says, men who were greedy 
after the property of others, used these orders 
as a means of robbing those who were doing 
no harm. He doubts if a just emperor could 
have ordered anything so unjust; and if the 
last order was really not from the emperor, the 
Christians entreat him not to give them up to 
their enemies.* We conclude from this that 

*Eusebius, iv. 26; and Routh's Reliquiae Sacrae, 
vol. 1, and the notes. The interpretation of this Frag- 
ment is not easy. Mosheim misunderstood one pas- 
sage so far as to affirm that Marcus promised rewards 
to those who denounced the Christians ; an interpre- 
tation which is entirely false. Melito calls the Chris- 
tian religion "our philosophy," which began among 
barbarians (the Jews), and flourished among the 
Roman subjects in the time of Augustus, to the great 
advantage of the empire, for from that time the power 
of the Romans grew great and glorious. He says 
that the emperor has and will have as the successor 
to Augustus' power the good wishes of men, if he will 
protect that philosophy which grew up with the em 
pire and began with Augustus, which philosophy the 
predecessors of Antoninus honored in addition to the 
other religions. He further says that the Christian 
religion had suffered no harm since the time of Au- 
gustus, but on the contrary had enjoyed all honor and 
respect that any man could desire. Nero and Domi- 



32 asioerapbical Sketcb. 

there were at least imperial rescripts or consti- 
tutions of M. Antoninus which were made the 
foundation of these persecutions. The fact of 
being a Christian was now a crime and pun- 
ished, unless the accused denied their religion. 
Then come the persecutions at Smyrna, which 
some modern critics place in A. d. 167, ten 

tian, he says, were alone persuaded by some malicious 
men to calumniate the Christian religion, and this 
was the origin of the false charges against the Chris- 
tians. But this was corrected by the emperors who 
immediately preceded Antoninus, who often by their 
rescripts reproved those who attempted to trouble the 
Christians. Hadrian, Antoninus' grandfather, wrote 
to many, and among them to Fundanus, the governor 
of Asia. Antoninus Pius, when Marcus was asso- 
ciated with him in the empire, wrote to the cities that 
they must not trouble the Christians ; among others, 
to the people of Larissa, Thessalonica, the Athenians, 
and all the Greeks. Melito concluded thus: "We 
are persuaded that thou who hast about these things 
the same mind that they had, nay rather one much 
more humane and philosophical, wilt do all that we 
ask thee." — This Apology was written after a. d. 169, 
the year in which Verus died, for it speaks of Marcus 
only and his son Commodus. According to Melito's 
testimony, Christians had only been punished for 
their religion in the time of Nero and Domitian, and 
the persecutions began again in the time of M. 
Antoninus, and were founded on his orders, which 
were abused, as he seems to mean. He distinctly 
affirms "that the race of the godly is now persecuted 
and harassed by fresh imperial orders in Asia, a thing 
which had never happened before." But we know 
that all this is not true, and that Christians had been 
punished in Trajan's time. 



dSarcus HureHus Hntonfftus, 33 

years before the persecution of Lyon. The 
governors of the provinces under M. Antoni- 
nus might have found enough even in Trajan's 
rescript to warrant them in punishing Chris- 
tians, and the fanaticism of the people would 
drive them to persecution, even if they were 
unwilling. But besides the fact of the Chris- 
tians rejecting all the heathen ceremonies, we 
must not forget that they plainly maintain that 
all the heathen religions were false. The 
Christians thus declared war against the hea- 
then rites, and it is hardly necessary to observe 
that this was a declaration of hostility against 
the Roman government, which tolerated all the 
various forms of superstition that existed in 
the empire, and could not consistently tolerate 
another religion, which declared that all the 
rest were false and all the splendid ceremonies 
of the empire only a worship of devils. 

If we had a true ecclesiastical history, we 
should know how the Roman emperors at- 
tempted to check the new religion; how they 
enforced their principle of finally punishing 
Christians, simply as Christians, which Justin 
in his Apology affirms that they did, and I 
have no doubt that he tells the truth; how far 
popular clamor and riots went in this matter, 
and how far many fanatical and ignorant Chris- 
tians — for there were many such — contributed 
to excite the fanaticism on the other side and 
to embitter the quarrel between the Roman 
government and the new religion. Our extant 
3 



34 $fO0tapbfcal Sftetcb. 

ecclesiastical histories are manifestly falsified, 
and what truth they contain is grossly exag- 
gerated; but the fact is certain that in the time 
of M. Antoninus the heathen populations were 
in open hostility to the Christians, and that 
under Antoninus' rule men were put to death 
because they were Christians. Eusebius, in 
the preface to his fifth book, remarks that in 
the seventeenth year of Antoninus' reign, in 
some parts of the world, the persecution of the 
Christians became more violent, and that it 
proceeded from the populace in the cities; and 
he adds, in his usual style of exaggeration, that 
we may infer from what took place in a single 
nation that myriads of martyrs were made in 
the habitable earth. The nation which he 
alludes to is Gallia; and he then proceeds to 
give the letter of the churches of Vienna and 
Lugdunum. It is probable that he has assiged 
the true cause of the persecutions, the fanati- 
cism of the populace, and that both governors 
and emperor had a great deal of trouble with 
these disturbances. How far Marcus was cog- 
nizant of these cruel proceedings we do not 
know, for the historical records of his reign are 
very defective. He did not make the rule 
against the Christians, for Trajan did that; and 
if we admit that he would have been willing 
to let the Christians alone, we cannot affirm 
that it was in his power, for it would be a great 
mistake to suppose that Antoninus had the un- 
limited authority which some modern sove-- 



Marcus Burelius Antoninus* 



35 



reigns have had. His power was limited by 
certain constitutional forms, by the Senate, and 
by the precedents of his predecessors. We 
cannot admit that such a man was an active 
persecutor, for there is no evidence that he 
was,* though it is certain that he had no good 
opinion of the Christians, as appears from his 
own words. f But he knew nothing of them 

*Kxcept that of Orosius (vii. 15), who says that 
during the Parthian war there w T ere grievous perse- 
cutions of the Christians in Asia and Gallia under the 
orders of Marcus (praecepto ejus), and "many were 
crowned with the martyrdom of saints." 

f See xi. 3. The emperor probably speaks of such 
fanatics as Clemens (quoted by Gataker on this pas- 
sage) mentions. The rational Christians admitted no 
fellowship with them. "Some of these heretics," 
says Clemens, " show their impiety and cowardice by 
loving their lives, saying that the knowledge of the 
really existing God is true testimony (martyrdom), 
but that a man is a self-murderer who bears witness 
by his death. We also blame those who rush t<\ 
death; for there are some, not of us, but only bearing 
the same name, who give themselves up. We say of 
them that they die without being martyrs, even if they 
are publicly punished; and they give themselves up 
to a death which avails nothing, as the Indian Gym- 
nosophists give themselves up foolishly to fire.' , 
Cave, in his primitive Christianity (ii. c. 7), says of 
the Christians: "They did flock to the place of tor- 
ment faster than droves of beasts that are driven to 
the shambles. They even longed to be in the arms 
of suffering. Ignatius, though then in his journey to 
Rome in order to his execution, yet by the way as lie 
went could not but vent his passionate desire of i* 



36 asiograpbical Sftetcb, 

except their hostility to the Roman religion, 
and he probably thought that they were dan- 
gerous to the state, notwithstanding the pro- 
fessions, false or true, of some of the Apologists, 
So much I have said, because it would be un- 
fair not to state all that can be urged against 
a man whom his contemporaries and subse- 
quent ages venerated as a model of virtue and 
benevolence. If I admitted the genuineness of 
some documents, he would be altogether clear 
from the charge of even allowing any persecu- 
tions; but as I seek the truth and am sure that 
they are false, I leave him to bear whatever 
blame is his due.* I add that it is quite cer- 
tain that Antoninus did not derive any of his 

1 Ob that I might come to those wild beasts that are 
prepared for me; I heartily wish that I may presently 
meet with them; I would invite and encourage them 
speedily to devour me, and not be afraid to set upon 
me as they have been to others; nay, should they re- 
fuse it, I would even force them to it;' " and more to 
the same purpose from Busebius. Cave, an honest 
and good man, says all this in praise of the Christians; 
but I think that he mistook the matter. We admire 
a man who holds to his principles even to death; but 
these fanatical Christians are the Gymnosophists 
whom Clemens treats with disdain. 

*Dr. F. C. Baur, in his work entitled "Das 
Christen thum und die Christliche Kirch e der drei 
ersten Jahrhunderte, " &c, has examined this ques- 
tion with great good sense and fairness, and I believe 
he has stated the truth as near as our authorities en- 
able us to reacli it. 



fllbarcus Burelius Bntoninus* 37 

ethical principles from a religion of which he 
knew nothing.* 

There is no doubt that the Emperor's Re- 
flections — or his Meditations, as they are gen- 
erally named — is a genuine work. In the first 
book he speaks of himself, his family, and his 
teachers; and in other books he mentions him- 
self. Suidas (v. MdpKog) notices a work of 
Antoninus in twelve books, which he names 
the "conduct of his own life;" and he cites 
the book under several words in his Dictionary, 
giving the emperor's name, but not the title 
of the work. There are also passages cited by 
Suidas from Antoninus without mention of the 
emperor's name. The true title of the work is 
unknown. Xy lander, who published the first 
edition of this book (Zurich, 1558. 8vo, with a 
Latin version), used a manuscript which con- 
tained the twelve books, but it is not known 
where the manuscript is now. The only other 
complete manuscript which is known to exist 
is in the Vatican library, but it has no title 
and 110 inscriptions of the several books: the 
eleventh only has the inscription, Mapnov avroKpa- 
ropoQ marked with an asterisk. The other 
Vatican manuscripts and the three Florentine 
contain only excerpts from the emperor's book. 

* In the Digest, 48, 19, 30, there is the following ex- 
cerpt from Modestinus: " Si quis aliquid fecerit, quo 
leves hominuin animi superstitione numinis terreren- 
tur, divus Marcus hujusmodi homines in insulam re- 
legari rescripsit. ' ' 



38 rfBfoflrapbfcal Sftetcb* 

Ail the titles of the excerpts nearly agree with 
that which Xylander prefixed to his edition, 

Mapnov 'Avruvivov AvroKparopog ruv elg eavrbv fiifikia i(5. 

This title has been used by all subsequent 
editors. We cannot tell whether Antoninus 
divided his work into books or somebody else 
did it. If the inscriptions at the end of the 
first and second books are genuine, he may 
have made the division himself. 

It is plain that the emperor wrote down his 
thoughts or reflections as the occasions arose; 
and since they were intended for his own use, 
it is no improbable conjecture that he left a 
complete copy behind him written with his 
own hand; for it is not likely that so diligent 
a man would use the labor of a transcriber for 
such a purpose, and expose his most secret 
thoughts to any other eye. He may have also 
intended the book for his son Commodus, who 
however had no taste for his father's philos- 
ophy. Some careful hand preserved the 
precious volume; and a work by Antoninus is 
mentioned by other late writers besides Suidas. 

Many critics have labored on the text of 
Antoninus. The most complete edition is that 
by Thomas Gataker, 1652, 4to. The second 
edition of Gataker was superintended by George 
Stanhope, 1697, 4*°- There is also an edition 
of 1704. Gataker made and suggested many 
good corrections, and he also made a new 
Latin version, which is not a very good speci- 
men of Latin, but it generally expresses the 



Marcus Burelius Bntoninus* 39 

sense of the original, and often better than 
some of the more recent translations. He 
added in the margin opposite to each para- 
graph references to the other parallel passages; 
and he wrote a commentary, one of the most 
complete that has been written on any ancient 
author. This commentary contains the editor's 
exposition of the more difficult passages, and 
quotations from all the Greek and Roman 
writers for the illustration of the text. It is a 
wonderful monument of learning and labor, 
and certainly no Englishman has yet done 
anything like it. At the end of his preface 
the editor says that he wrote it at Rotherhithe 
near London, in a severe winter, when he was 
in the seventy-eighth year of his age, 1651 — a 
time when Milton, Selden, and other great 
men of the Commonwealth time were living; 
and the great French scholar Saumaise (Salma- 
sius), with w T hom Ga taker corresponded and 
received help from him for his edition of An- 
toninus. The Greek test has also been edited 
by J. M. Schultz, Leipzig, 1802, 8vo; and by 
the learned Greek Adamantinus Corais, Paris, 
1816, 8vo. The text of Schultz was repub- 
lished by Tauchnitz, 1821. 

There are English, German, French, Italian, 
and Spanish translations of M. Antoninus, and 
there may be others. I have not seen all the 
English translations. There is one by Jeremy 
Collier, 1702, 8vo, a most coarse and vulgar 
copy of the original. The latest French trans- 



40 astoflrapbtcal Sfeetcb* 

lation by Alexis Pierron in the collection of 
Charpentier is better than Dacier's, which has 
been honored with an Italian version (Udine, 
1772). There is an Italian version (1675), 
f which I have not seen. It is by a cardinal. 
" A man illustrious in the church, the Cardinal 
Francis Barberini the elder, nephew of Pope 
Urban VIII., occupied the last years of his life 
in translating into his native language the 
thoughts of the Roman emperor, in order to 
diffuse among the faithful the fertilizing and 
vivifying seeds. He dedicated this translation 
to his soul, to make it, as he says in his ener- 
getic style, redder than his purple at the sight 
of the virtues of this Gentile " (Pierron, 
Preface). 

I have made this translation at intervals 
after having used the book for many years. It 
is made from the Greek, but I have not always 
followed one text; and I have occasionally 
compared other versions with my own. I made 
this translation for my own use, because I 
found that it was worth the labor; but it may 
be useful to others also; and therefore I deter- 
mined to print it. As the original is some- 
times very difficult to understand and still 
more difficult to translate, it is not possible 
that I have always avoided error. But I be- 
lieve that I have not often missed the meaning, 
and those who will take the trouble to compare 
the translation with the original should not 
hastily conclude that I am wrong, if they do 



flfcarcus Surelius Bntoninus* 41 

not agree with me. Some passages do give the 
meaning, though at first sight they may not 
appear to do so; and when I differ from the 
translators, I think that in some places they 
are wrong, and in other places I am sure that 
they are. I have placed in some passages a +, 
which indicates corruption in the text or great 
uncertainty in the meaning. I could have 
made the language more easy and flowing, but 
I have preferred a ruder style as being better 
suited to express the character of the original; 
and sometimes the obscurity which may ap- 
pear in the version is a fair copy of the obscur- 
ity of the Greek. If I should ever revise this 
version, I would gladly make use of any cor- 
rections which may be suggested. I have 
added an index of some of the Greek terms 
with the corresponding English. If I have 
not given the best words for the Greek, I have 
done the best that I could; and in the text I 
have always given the same translation of the 
same word. 

The last reflection of the Stoic philosophy 
that I have observed is in Simplicius' Com- 
mentary on the Enchiridion of Epictetus. 
Simplicius was not a Christian, and such a man 
was not likely to be converted at a time when 
Christianity was grossly corrupted. But he 
was a really religious man, and he concludes 
his commentary with a prayer to the Deity 
which no Christian could improve. From the 
time of Zeno to Simplicius, a period of about 



42 JBloflrapbical Sfcetcb* 

nine hundred years, the Stoic philosophy 
formed the characters of some of the best and 
greatest men. Finally it became extinct, and 
we hear no more of it till the revival of letters 
in Italy. Angelo Poliziano met with two very 
inaccurate and incomplete manuscripts of 
Epictetus' Enchiridion, which he translated 
into Latin and dedicated to his great patron 
Lorenzo de' Medici, in whose collection he had 
found the book. Poliziano's version was 
printed in the first Bale edition of the Enchir- 
idion, A. d. 1531 (apud And. Cratandrum). 
Poliziano recommends the Enchiridion to 
Lorenzo as a work well suited to his temper, 
and useful in the difficulties by which he was 
surrounded. 

Epictetus and Antoninus have had readers 
ever since they were first printed. The little 
book of Antoninus has been the companion of 
some great men. Machiavelli's Art of War 
and Marcus Antoninus were the two books 
which were used when he was a young man by 
Captain John Smith, and he could not have 
found two writers better fitted to form the char- 
acter of a soldier and a man. Smith is almost 
unknown and forgotten in England, his native 
country, but not in America, where he saved 
the young colony of Virginia. He was great 
in his heroic mind and his deeds in arms, but 
greater still in the nobleness of his character. 
For a man's greatness lies not in wealth and 
station, as the vulgar believe, nor yet in his 



dfcarcus aurelius Bntontnus* 



43 



intellectual capacity, which is often associated 
with the meanest moral character, the most ab- 
ject servility to those in high places, and arro- 
gance to the poor and lowly; but a man's true 
greatness lies in the consciousness of an honest 
purpose in life, founded on a just estimate of 
himself and everything else, on frequent self- 
examination, and a steady obedience to the rule 
which he knows to be right, without troubling 
himself, as the emperor says he should not, 
about what others may think or say, or whether 
they do or do not do that which he thinks and 
says and does. 



THE PHILOSOPHY 



OF 



MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 



THE PHILOSOPHY 

OF 

MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 



IT has been said that the Stoic philosophy 
first showed its real value when it passed 
from Greece to Rome. The doctrines of Zeno 
and his successors were well suited to the grav- 
ity and practical good sense of the Romans; 
and even in the Republican period we have an 
example of a man, M. Cato Uticensis, who 
lived the life of a Stoic and died consistently 
with the opinions which he professed. He was 
a man, says Cicero, who embraced the Stoic 
philosophy from conviction; not for the purpose 
of vain discussion, as most did, but in order to 
make his life conformable to the Stoic precepts. 
In the wretched times from the death of 
Augustus to the murder of Domitian, there 
was nothing but the Stoic philosophy which 
could console and support the followers of the 
old religion under imperial tyranny and amidst 
universal corruption There were even then 
(47) 



48 IPbllosopbg* 



noble minds that could dare and endure, 
sustained by a good conscience and an elevated 
idea of the purposes of man's existence. Such 
were Paetus Thrasae, Helvidius Priscus, Cor- 
nutus, C. Musonius Rufus,* and the poets 
Persius and Juvenal, whose energetic language 
and manly thoughts may be as instructive to 
us now as they might have been to their con- 
temporaries. Persius died under Nero's bloody 
reign; but Juvenal had the good fortune to 
survive the tyrant Domitian and to see the 
better times of Nerva, Trajan, and Hadrian.f 
His best precepts are derived from the Stoic 
school, and they are enforced in his finest verses 
by the unrivalled vigor of the Latin language. 
The best two expounders of the later Stoical 
philosophy were a Greek slave and a Roman 
emperor. Epictetus, a Phrygian Greek, was 

* I have omitted Seneca, Nero's preceptor. He was 
in a sense a Stoic, and he has said many good things 
in a very fine way. There is a judgment of Gellius 
(xii. 2.) on Seneca, or rather a statement of what 
some people thought of his philosophy, and it is not 
favorable. His writings and his life must be taken 
together, and I have nothing more to say of him here. 
The reader will find a notice of Seneca and his phil- 
osophy in " Seekers after God," by the Rev. F. W. 
Farrar. Macmillan and Co. 

t Ribbeck has labored to prove that those Satires, 
which contain philosophical precepts, are not the 
work of the real, but of a false Juvenal, a Declamator. 
Still the verses exist, and were written by somebody 
who was acquainted with the Stoic doctrines. 



/Batcus aurelfus antonfntia* 49 

brought to Rome, we know not how, but he 
was there the slave and afterwards the freed- 
man of an unworthy master, Epaphroditus 
by name, himself a freedman and a favorite 
of Nero. Epictetus may have been a hearer 
of C. Musonius Rufus, while he was still a 
slave, but he could hardly have been a teacher 
before he was made free. He was one of the 
philosophers whom Domitian's order banished 
from Rome. He retired .to Nicopolis in Epi- 
rus, and he may have died there. Like other 
great teachers he wrote nothing, and we are 
indebted to his grateful pupil Arrian for what 
we have of Epictetus' discourses. Arrian wrote 
eight books of the discourses of Epictetus, of 
which only four remain and some fragments. 
We have also from Arrian' s hand the small 
Enchiridion or Manual of the chief precepts of 
Epictetus. This is a valuable commentary on 
the Enchiridion by Simplicius, who lived in 
the time of the emperor Justinian.* 

Antoninus in his first book (i. 7), in which 
he gratefully commemorates his obligations to 
his teachers, says that he was made acquainted 
by Junius Rusticus with the discourses of 
Epictetus, whom he mentions also in other 
passages (iv. 41; xi. 34, 36). Indeed, the doc- 
trines of Epictetus and Antoninus are the same, 

* There is a complete edition of Arrian's Bpictetus 
with the commentary of Simplicius by J. Schweig- 
haeuser, 6 vols. 8vo. 1799, 1800. There is also an 
English translation of Bpictetus b}' Mrs. Carter. 

4 



50 IPbflosopbg. 



and Epictetus is the best authority for the ex- 
planation of the philosophical language of An- 
toninus and the exposition of his opinions. 
But the method of the two philosophers is en- 
tirely different. Epictetus addressed himself 
to his hearers in a continuous discourse and in 
a familiar and simple manner. Antoninus 
wrote down his reflections for his own use 
only, in short, unconnected paragraphs, which 
are often obscure. 

The Stoics made three divisions of philoso- 
phy, — Physic ($vclk6v), Ethic (i?diK6v), and Logic 
(loyiK6v) (viii. 13). This division, we are told 
by Diogenes, was made by Zeno of Citium, 
the founder of the Stoic sect, and by Chrysip- 
pus; but these philosophers placed the three 
divisions in the following order, — Logic, 
Physic, Ethic. It appears, however, that this 
division was made before Zeno's time, and ac- 
knowledged by Plato, as Cicero remarks (Acad. 
Post. i. 5). Logic is not synonymous with 
our term Logic in the narrower sense of that 
word. 

Cleanthes, a Stoic, subdivided the three di- 
visions, and made six, — Dialectic and Rhet- 
oric, comprised in Logic ; Ethic and Politic ; 
Physic and Theology. This division was 
merely for practical use, for all Philosophy is 
one. Even among the earliest Stoics Logic, or 
Dialectic, does not occupy the same place as in 
Plato: it is considered only as an instrument 
which is to be used for the other divisions of 



dfoarcus Burelius Bntontnus* 



5i 



Philosophy. An exposition of the earlier 
Stoic doctrines and of their modifications would 
require a volume. My object is to explain 
only the opinions of Antoninus, so far as they 
can be collected from his book. 

According to the subdivision of Cleanthes, 
Physic and Theology go together, or the study 
of the nature of Things, and the study of the 
nature of the Deit}% so far as man can under- 
stand the Deity, and of his government of the 
universe. This division or subdivision is not 
formally adopted by Antoninus, for, as already 
observed, there is no method in his book ; but 
it is virtually contained in it. 

Cleanthes also connects Ethic and Politic, or 
the study of the principles of morals and the 
study of the constitution of civil society; and 
undoubtedly he did well in subdividing Ethic 
into two parts, Ethic in the narrower sense and 
Politic; for though the two are intimately con- 
nected, they are also very distinct, and many 
questions can only be properly discussed by 
carefully observing the distinction. Antoninus 
does not treat of Politic. His subject is Ethic, 
and Ethic in its practical application to his 
own conduct in life as a man and as a gover- 
nor. His Ethic is founded on his doctrines 
about man's nature, the Universal Nature, and 
the relation of every man to everything else. 
It is therefore intimately and inseparably con- 
nected with Physic, or the Nature of Things, 
and with Theology, or the Nature of the Deity. 



52 iPbflosopbE* 



He advises us to examine well all the impres- 
sions on our minds (^avraalai) and to form a 
right judgment of them, to make just conclu- 
sions, and to inquire into the meanings of 
words, and so far to apply Dialectic; but he 
has no attempt at any exposition of Dialectic, 
and his philosophy is in substance purely 
moral and practical. He says (viii. 13), 
<k Constantly and, if it be possible, on the oc- 
casion of every impression on the soul,* apply 
to it the principles of Physic, of Ethic, and of 
Dialectic:" which is only another way of tell- 
ing us to examine the impression in every pos- 
sible way. In another passage (iii. 11) he 
says, "To the aids which have been men- 
tioned, let this one still be added: make for 
thyself a definition or description of the object 
(to (pavraorov) which is presented to thee, so as 
to see distinctly what kind of a thing it is in 
its substance, in its nudity, in its complete en- 
tirety, and tell thyself its proper name, and the 
names of the things of which it has been com- 

* The original is eirl irdcr^g (pavTaeiac We have no 
word which expresses (pavraaia, for it is not only the 
sensuous appearance w 7 hich conies from an external 
object, which object is called to (pavTaoTov, but it is 
also the thought or feeling or opinion which is pro- 
duced even when there is no corresponding external 
object before us. Accordingly everything which 
moves the soul is <P(ivtclot6v, and produces a (pavTaaia. 

In this extract Antoninus says <pvaio?ioyelv y iradoXoyelv, 
()i(L'/xKTiKtv£oO(u. I have translated nadoXoyelv by using 
the word Moral (Ethic), and that is the meaning here. 



Marcus Burelius Bntonfnus, 



53 



pounded, and into which it will be resolved." 
Such an examination implies a use of Dialectic, 
which Antoninus accordingly employed as a 
means toward establishing his Physical, Theo- 
logical, and Ethical principles. 

There are several expositions of the Physical, 
Theological, and Ethical principles, which are 
contained in the work of Antoninus; and more 
expositions than I have read. Ritter (Ge- 
schichte der Philosophie, iv. 241), after explain- 
ing the doctrines of Epictetus, treats very 
briefly and insufficiently those of Antoninus. 
But he refers to a short essay, in which the 
work is done better.* There is also an essay 
on the Philosophical Principles of M. Aurelius 
Antoninus by J. M. Schultz, placed at the end 
of his German translation of Antoninus (Schles- 
wig, 1799). With the assistance of these two 
useful essays and his own diligent study, a man 
may form a sufficient notion of the principles 
of Antoninus; but he will find it more difficult 
to expound them to others. Besides the want 
of arrangement in the original and of connec- 
tion among the numerous paragraphs, the 
corruption of the text, the obscurity of the lan- 
guage and the style, and sometimes perhaps 
the confusion in the writer's own ideas — besides 
all this, there is occasionally an apparent con- 

* De Marco Aurelio Antonino ... ex ipsius Com- 
mentariis. Scriptio Philologica. Instituit Nicolaus 
Bachius, Lipsiae, 1826. 



54 IPbftosopbs. 

tradiction in the emperor's thoughts, as if his 
principles were sometimes unsettled, as if doubt 
sometimes clouded his mind. A man who leads 
a life of tranquillity and reflection, who is not 
disturbed at home and meddles not with the 
affairs of the world, may keep his mind at ease 
and his thoughts in one even course. But 
such a man has not been tried. All his Ethical 
philosophy and his passive virtue might turn 
out to be idle words, if he were once exposed 
to the rude realities of human existence. Fine 
thoughts and moral dissertations from men who 
have not worked and suffered may be read, 
but they will be forgotten. No religion, no 
Ethical philosophy is worth anything, if the 
teacher has not lived the " life of an apostle," 
and been ready to die " the death of a martyr." 
''Not in passivity (the passive effects) but in 
activity lie the evil and the good of the rational 
social animal, just as his virtue and his vice lie 
not in passivity, but in activity" (ix. 16). The 
emperor Antoninus was a practical moralist. 
From his youth he followed a laborious disci- 
pline, and though his high station placed him 
above all want or the fear of it, he lived as fru- 
gally and temperately as the poorest philospher. 
Epictetns wanted little, and it seems that he 
always had the little that he wanted and he 
was content with it, as he had been with 
his servile station! But Antoninus after his 
accession to the empire sat on an uneasy 
seat. He had the administration of an em- 



/Ifcarcus Burelius Bntonfnus* 55 

pire which extended from the Euphrates to 
the Atlantic, from the cold mountains of Scot- 
land to the hot sands of Africa; and we may 
imagine, though we cannot know it by expe- 
rience, what must be the trials, the troubles, 
the anxiety, and the sorrows of him who has 
the world's business on his hands, with the 
wish to do the best that he can, and the cer- 
tain knowledge that he can do very little of 
the good which he wishes. 

In the midst of war, pestilence, conspiracy, 
general corruption, and with the weight of so 
unwieldy an empire upon him, we may easily 
comprehend that Antoninus often had need of 
all his fortitude to support him. The best and 
the bravest men have moments of doubt and 
of weakness; but if they are the best and the 
bravest, they rise again from their depression 
by recurring to first principles, as Antoninus 
does. The emperor says that life is smoke, a 
vapor, and St. James in his Epistle is of the 
same mind; that the world is full of envious, 
jealous, malignant people, and a man might 
be well content to get out of it. He has 
doubts perhaps sometimes even about that to 
which he holds most firmly. There are only 
a few passages of this kind, but they are evi- 
dence of the struggles which even the noblest 
of the sons of men had to maintain against the 
hard realities of his daily life. A poor remark 
it is which I have seen somewhere, and made 
m a disparaging way, that the emperor's re- 



56 Pbilo0opb£* 



flections show that he had need of consolation 
and comfort in life, and even to prepare him to 
meet his death. True that he did need comfort 
and support, and we see how he found it. He 
constantly recurs to his fundamental principle 
that the universe is wisely ordered, that every 
man is a part of it and must conform to that 
order which he cannot change, that whatever 
the Deity has done is good, that all mankind 
are a man's brethren, that he must love and 
cherish them and try to make them better, 
even those who would do him harm. This is 
his conclusion (ii. 17): "What then is that 
which is able to conduct a man? One thing 
and only one, Philosophy. But this consists 
in keeping the divinity within a man free from 
violence and unharmed, superior to pains and 
pleasures, doing nothing without a purpose 
nor yet falsely and with hypocrisy, not feeling 
the need of another man's doing or not doing 
anything; and besides, accepting all that hap- 
pens and all that is allotted, as coming from 
thence, wherever it is, from whence he himself 
came; and finally waiting for death with a 
cheerful mind as being nothing else than a dis- 
solution of the elements of which every living 
being is compounded. But if there is no harm 
to the elements themselves in each continually 
changing into another, why should a man 
have any apprehension about the change and 
dissolution of all the elements [himself] ? for it 
is according to nature; and nothing is evil that 
is according to nature.' ' 



Tlftarcus Burelius Bntoninus* 57 

The Physic of Antoninus is the knowledge 
of the Nature of the Universe, of its govern- 
ment, and of the relation of man's nature to 
both. He names the universe (y t&v bhw ovcla, 
vi. 1),* "the universal substance," and he 
adds that ' ■ reason ' ' (Uyog) governs the uni- 
verse. He also (vi. 9) uses the terms " uni- 
versal nature" or "nature of the universe." 
He (vi. 25) calls the universe " the one and all, 
which we name Cosmos or Order" (udo/iog). 
If he ever seems to use these general terms as 
significant of the All, of all that man can in 
any way conceive to exist, he still on other oc- 
casions plainly distinguishes between Matter, 

* As to the word ovoia, the reader may see the Index. 
I add here a few examples of the use of the word ; 
Antoninus has (v. 24), rj avfitraaa ovoia, "the universal 
substance." He says (xii. 30 and iv. 40), " there is 
one common substance" (ovola), distributed among 
countless bodies. In Stobaeus (torn. 1. lib. 1, tit. 14) 
there is this definition, ovoiav 6e §clglv tcjv ovtcov aizavrtdv 
ttjv TTpcdrrjv v7i7]v. In viii. 11, Antoninus speaks of to 
ovoi&det; kcu vIlkov, " the substantial and the material ; " 
and (vii. 10) he says that ' ' everything material ' ' 
(evvlov) disappears in the substance of the whole (r§ 
tcjv oXcjv ovoia). The ovaia is the generic name of that 
existence which we assume as the highest or ultimate, 
because we conceive no existence which can be co- 
ordinated with it and none above it. It is the phil- 
osopher's " substance : " it is the ultimate expression 
. for that which we conceive or suppose to be the basis, 
the being of a thing. "From the Divine, which is 
substance in itself, or the only and sole substance, all 
and everything that is created exists ' ' (Swedenborg, 
Angelic Wisdom, 198). 



5 8 IPbflosopbE* 



Material things ({ft?, 17uk6v), and Cause, Origin, 
Reason (cur(a, alri&dec, 16yoq)* This is conform- 
able to Zeno's doctrine that there are two orig- 
inal principles (apxai) of all things, that which 
acts (to tzoiovv) and that which is acted upon (jb 
ttclgxov). That which is acted on is the form- 
less matter ({ft?) : that which acts is the reason 
(Uyog), God, who is eternal and operates 

* I remark, In order to anticipate any misappre- 
hension, that all these general terms involve a contra- 
diction. _ The " one and all," and the like, and "the 
whole, ' ' imply limitation. ' ' One ' ' is limited; ' ' all ' ' is 
limited; the "whole" is limited. We cannot help it. 
We cannot find words to express that which we cannot 
fully conceive. The addition of " absolute " or any 
other such word does not mend the matter. Even the 
word God is used b} T most people, often unconsciously, 
in such a way that limitation is implied, and yet at the 
same time words are added which are intended to deny 
limitation. A Christian martyr, when he was asked 
what God was, is said to have answered that God has 
no name like a man; and Justin says the same (Apol. 
ii. 6), "the names Father, God, Creator, L/ord, and 
Master are not names, but appellations derived from 
benefactions and acts." (Compare Seneca, De Benef. 
iv. 8.) We can conceive the existence of a thing, or 
rather we may have the idea of an existence, without 
an adequate notion of it, "adequate" meaning co- 
extensive and coequal with the thing. We have a 
notion of limited space derived from the dimensions 
of what we call a material thing, though of 9pace ab- 
solute, if I may use the term, we have no notion at 
all; and of infinite space the notion is the same — no 
notion at all; and yet we conceive it in a sense, 
though 1 know not how, and we believe that space is 
infinite, and we cannot conceive it to be finite. 



Marcus Bureltus Sntonfnus* 59 

through all matter, and produces all things. 
So Antoninus (v. 32) speaks of the reason 
(jidyog) which pervades all substance (ovala); and 
through all time by fixed periods (revolutions) 
administers the universe (to nav). God is eter- 
nal, and Matter is eternal. It is God who 
gives form to matter, but he is not said to have 
created matter. According to this view, which 
is as old as Anaxagoras, God and matter exist 
independently, but God governs matter. This 
doctrine is simply the expression of the fact of 
the existence both of matter and of God. The 
Stoics did not perplex themselves with the in- 
soluble question of the origin and nature of 
matter.* Antoninus also assumes a beginning 

* The notions of matter and of space are insepar- 
able. We derive the notion of space from matter and 
form. But we have no adequate conception either of 
matter or space. Matter in its ultimate resolution is 
as unintelligible as what men call mind, spirit, or by 
whatever other name they may express the power 
which makes itself known by acts. Anaxagoras laid 
down the distinction between intelligence [vovg) and 
matter, and he said that intelligence impressed motion 
on matter, and so separated the elements of matter 
and gave them order; but he probably only assumed 
a beginning, as Simplicius says, as a foundation of 
his philosophical teaching. Empedocles said, "The 
universe always existed." He had no idea of what is 
called creation. Ocellus Xyucanus (i, $ 2) maintained 
that the Universe (to nav) was imperishable and un- 
created. Consequently it is eternal. He admitted 
the existence of God; but his theology would require 
some discussion. On the' contrary, the Brachmans, 



6o IPbilosopbE* 



of things, as we now know them; but his lan- 
guage is sometimes very obscure. I have en- 
deavored to explain the meaning of one difficult 
passage (vii. 75, and the note). 

Matter consists of elemental parts (vTOLxeia) 
of which all material objects are made. But 
nothing is permanent in form. The nature of 
the universe, according to Antoninus' expres- 
sion (iv. 36), " loves nothing so much as to 
change the things which are, and to make new 
things like them. For everything that exists 
is in a manner the seed of that which will be. 
But thou art thinking only of seeds which are 
cast into the earth or into a womb : but this is 
a very vulgar notion." All things then are in 
a constant flux and change; some things are 
iissolved into the elements, others come in 
their places ; and so the ' ' whole universe con- 
tinues ever young and perfect" (xii. 23). 

Antoninus has some obscure expressions 
about what he calls ' ' seminal principles ' ' (Wep- 
fianKol Uyot) . He opposes them to the Epicu- 
rean atoms (vi. 24), and consequently his 

according to Strabo (p. 713, ed. Cas.), taught that the 
universe was created and perishable; and the creator 
and administrator of it pervades the whole. The 
author of the book of Solomon's Wisdom says (xi. 
17) : " Thy Almighty hand made -the world of matter 
without form," which may mean that matter existed 
already. 

The common Greek word which we translate 
" matter " is vlrj. It is th^ stuff that things are made 
of. 



flfoarcus Surelfus Bntonfnus* 61 

€i seminal principles' ' are not material atoms 
which wander about at hazard, and combine 
nobody knows how. In one passage (iv. 21) 
he speaks of living principles, souls ($vxat) 
after the dissolution of their bodies being re- 
ceived into the " seminal principle of the uni- 
verse." Schultz thinks that by "seminal 
principles Antoninus means the relations of the 
various elemental principles, which relations 
are determined by the Deity and by which 
alone the production of organized beings is 
possible." This may be the meaning; but if 
it is, nothing of any value can be derived from 
it.* Antoninus often uses the word ' ' Nature ' ' 
(jwoig), and we must attempt to fix its meaning, 
The simple etymological sense of ywaig is ' * pro- 
duction," the birth of what we call Things. 
The Romans used Natura, which also means 
"birth" originally. But neither the Greeks 
nor the Romans stuck to this simple meaning, 
nor do we. Antoninus says (x. 6) : ( * Whether 
the universe is [a concourse of] atoms or 
Nature [is a system], let this first be estab- 

* Justin (Apol. ii. 8) has the words Kara cnepaariKov 
?i6yov ftepog, where he is speaking of the Stoics ; but he 
uses this expression in a peculiar sense (note 11). 
The early Christian writers were familiar with the 
Stoic terms, and their writings show that the contest 
was begun between the Christian expositors and the 
Greek philosophy. Kven in the second Epistle of St. 
Peter (ii. 1, v. 4) we find a Stoic expression, Iva dca 
lovruv yevqcde Odag kocvuvol dtvaeuQ. 



62 Ipbtlosopbg. 



lished, that I am a part of the whole which is 
governed by nature." Here it might seem as 
if nature were personified and viewed as an 
active, efficient power; as something which, it 
not independent of the Deity, acts by a power 
which is given to it by the Deity. Such\ if I 
understand the expression right, is the way in 
which the word Nature is often used now, 
though it is plain that many writers use the 
word without fixing any exact meaning to it. 
It is the same with the expression Laws of 
Nature, which some writers may use in an in- 
telligible sense, but others as clearly use in no 
definite sense at all. There is no meaning in this 
word Nature, except that which Bishop Butler 
assigns to it, when he says, ' ' The only distinct 
meaning of that word Natural is Stated, Fixed, 
or Settled ; since what is natural as much re- 
quires and presupposes an intelligent agent to 
render it so, i. e. to effect it continually or at 
stated times, as what is supernatural or mirac- 
ulous does to effect it at once." This is 
Plato's meaning (De Leg., iv. 715) when he 
says that God holds the beginning and end 
and middle of all that exists, and proceeds 
straight on his course, making his circuit ac- 
cording to nature (that is by a fixed order) ; and 
he is continually accompanied by justice, who 
punishes those who deviate from the divine 
law, that is, from the order or course which 
God observes. 

When we look at the motions of the planets, 



ilfcarcus Sureltus antonfnus* 63 

the action of what we call gravitation, the ele- 
mental combination of unorganized bodies and 
their resolution, the production of plants and 
of living bodies, their generation, growth, and 
their dissolution, which we call their death, we 
observe a regular sequence of phenomena, 
which within the limits of experience present 
and past, so far as we know the past, is fixed 
and invariable. But if this is not so, if the 
order and sequence of phenomena, as known to 
us, are subject to change in the course of an 
infinite progression, — and such change is con- 
ceivable, — we have not discovered, nor shall we 
ever discover, the whole of the order and se- 
quence of phenomena, in which sequence there 
may be involved according to its very nature, 
that is, according to its fixed order, some vari- 
ation of what we now call the Order or Nature 
of Things. It is also conceivable that such 
changes have taken place, — changes in the 
order of things, as we are compelled by the im- 
perfection of language to call them, but which 
are no changes; and further it is certain that 
our knowledge of the true sequence of all actual 
phenomena, as for instance the phenomena of 
generation, growth, and dissolution, is and 
ever must be imperfect. 

We do not fare much better when we speak 
of Causes and Effects than when we speak of 
Nature. For the practical purposes of life we 
may use the terms cause and effect conveni- 
ently, and we may fix a distinct meaning to 



64 l>bUO0op&£* 



them, distinct enough at least to prevent all 
misunderstanding. But the case is different 
when we speak of causes and effects as of 
Things. All that we know is phenomena, as 
the Greeks called them, or appearances which 
follow one another in a regular order, as we 
conceive it, so that if some one phenomenon 
should fail in the series, we conceive that there 
must either be an interruption of the series, or 
that something else will appear after the phe- 
nomenon which has failed to appear, and will 
occupy the vacant place; and so the series in 
its progression may be modified or totally 
changed. Cause and effect then mean nothing 
in the sequence of natural phenomena beyond 
what I have said; and the real cause, or the 
transcendent cause, as some would call it, of 
each successive phenomenon is in that which 
is the cause of all things which are, which have 
been, and which will be forever. Thus the 
word Creation may have a real sense if we 
consider it as the first, if we can conceive a 
first, in the present order of natural phenom- 
ena; but in the vulgar sense a creation of all 
things at a certain time, followed by a quies- 
cence of the first cause and an abandonment 
of all sequences of Phenomena to the laws of 
Nature, or to the other words that people may 
use, is absolutely absurd.* 

*Time and space are the conditions of our thought ; 
but time infinite and space infinite cannot be objects 



dfoarcus aurelfus Hntoninus* 65 

Now, though there is great difficulty in un- 
derstanding all the passages of Antoninus, in 
which he speaks of Nature, of the changes of 
things and of the economy of the universe, I 
am convinced that his sense of Nature and 
Natural is the same as that which I have 
stated; and as he was a man who knew how to 
use words in a clear way and with strict con- 
sistency, we ought to assume, even if his mean- 
ing in some passages is doubtful, that his view 
of Nature was in harmony with his fixed be- 
lief in the all-pervading, ever present, and 
ever active energy of God. (ii. 4; iv. 40; x. 1; 
vi. 40; and other passages. Compare Seneca, 
De Benef., iv. 7. Swedenborg, Angelic Wis- 
dom, 349-3570 

There is much in Antoninus that is hard to 
understand, and it might be said that he did 
not fully comprehend all that he wrote; which 
would however be in no way remarkable, for 

of thought, except in a very imperfect way. Time 
and Space must not in any way be thought of when 
we think of the Deity. Swedenborg says, "The 
natural man may believe that he would have no 
thought, if the ideas of time, of space, and of things 
material were taken away ; for upon those is founded 
all the thought that man "has. But let him know that 
the thoughts are limited and confined in proportion 
as they partake of time, of space, and of what is ma- 
terial ; and that they are not limited and are extended, 
in proportion as they do not partake of those things ; 
since the mind is so far elevated above the things cor- 
poreal and worldly' ' (Concerning Heaven and Hell, 

169). 
5 



66 IPbilosopbs* 



it happens now that a man may write what 
neither he nor anybody can understand. An- 
toninus tells us (xii. 10) to look at things and 
see what they are, resolving them into the 
material ( i<?j/), the casual (alnov), and the rela- 
tion (dva^opa), or the purpose, by which he 
seems to mean something in the nature of what 
we call effect, or end. The word Cause {alrla) 
is the difficulty. There is the same word in 
the Sanscrit {hetu N ; and the subtle philosophers 
of India and of Greece, and the less subtle 
philosophers of modern times, have all used 
this word, or an equivalent word, in a vague 
way. Yet the confusion sometimes may be in 
the inevitable ambiguity of language rather 
than in the mind of the writer, for I cannot think 
that some of the wisest of men did not know 
what they intended to say. When Antoninus 
says (iv. 36), "that everything that exists is in 
a manner the seed of that which will be, ' ' he 
might be supposed to say what some of the In- 
dian philosophers have said, and thus a pro- 
found truth might be converted into a gross 
absurdity. But he says, "in a manner," and 
in a manner he said true ; and in another man- 
ner, if you mistake his meaning, he said false. 
When Plato said, " Nothing ever is, but is al- 
ways becoming" (ael yiyvercu), he delivered a 
text, out of which we may derive something ; 
for he destroys by it not all practical, but all 
speculative notions of cause and effect. The 
whole series of things, as they appear to us, 



jflfcarcue Bureltua Bntoninus. 67 



must be contemplated in time, that is in suc- 
cession, and we conceive or suppose intervals 
between one state of things and another state 
of things, so that there is priority and sequence, 
and interval, and Being, and a ceasing to Be, 
and beginning and ending. But there is noth- 
ing of the kind in the Nature of Things. It is 
an everlasting continuity (iv. 45 ; vii. 75). 
When Antoninus speaks of generation (x. 26), 
he speaks of one cause (alrta) acting, and then 
another cause taking up the work, which the 
former left in a certain state, and so on ; and 
we might perhaps conceive that he had some 
notion like what has been called ' ' the self- 
evolving power of nature;" a fine phrase in- 
deed, the full import of which I believe that 
the writer of it did not see, and thus he laid 
himself open to the imputation of being a fol- 
lower of one of the Hindu sects, which makes 
all things come by evolution out of nature or 
matter, or out of something which takes the 
place of Deity, but is not Deity. I would have 
all men think as they please, or as they can, 
and I only claim the same freedom which I 
give. When a man writes anything, we may 
fairly try to find out all that his words must 
mean, even if the result is that they mean what 
he did not mean ; and if we find this contradic- 
tion, it is not our fault, but his misfortune. 
Now Antoninus is perhaps somewhat in this 
condition in what he says (x. 26), though he 
speaks at the end of the paragraph of the 



68 Pbtlosopbg* 



power which acts, unseen by the eyes, but still 
no less clearly. But whether in this passage 
(x. 26) he means that the power is conceived 
to be in the different successive causes (atrial), 
or in something else, nobody can tell. From 
other passages, however, I do collect that his 
notion of the phenomena of the universe is what 
I have stated. . The Deity works unseen, if we 
may use such language, and perhaps I may, as 
Job did, or he who wrote the book of Job. 
"In him we live and move and are,'' said St. 
Paul to the Athenians ; and to show his hearers 
that this was no new doctrine, he quoted the 
Greek poets. One of these poets was the Stoic 
Cleanthes, whose noble hymn to Zeus, or God, 
is an elevated expression of devotion and phi- 
losophy. It deprives Nature of her power, and 
puts her under the immediate government of 
the Deity. 

"Thee all this heaven, which whirls around the earth, 
Obeys, and willing follows where thou leadest. 
Without thee, God, nothing is done on earth, 
Nor in the ethereal realms, nor in the sea, 
Save what the wicked through their folly do." 

Antoninus' conviction of the existence of a 
divine power and government was founded on 
his perception of the order of the universe. 
Iyike Socrates (Xen. Mem., iv. 3, 13, etc.) he 
says that though we cannot see the forms of 
divine powers, we know that they exist because 
we see their works. 



d&arcus Hurelius Bntonfnus* 69 

"To those who ask, Where hast thou seen 
the gods, or how dost thou comprehend that 
they exist and so worshipest them ? I answer, 
in the first place, that they may be seen even 
with the eyes; in the second place, neither 
have I seen my own soul, and yet I honor it. 
Thus then with respect to the gods, from what 
I constantly experience of their power, from 
this I comprehend that they exist, and I ven- 
erate them." (xii. 28, and the note. Comp. 
Aristotle de Mundo, c. 6; Xen. Mem. i. 4, 9; 
Cicero, Tuscul. i. 28, 29; St. Paul's Epistle to 
the Romans, i. 19, 20; and Montaigne's Apol- 
ogy for Raimond de Sebonde, ii. c. 12.) This 
is a very old argument, which has always had 
great weight with most people, and has ap- 
peared sufficient. It does not acquire the least 
additional strength by being developed in a 
learned treatise. It is as intelligible in its 
simple enunciation as it can be made. If it is 
rejected, there is no arguing with him who re- 
jects it: and if it is worked out into innumer- 
able particulars, the value of the evidence 
runs the risk of being buried under a mass of 
words. 

Man being conscious that he is a spiritual 
power, or that he has such a power, in what- 
ever way he conceives that he has it — for I 
wish simply to state a fact — -from this power 
which he has in himself, he is led, as Antoni- 
nus says, to believe that there is a greater 
power, which, as the old Stoics tell us, per- 



7o pbfloeopbE* 



vades the whole universe as the intellect* 
(voir) pervades man. (Compare Epictetus' Dis- 
courses, i. 14; and Voltaire a Mad e . Necker, 
vol. lxvii., p. 278, ed. Lequien.) 

*I have always translated the word vovg, ''intelli- 
gence" or "intellect." It appears to be the word 
used by the oldest Greek philosophers to express the 
notion of "intelligence " as opposed to the notion of 
"matter." I have always translated the word Myoq 
by "reason," and Xoycudg by the word "rational," or 
perhaps sometimes " reasonable," as I have translated 
voepog by the word "intellectual." Every man who 
has thought and has read any philosophical writings 
knows the difficulty of finding words to express cer- 
tain notions, how imperfectly words express these 
notions, and how carelessl} 7 the words are often used. 
The various senses of the word loyog are enough to 
perplex any man. Our translators of the New Testa- 
ment (St. John, c. I.) have simply translated 6 loyoq 
by "the word," as the Germans translated it by "das 
Wort ; " but in their theological writings they some- 
times retain the original term Logos. The Germans 
have a term Vernunft, which seems to come nearest 
to our word Reason, or the necessary and absolute 
truths which we cannot conceive as being other than 
what they are. Such are what some people have 
called the laws of thought, the conceptions of .space 
and of time, and axioms or first principles, which 
need no proof and cannot be proved or denied. Ac- 
cordingly the Germans can say, " Gott ist die hochste 
Vernunft," the Supreme Reason. The Germans have 
also a word Verstand, which seems to represent our 
word "understanding," "intelligence," "intellect," 
not as a thing absolute which exists by itself, but as a 
thing connected with an individual being, as a man. 
Accordingly it is the capacity of receiving impressions 



Marcus Bureliue Sntonfnus* 



7i 



God exists then, but what do we know of 
his nature ? Antoninus says that the soul of 
man is an efflux from the divinity. We have 
bodies like animals, but we have reason, in- 
telligence, as the gods. Animals have life 
(ipvxv), and what we call instincts or natural 
principles of action: but the rational animal 
man alone has a rational, intelligent soul 
($vx?) ho-yiny, voepd). Antoninus insists on this 

(Vorstellungen, (pavraciai), and forming from them 
distinct ideas (Begriffe), and perceiving differences. 
I do not think that these remarks will help the reader 
to the understanding of Antoninus, or his use of the 
words vovg and loyog. The emperor's meaning must 
be got from his own words, and if it does not agree 
altogether with modern notions, it is not our business 
to force it into agreement, but simply to find out what 
his meaning is, if we can. 

Justin us (ad Diognetum, c. vii.) says that the om- 
nipotent, all-creating, and invisible God has fixed 
truth and the holy, incomprehensible Logos in men's 
hearts ; and this Logos is the architect and creator of 
the Universe. In the first Apology (c. xxxii.), he 
says that the seed (aTrep/ua) from God is the Logos, 
which dwells in those who believe in God. So it ap- 
pears that according to Justinus the Logos is only in 
such believers. In the second Apology (c. viii.) he 
speaks of the seed of the Logos being implanted in 
all mankind ; but those who order their lives accord- 
ing to Logos, such as the Stoics, have only a portion 
of the Logos (Kara G7repjuariK,ov Xdyov fiepog), and have 
not the knowledge and contemplation of the entire 
Logos, which is Christ. Swedenborg's remarks (An- 
gelic Wisdom, 240) are worth comparing with Justi- 
nus. The modern philosopher in substance agrees 
with the ancient ; but he is more precise. 



72 IPbUosopbE* 



continually: God is in man,* and so we must 
constantly attend to the divinity within us, 
for it is only in this way that we can have any 
knowledge of the nature of God. The human 
soul is in a sense a portion of the divinity, and 
the soul alone has any communication with 
the Deity; for as he says (xii. 2): "With his 
intellectual part alone God touches the intelli- 
gence only which has flowed and been derived 
from himself into these bodies." In fact he 
says that which is hidden within a mail is life, 
that is, the man himself. All the rest is 
vesture, covering, organs, instrument, which 
the living man, the realf man, uses for the 

*Comp. Bp. to the Corinthians, i. 3, 17, and James 
iv. 8, " Drawnigh to God and he will draw nigh to 
you." 

fThis is also Swedenborg's doctrine of the soul. 
" As to what concerns the soul, of which it is said that 
it shall live after death, it is nothing else but the man 
himself, who lives in the body, that is, the interior 
man, who by the body acts in the world and from 
whom the body itself lives" (quoted by Clissold, p. 
456 of "The Practical Nature of the Theological 
Writings of Emanuel Swedenborg, in a Letter to the 
Archbishop of Dublin (Whately)," second edition, 
1859 ; a book which theologians might read with 
profit). This is an old doctrine of the soul, which 
has been often proclaimed, but never better expressed 
than by the " Auctor de Mundo," c. 6, quoted by 
Gataker in his "Antoninus," p. 436. "The soul by 
which we live and have cities and houses is invisible, 
but it is seen by its works ; for the whole method of 
life has been devised by it and ordered, and by it is 



.fl&arcus autetiue Bntonfnus* 73 

purpose of his present existence. The air is 
universally diffused for him who is able to re- 
spire; and so for him who is willing to partake 
of it the intelligent power, which holds within 
it all things, is diffused as wide and free as the 
air (viii. 54). It is by living a divine life that 
man approaches to a knowledge of the divin- 
ity.* It is by following the divinity within, 

held together. In like manner we must think also 
about the Deity, who in power is most mighty, in 
beauty most comely, in life immortal, and in virtue 
supreme : wherefore though he is invisible to human 
nature, he is seen by his very works." Other pas- 
sages to the same purpose are quoted by Gataker (p. 
382). Bishop Butler has the same as to the soul : 
1 i Upon the whole, then, our organs of sense and our 
limbs are certainly instruments, which the living 
persons, ourselves, make use of to perceive and move 
with." If this is not plain enough, he also says : "It 
follows that our organized bodies are no more our- 
selves, or part of ourselves, than any other matter 
around us." (Compare Anton, x. 38). 

* The reader may consult Discourse V., " Of the ex- 
istence and nature of God," in John Smith's " Select 
Discourses. ' ' He has prefixed as a text to this Dis- 
course, the striking passage of Agapetus, Paraenes. 
\ 3: "He who knows himself will know God ; and he 
who knows God will be made like to God ; and he 
will be made like to God, who has become worthy 
God; and he becomes worthy of God, who does noth- 
ing unworthy of God, but thinks the things that are 
his, and speaks what he thinks, and does what he 
speaks." I suppose that the old saying, " Know thy- 
self," which is attributed to Socrates and others, had 
a larger meaning than the narrow sense which is gen- 



74 IPbilosopbE* 



da'uujv or Oeog, as Antoninus calls it, that man 
comes nearest to the Deity, the supreme good; 
for man can never attain to perfect agreement 
with his internal guide (™ r/yejuoviK6v). "Live 
with the gods. And he does live with the 
gods who constantly shows to them that his 
own soul is satisfied with that which is assigned 
to him, and that it does all the daemon (daijuov) 
wishes, which Zeus hath given to every man 
for his guardian and guide, a portion of him- 
self. And this daemon is every man's under- 
standing and reason " (v. 27). 

There is in man, that is in the reason, the 
intelligence, a superior faculty which if it is 
exercised rules all the rest. This is the ruling 
faculty (to Tjyefiovmdv), which Cicero (De Natura 
Deorum, ii. 11) renders by the Latin word 
Principatus, ' ' to which nothing can or ought 
to be superior." Antoninus often uses this 
term and others which are equivalent. He 
names it (vii. 64) "the governing intelli- 
gence. ' ' The governing faculty is the master 
of the soul (v. 26). A man must reverence 
only his ruling faculty and the divinity within 
him. As we must reverence that which is 
supreme in the universe, so we must reverence 
that which is supreme in ourselves; and this is 
that which is of like kind with that which is 
supreme in the universe (v. 21). So, as 

erally given to it. (Agapetus, ed. Stephan. Schem- 
ing, Franeker, 1608. This volume contains also the 
Paraeneses of Nilus.) 



/Ifoarcus aurelius Bntontnua* 75 

Plotinus says, the soul of man can only know 
the divine so far as it knows itself. In one 
passage (xi. 19) Antoninus speaks of a man's 
condemnation of himself when the diviner part 
within him has been overpowered and yields 
to the less honorable and to the perishable 
part, the body, and its gross pleasures. In a 
word, the views of Antoninus on this matter, 
however his expressions may vary, are ex- 
actly what Bishop Butler expresses when he 
speaks of " the natural supremac}^ of reflection 
or conscience," of the faculty " which surveys, 
approves, or disapproves the several affections 
of our mind and actions of our lives. ' ' 

Much matter might be collected from Anto- 
ninus on the notion of the Universe being one 
animated Being. But all that he says amounts 
to no more, as Schultz remarks, than this : the 
soul of man is most intimately united to his 
body, and together they make one animal, 
which we call man ; so the Deity is most inti- 
mately united to the world, or the material 
universe, and together they form one whole. 
But Antoninus did not view God and the ma- 
terial universe as the same, any more than he 
viewed the body and soul of man as one. An- 
toninus has no speculations on the absolute 
nature of the Deity. It was not his fashion to 
waste his time on what man cannot under- 
stand.* He was satisfied that God exists, that 

* "God, who is infinitely beyond the reach of our 



76 iPbilosopbE* 



he governs all things, that man can only have 
an imperfect knowledge of his nature, and he 
must attain this imperfect knowledge by rever- 
encing the divinity which is within him, and 
keeping it pure. 

From all that has been said, it follows that 
the universe is administered by the Providence 
of God (irpdvoia), and that all things are wisely 
ordered. There are passages in which Anto- 
ninus expresses doubts, or states different pos- 
sible theories of the constitution and govern- 
ment of the universe ; but he always recurs to 
his fundamental principle, that if we admit the 
existence of a deity, we must also admit that 
he orders all things wisely and well (iv. 27; 
vi. 1 ; ix. 28; xii. 5; and many other passages). 
Epictetus says (i. 6) that we can discern the 
providence which rules the world, if we possess 
two things, — the power of seeing all that hap- 
pens with respect to each thing, and a grateful 
disposition. 

But if all things are wisely ordered, how is 
the world so full of what we call evil, physical 
and moral? If instead of saying that there is 
evil in the world, we use the expression which 
I have used, "what we call evil," we have 
partly anticipated the emperor's answer. We 
see and feel and know imperfectly very few 
things in the few years that we live, and all the 
knowledge and all the experience of all the hu- 

narrow capacities" (Locke, Essay concerning the 
Human Understanding, ii. chap. 17). 



/Ratcua Burelfus Sntonfnua* 



77 



man race is positive ignorance of the whole, 
which is infinite. Now, as our reason teaches 
us that everything is in some way related to 
and connected with every other thing, all 
notion of evil as being in the universe of things 
is a contradiction ; for if the whole comes from 
and is governed by an intelligent being, it is 
impossible to conceive anything in it which 
tends to the evil or destruction of the whole 
(viii. 55; x. 6). Everything is in constant 
mutation, and yet the whole subsists; we 
might imagine the solar system resolved into 
its elemental parts, and yet the whole would 
still subsist "ever young and perfect." 

All things, all forms, are dissolved, and new 
forms appear. All living things undergo the 
change which we call death. If we call death 
an evil, then all change is an evil. Living be- 
ings also suffer pain, and man suffers most of 
all, for he suffers both in and by his body and 
by his intelligent part. Men suffer also from 
one another, and perhaps the largest part of 
human suffering comes to man from those 
whom he calls his brothers. Antoninus says 
(viii. 55), "Generally, wickedness does no 
harm at all to the universe; and particularly, 
the wickedness [of one man] does no harm to / 
another. It is only harmful to him who has ( 
it in his power to be released from it as soon as 
he shall choose. ' ' The first part of this is per- 
fectly consistent with the doctrine that the / 
whole can sustain no evil or harm. The sec- 



7 8 1Pbflosopb£* 



ond part must be explained by the Stoic prin- 
ciple that there is no evil in anything which is 
not in our power. What wrong we suffer from 
another is his evil, not ours. But this is an 
admission that there is evil in a sort, for he 
who does wrong does evil, and if others can 
endure the wrong, still there is evil in the 
wrong-doer. Antoninus (xi. 18) gives many 
excellent precepts with respect to wrongs and 
injuries, and his precepts are practical. He 
teaches us to bear w r hat we cannot avoid, and 
his lessons may be just as useful to him who 
denies the being and the government of God 
as to him who believes in both. There is no 
direct answer in Antoninus to the objections 
which may be made to the existence and provi- 
dence of God because of the moral disorder and 
suffering which are in the world, except this 
answer which he makes in reply to the suppo- 
sition that even the best men may be extin- 
guished by death. He says if it is so, we may 
be sure that if it ought to have been otherwise, 
the gods w T ould have ordered it otherwise (xii. 
5). His conviction of the wisdom which we 
may observe in the government of the world is 
too strong to be disturbed by any apparent ir- 
regularities in the order of things. That these 
disorders exist is a fact, and those who would 
conclude from them against the being and gov- 
ernment of God conclude too hastily. We all 
admit that there is an order in the material 
world, a Nature, in the sense in which that word 



dlbarcus Hureliue Bntoninus* 79 

has been explained, a constitution (mraoKevfj), 
what we call a system, a relation of parts to 
one another and a fitness of the whole for some- 
thing. So in the constitution of plants and of 
animals there is an order, a fitness for some end. 
Sometimes the order, as we conceive it, is in- 
terrupted, and the end, as we conceive it, is not 
attained. The seed, the plant, or the animal 
sometimes perishes before it has passed through 
all its changes and done all its uses. It is ac- 
cording to Nature, that is a fixed order, for 
some to perish early and for others to do all 
their uses and leave successors to take their 
place. So man has a corporeal and intellectual 
and moral constitution fit for certain uses, and 
on the whole man performs these uses, dies, 
and leaves other men in his place. So society 
exists, and a social state is manifestly the 
natural state of man — the state for which his 
nature fits him, and society amidst innumer- 
able irregularities and disorders still subsists; 
and perhaps we may say that the history of the 
past and our present knowledge give us a rea- 
sonable hope that its disorders will diminish, 
and that order, its governing principle, may be 
more firmly established. As order then, a fixed 
order, we may say, subject to deviations real 
or apparent, must be admitted to exist in the 
whole nature of things, that which we call dis- 
order or evil, as it seems to us, does not in any 
way alter the fact of the general constitution of 
things having a nature or fixed order. No- 



8o f>bfl06opb£* 



body will conclude from the existence of disor- 
der that order is not the rule, for the existence 
of order both physical and moral is proved by 
daily experience and all past experience. We 
cannot conceive how the order of the universe 
is maintained: we cannot even conceive how 
our own life from day to day is continued, nor 
how we perform the simplest movements of the 
body, nor how we grow and think and act, 
though we know many of the conditions which 
are necessary for all these functions. Know- 
ing nothing then of the unseen power which 
acts in ourselves except by what is done, we 
know nothing of the power which acts through 
what we call all time and all space; but seeing 
that there is a nature or fixed order in all things 
known to us, it is conformable to the nature of 
our minds to believe that this universal Nature 
has a cause which operates continually, and 
that we are totally unable to speculate on the 
reason of any of those disorders or evils which 
we perceive. This I believe is the answer 
which may be collected from all that Antoni- 
nus has said.* 

The origin of evil is an old question. Achil- 

* Clean thes says in his Hymn : — 

" For all things good and bad to One thou formest, 
So that One everlasting reason governs all." 

See Bishop Butler's Sermons. Sermon XV., " Upon 
the Ignorance of Man." 



dfcarcus Bureliue Sntoninus. 81 

les tells Priam (Iliad, 24, 527) that Zeus has 
two casks, one filled with good things, and the 
other with bad, and that he gives to men out 
of each according to his pleasure; and so we 
must be content, for we cannot alter the will of 
Zeus. One of the Greek commentators asks 
how must we reconcile this doctrine with what 
we find in the first book of the Odyssey, w T here 
the king of the gods says, Men say that evil 
comes to them from us, but they bring it on 
themselves through their own folly. The an- 
swer is plain enough even to the Greek com- 
mentator. The poets make both Achilles and 
Zeus speak appropriately to their several char- 
acters. Indeed, Zeus says plainly that men do 
attribute their sufferings to their gods, but they 
do it falsely, for they are the cause of their own 
sorrows. 

Epictetus in his Enchiridion (c. 27) makes 
short work of the question of evil. He says, 
' ' As a mark is not set up for the purpose of 
missing it, so neither does the nature of evil ex- 
ist in the universe." This will appear obscure 
enough to those who are not acquainted with 
Epictetus, but he always knows what he is 
talking about. We do not set up a mark in 
order to miss it, though we may miss it. God, 
whose existence Epictetus assumes, has not 
ordered all things so that his purpose shall fail. 
Whatever there may be of what we call evil, 
the nature of evil, as he expresses it, does not 
exist; that is, evil is not a part of the constitu- 
6 



82 IPbflosopbE* 



tiou or nature of things. If there were a prin- 
ciple of evil (apxv) in the constitution of things, 
evil would no longer be evil, as Simplicius 
argues, but evil would be good. Simplicius 
(c. 34, [27]) has a long and curious discourse 
on this text of Epictetus, and it is amusing 
and instructive. 

One passage more will conclude this matter. 
It contains all that the emperor could say (ii. 
11): "To go from among men, if there are 
gods, is not a thing to be afraid of, for the gods 
will not involve thee in evil; but if indeed they 
do not exist, or if they have no concern about 
human affairs, what is it to me to live in a uni- 
verse devoid of gods or devoid of providence ? 
But in truth they do exist, and they do care for 
human things, and they have put all the means 
in man's power to enable him not to fall into 
real evils. And as to the rest, if there was any- 
thing evil, they would have provided for this 
also, that it should be altogether in a man's 
power not to fall into it. But that which does 
not make a man worse, how can it make a 
man's life worse? But neither through igno- 
rance, nor having the knowledge but not the 
power to guard against or correct these things, 
is it possible that the nature of the universe 
has overlooked them; nor is it possible that it 
has made so great a mistake, either through 
want of power or want of skill, that good and 
evil should happen indiscriminately to the good 
and the bad. But death certainly and life, 



dfcatcus Bureltus Bntonfnus* 83 

honor and dishonor, pain and pleasure, all 
these things equally happen to good and bad 
men, being things which make us neither better 
nor worse. Therefore they are neither good 
nor evil." 

The Ethical part of Antoninus' Philosophy 
follows from his general principles. The end 
of all his philosophy is to live conformably to 
Nature, both a man's own nature and the nature 
of the universe. Bishop Butler has explained 
what the Greek philosophers meant when they 
spoke of living according to Nature, and he says 
that when it is explained, as he has explained it 
and as they understood it, it is "a manner of 
speaking not loose and undeterminate, but 
clear and distinct, strictly just and true." To 
live according to Nature is to live according to 
a man's whole nature, not according to a part 
of it, and to reverence the divinity within him 
as the governor of all his actions. ' ' To the 
rational animal the same act is according to 
nature and according to reason " ¥ (vii. 11). 
That which is done contrary to reason is also 
an act contrary to nature, to the whole nature, 
though it is certainly conformable to some 
part of man's nature, or it could not be done. 
Man is made for action, not for idleness or 
pleasure. As plants and animals do the uses 
of their nature, so man must do his (v. 1). 

* This is what Juvenal means when he says (xiv. 
32i),— 

"Nunquam aliud Natura aliud Sapientia dick." 



84 iPbtlosopbE. 



Man must also live conformably to the uni- 
versal nature, conformably to the nature of all 
things of which he is one; and as a citizen of a 
political community he must direct his life and 
actions with reference to those among whom, 
among other purposes, he lives. * A man must 
not retire into solitude and cut himself off from 
his fellow-men. He must be ever active to do 
his part in the great whole. All men are his 
kin, not only in blood, but still more by par- 
ticipating in the same intelligence and by be- 
ing a portion of the same divinity. A man 
cannot really be injured by his brethren, for 
no act of theirs can make him bad, and he 
must not be angry with them nor hate them: 
"For we are made for co-operation, like feet, 
like hands, like eyelids, like the rows of the 
upper and lower teeth. To act against one 
another then is contrary to nature; and it is 
acting against one another to be vexed and to 
turn away" (ii. i). 

Further he says: "Take pleasure in one 
thing and rest in it in passing from one social 
act to another social act, thinking of God" 
(vi. 7). Again: "L,ove mankind. Follow 
God" (vii. 31). It is the characteristic of the 
rational soul for a man to love his neighbor 
(xi. 1). Antoninus teaches in various passages 
the forgiveness of injuries, and we know that 
he also practised what he taught. Bishop 

*See viii. 52; atid Persius iii. 66 



dlbarcus Butelfus Bntomnus* 85 

Butler remarks that "this divine precept to 
forgive injuries and to love our enemies, though 
to be met with in Gentile moralists, yet is in a 
peculiar sense a precept of Christianity, as our 
Saviour has insisted more upon it than on any 
other single virtue. ' ' The practice of this pre- 
cept is the most difficult of all virtues. Anto- 
ninus often enforces it and gives us aid towards 
following it. When we are injured, we feel 
anger and resentment, and the feeling is nat- 
ural, just, and useful for the conservation of 
society. It is useful that wrong-doers should 
feel the natural consequences of their actions, 
among which is the disapprobation of society 
and the resentment of him who is wronged. 
But revenge, in the proper sense of that word, 
must not be practised. ''The best way of 
avenging thyself," says the emperor, "is not 
to become like the wrong-doer. ' ' It is plain 
by this that he does not mean that we should 
In any case practise revenge; but he says to 
those who talk of revenging wrongs, Be not like 
him who has done the wrong. Socrates in the 
Crito (c. to) says the same in other words, and 
St. Paul (Ep. to the Romans, xii. 17). "When 
a man has done thee any wrong, immediately 
consider with what opinion about good or evil 
he has done wrong. For when thou hast seen 
this, thou wilt pity him and wilt neither won- 
der nor be angry" (vii. 26). Antoninus would 
not deny that wrong naturally produces the 
feeling of anger and resentment, for this is im- 



86 8>btlosopb£. 



plied in the recommendation to reflect on the 
nature of the man's mind who has done the 
wrong, and then you will have pity instead of 
resentment; and so it comes to the same as St. 
Paul's advice to be angry and sin not; which, 
as Butler well explains it, is not a recommen- 
dation to be angry, which nobody needs, for 
anger is a natural passion, but it is a warning 
against allowing anger to lead us into sin. In 
short the emperor's doctrine about wrongful 
acts is this: wrong-doers do not know what 
good and bad are: they offend out of ignorance, 
and in the sense of the Stoics this is true. 
Though this kind of ignorance will never be 
admitted as a legal excuse, and ought not to 
be admitted as a full excuse in anyway by 
society, there may be grievous injuries, such 
as it is in a man's power to forgive without 
harm to society; and if he forgives because he 
sees that his enemies know not what they do, 
he is acting in the spirit of the sublime prayer, 
''Father, forgive them, for they know not what 
they do." 

The emperor's moral philosophy was not a 
feeble, narrow system, which teaches a man to 
look directly to his own happiness, though a 
man's happiness or tranquillity is indirectly 
promoted by living as he ought to do. A man 
must live conformably to the universal nature, 
which means, as the emperor explains it in 
many passages, that a man's actions must be 
conformable to his true relations to all other 



dfoarcua Jlureltus Bntonfnus* 87 

human beings, both as a citizen of a political 
community and as a member of the whole 
human family. This implies, and he often ex- 
presses it in the most forcible language, that a 
man's words and actions, so far as they affect 
others, must be measured by a fixed rule, 
which is their consistency with the conserva- 
tion and the interests of the particular society 
of which he is a member, and of the whole 
human race. To live conformably to such a 
rule, a man must use his rational faculties in 
order to discern clearly the consequences and 
full effect of all his actions and of the actions 
of others: he must not live a life of contempla- 
tion and reflection only, though he must often 
retire within himself to calm and purify his 
soul by thought,* but he must mingle in the 
work of man and be a fellow laborer for the 
general good. 

A man should have an object or purpose in 
life, that he may direct all his energies to it; 
of course a good object (ii. 7). He who has not 
one object or purpose of life, cannot be one and 
the same all through his life (xi. 21). Bacon 
has a remark to the same effect, on the best 
means of ' ' reducing of the mind unto virtue 
and good estate ; which is, the electing and 
propounding unto a man's self good and virtu- 
ous ends of his life, such as may be in a reas- 
onable sort within his compass to attain. ' ' He 

*Utnemo in sese tentat descendere, nemo. — Persius, 

iv* 21. 



88 fl>bflO0Opb£* 



is a happy man who has been wise enough to 
do this when he was young and has had the op- 
portunities; but the emperor seeing well that a 
man cannot always be so wise in his youth, 
encourages himself to do it when he can, and 
not to let life slip away before he has begun. 
He who can propose to himself good and virtu- 
ous ends of life, and be true to them, cannot 
fail to live conformably to his own interest and 
the universal interest, for in the nature of 
things they are one. If a thing is not good for 
the hive, it is not good for the bee (vi. 54). 

One passage may end this matter. " If the 
gods have determined about me and about the 
things which must happen to me, they 
have determined well, for it is not easy even to 
imagine a deity without forethought; and as 
to doing me harm, why should they have any 
desire towards that ? For what advantage 
would result to them from this or to the whole, 
which is the special object of their providence ? 
But if they have not determined about me in- 
dividually, they have certainly determined 
about the whole at least; and the things which 
happen by way of sequence in this general ar- 
rangement I ought to accept with pleasure and 
to be content with them. But if they deter- 
mine about nothing — which it is wicked to be- 
lieve, or if we do believe it, let us neither sac- 
rifice nor pray nor swear by them, nor do 
anything else which we do as if the gods were 
present and lived with us; but if however the 



flfoarcus aureltus antonfnus* 89 

gods determine about none of the things which 
concern us, I am able to determine about my- 
self, and I can inquire about that which is 
useful; and that is useful to every man which 
is conformable to his own constitution (KaraaKevy) 
and nature. But my nature is rational and 
social; and my city and country, so far as I am 
Antoninus, is Rome; but so far as I am a man, 
it is the world. The things then which are 
useful to these cities are alone useful to me" 
(vi. 44). 

It would be tedious, and it is not necessary, 
to state the emperor's opinions on all the ways 
in which a man may profitably use his under- 
standing towards perfecting himself in practical 
virtue. The passages to this purpose are in all 
parts of his book, but as they are in no order 
or connection, a man must use the book a long 
time before he will find out all that is in it. 
A few w T ords may be added here. If we ana- 
lyze all other things, we find how insufficient 
they are for human life, and how truly worth- 
less many of them are. Virtue alone is indi- 
visible, one, and perfectly satisfying. The 
notion of Virtue cannot be considered vague or 
unsettled, because a man may find it difficult 
to explain the notion fully to himself, or to ex- 
pound it to others in such a way as to prevent 
cavilling. Virtue is a whole, and no more 
consists of parts than man's intelligence does; 
and yet we speak of various intellectual facul- 
ties as a convenient way of expressing the var* 



90 iPbflosopbE* 



ious powers which man's intellect shows by 
his works. In the same way we may speak of 
various virtues or parts of virtue, in a practical 
sense, for the purpose of showing what partic- 
ular virtues we ought to practice in order to 
he exercise of the whole of virtue, that is, as 
man's nature is capable of. 

The prime principle in man's constitution is 
social. The next in order is not to yield to the 
persuasions of the body, when they are not 
conformable to the rational principle, which 
must govern. The third is freedom from error 
and from deception. " L,et then the ruling 
principle holding fast to these things go straight 
on, and it has what is its own " (vii. 55). The 
emperor selects justice as the virtue which is 
the basis of all the rest (x. 11), and this had 
been said long before his time. 

It is true that all people have some notion of 
what is meant by justice as a disposition of the 
mind, and some notion about acting in con- 
formity to this disposition ; but experience 
shows that men's notions about justice are as 
confused as their actions are inconsistent with 
the true notion* of justice. The emperor's 
notion of justice is clear enough, but not prac- 
tical enough for all mankind. " Let thei'e be 
freedom from perturbations with respect to the 
things which come from the external cause ; 
and let there be justice in the things done by 
virtue of the internal cause, that is, let there be 
movement and action terminating in this, in 



dftarcus Bureltus Bntoninus* 91 

social acts, for this is according to thy nature" 
(ix. 31). In another place (ix. 1) he says that 
4 'he who acts unjustly acts impiously," which 
follows of course from all that he says in various 
places. He insists on the practice of truth as a 
virtue and as a means to virtue, which no doubt 
it is : for lying even in indifferent things weak- 
ens the understanding ; and lying maliciously 
is as great a moral offense as a man can be 
guilty of, viewed both as showing an habitual 
disposition, and viewed with respect to conse- 
quences. He couples the notion of justice with 
action. A man must not pride himself on hav- 
ing some fine notion of justice in his head, but 
he must exhibit his justice in act, like St. 
James' notion of faith. But this is enough. 

The Stoics, and Antoninus among them, call 
some things beautiful (mla) and some ugly 
(alcxpa), and as they are beautiful so they are 
good, and as they are ugly so they are evil, or 
bad (ii. 1). All these things, good and evil, 
are in our power, absolutely, some of the stricter 
Stoics would say ; in a manner only, as those 
who would not depart altogether from common 
sense would say ; practically they are to a great 
degree in the power of some persons and in 
some circumstances, but in a small degree only 
in other persons and in other circumstances. 
The Stoics maintain man's free will as to the 
things which are in his power ; for as to the 
things which are out of his power, free will ter- 
minating in action is of course excluded by the 



92 pbflosopbg* 



very terms of the expression. I hardly know 
if we can discover exactly Antoninus' notion of 
the free will of man, nor is the question worth 
the inquiry. What he does mean and does say 
is intelligible. All the things which are not in 
our power (airpoaipeTa) are indifferent : they are 
neither good nor bad, morally. Such are life, 
health, wealth, power, disease, poverty, and 
death. Life and death are all men's portion. 
Health, wealth, power, disease, and poverty 
happen to men, indifferently to the good and to 
the bad ; to those who live according to nature 
and to those who do not.* " Iyife," says the 
emperor, "is a warfare and a stranger's so- 
journ, and after fame is oblivion" (ii. 17). 
After speaking of those men who have dis- 
turbed the world and then died, and of the 
death of philosophers such as Heraclitus and 
Democritus, who was destroyed by lice, and of 
Socrates whom other lice (his enemies) de- 
stroyed, he says: "What means all this? 
Thou hast embarked, thou hast made the voy- 

* " All events come alike to all: there is one event 
to the righteous and to the wicked: to the good and 
to the clean and to the unclean," &c. (Ecclesiastes, 
ix. v. 2); and (v. 3), "This is an evil among all 
things that are done under the sun, that there is one 
event unto all." In what sense " evil " is meant here 
seems rather doubtful. There is no doubt about the 
emperor's meaning. Compare Epictetus, Enchiridion, 
c. i., &c; and the doctrine of the Brachmans (Strabo 
p. 713, ed. Cas. ) : ayadbv 6e f) nanbv firjdhv elvat rw> 
Gvp.paivovT(j)V avOpojTroic 



dfcarcus Burelius Bntonfnus* 



93 



age, thou art come to shore ; get out. If in- 
deed to another life, there is no want of gods, 
not even there. But if to a state without sen- 
sation, thou wilt cease to be held by pains and 
pleasures, and to be a slave to the vessel which 
is as much inferior as that which serves it is 
superior: for the one is intelligence and Deity; 
the other is earth and corruption" (hi. 3). 
It is not death that a man should fear, but he 
should fear never beginning to live according 
to nature (xii. 1 ). Every man should live in 
such a way as to discharge his duty, and to 
trouble himself about nothing else. He should 
live such a life that he shall always be ready 
for death, and shall depart content when the 
summons comes. For what is death? "A 
cessation of the impressions through the senses, 
and of the pulling of the strings which move 
the appetites, and of the discursive movements 
of the thoughts, and of the service to the 
flesh" (vi. 28). Death is such as generation 
is, a mystery of nature (iv. 5). In another 
passage, the exact meaning of which is per- 
haps doubtful (ix. 3), he speaks of the child 
which leaves the womb, and so he says the 
soul at death leaves its envelope. As the 
child is born or comes into life by leaving the 
womb, so the soul ma}' on leaving the 
body pass into another existence which is per- 
fect. I am not sure if this is the emperor's 
meaning. Butler compares it with a passage 
in Strabo (p. 713) about the Brachmans' notion 



94 IPbflosopbE* 



of death being the birth into real life and a 
happy life, to those who have philosophized ; 
and he thinks Antoninus may allude to this 
opinion.* 

Antoninus' opinion of a future life is no- 
where clearly expressed. His doctrine of the 
nature of the soul of necessity implies that it 
does not perish absolutely, for a portion of the 
divinity cannot perish. The opinion is at least 
as old as the time of Epicharmus and Euripi- 
des; what comes from earth goes back to earth, 
and w 7 hat comes from heaven, the divinity, re- 
turns to him who gave it. But I find nothing 
clear in Antoninus as to the notion of the man 
existing after death so as to be conscious of his 
sameness with that soul which occupied his 
vessel of clay. He seems to be perplexed on 
this matter, and finally to have rested in this, 
that God or the gods will do whatever is best, 
and consistent with the university of things. 

Nor, I think, does he speak conclusively on 
another Stoic doctrine, which some Stoics prac- 

* Seneca (Kp. 102) has the same, whether an ex- 
pression of his own opinion, or merely a fine saying 
of others employed to embellish his writings, I know 
not. After speaking of the child being prepared in 
the womb to live this life, he adds, " Sic per hoc 
spatium, quod ab infantia patet in senectutem, in 
alium naturae sumimur partum. Alia origo nos ex- 
pectat, alius rerum status." See Ecclesiastes, xii. 7; 
and Lucan, i. 457: — 

' ' Longae, canitis si cognita, vitae 
Mors media est." 



Marcus Buteltua Hntoninus* 95 

tised, — the anticipating the regular course of 
nature by a man's own act. The reader will 
find some passages in which this is touched on, 
and he may make of them what he can. But 
there are passages in which the emperor en- 
courages himself to wait for the end patiently 
and with tranquillity; and certainly it is con- 
sistent with all his best teaching that a man 
should bear all that falls to his lot and do use- 
ful acts as he lives. He should not therefore 
abridge the time of his usefulness by his own 
act. Whether he contemplates any possible 
cases in which a man should die by his own 
hand, I cannot tell; and the matter is not worth 
a curious inquiry, for I believe it would not 
lead to any certain result as to his opinion on 
this point. I do not think that Antoninus, 
who never mentions Seneca, though he must 
have known all about him, would have agreed 
with Seneca when he gives as a reason for sui- 
cide, that the eternal law, whatever he means, 
has made nothing better for us than this, that 
it has given us only one way of entering into 
life and many ways of going out of it. The 
ways of going out indeed are many, and that is 
a good reason for a man taking care of him- 
self* 

Happiness was not the direct object of a 
Stoic's life. There is no rule of life contained 
in the precept that a man should pursue his 

*See Plinius H. N. ii., c. 7; Seneca, De Provid. c. 
6.; and Bp. 70: " Nihil melius aeterna lex," &c. 



96 ©btlosopbs* 



own happiness. Many men think that they 
are seeking happiness when they are only seek- 
ing the gratification of some particular passion, 
the strongest that they have. The end of a 
man is, as already explained, to live conform- 
ably to nature, and he will thus obtain happi- 
ness, tranquillity of mind, and contentment 
(iii. 12; viii. 1, and other places). As a 
means of living conformably to nature he must 
study the four chief virtues, each of which has 
its proper sphere: wisdom, or the knowledge 
of good and evil; justice, or the giving to every 
man his due; fortitude, or the enduring of labor 
and pain ; and temperance, which is moderation 
in all things. By thus living conformably to 
nature the Stoic obtained all that he wished or 
expected. His reward was in his virtuous life, 
and he was satisfied with that. Some Greek 
poet long ago wrote: — 

" For virtue only of all human things 
Takes her reward not from the hands of others. 
Virtue herself rewards the toils of virtue." 

Some of the Stoics indeed expressed them- 
selves in very arrogant, absurd terms, about 
the wise man's self-sufficiency; they elevated 
him to the rank of a deity.* But these were 

*J. Smith in his Select Discourses on "the Excel- 
lency and Nobleness of True Religion " (c. vi.) has re- 
marked on this Stoical arrogance. He finds it in 
Seneca and others. In Seneca certainly, and perhaps 
something of it in Epictetus; but it is not in Antoni- 



fl&arcus Butelfus Bntonfnus* 97 

only talkers and lecturers, such as those in all 
ages who utter fine words, know little of human 
affairs, and care only for notoriety. Epictetus 
and Antoninus both by precept and example 
labored to improve themselves and others; and 
if we discover imperfections in their teaching, 
we must still honor these great men who at- 
tempted to show that there is in man's nature 
and in the constitution of things sufficient 
reason for living a virtuous life. It is difficult 
enough to live as we ought to live, difficult 
even for any man to live in such a way as to 
satisfy himself, if he exercises only in a moder- 
ate degree the power of reflecting upon and re- 
viewing his own conduct; and if all men cannot 
be brought to the same opinions in morals and 
religion, it is at least worth while to give them 
good reasons for as much as they can be per- 
suaded to accept. 



THE THOUGHTS 



OF 



MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 



THE THOUGHTS 
OF 

MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 



I. 

FROM my grandfather Verus* [I learned] 
good morals and the government of my 
temper. 

2. From the reputation and remembrance of 
my father, f modesty and a manly character. 

* Annius Verus was his grandfather's name. There 
is no verb in this section connected with the word 
"from," nor in the following sections of this book; 
and it is not quite certain what verb should be sup- 
plied. What I have added may express the meaning 
here, though there are sections which it will not fit. 
If he does not mean to say that he learned all these 
good things from the several persons whom he men- 
tions, he means that he observed certain good quali- 
ties in them, or received certain benefits from them, 
and it is implied that he was the better for it, or at 
least might have been for it would be a mistake to 
understand Marcus as saying that he possessed all the 
virtues which he observed in his kinsmen and teachers, 

t His father's name was Annius Verus. 
(IOI) 



io2 GbcmsbtS* [Book L 

3. From my mother,* piety and beneficence, 
and abstinence, not only from evil deeds, but 
even from evil thoughts; and further, sim- 
plicity in my way of living, far removed from 
the habits of the rich. 

4. From my great-grandfather, f not to have 
frequented public schools, and to have had 
good teachers at home, and to know that on 
such things a man should spend liberally. 

5. From my governor, to be neither of the 
green nor of the blue party at the games in the 
Circus, nor a partisan either of the Parmular- 
ius or the Scutarius at the gladiators' fights ; 
from him too I learned endurance of labor, and 
to want little, and to work with my own 
hands, and not to meddle with other people's 
affairs, and not to be ready to listen to slander. 

6. From Diognetus, J not to busy myself 

*His mother was Domitia Calvilla, named also 
Lucilla. 

t Perhaps his mother's grandfather, Catilius Severus. 

X In the works of Justinus there is printed a letter 
to one Diognetus, whom the writer names "most ex- 
cellent." He was a Gentile, but he wished very much 
to know what the religion of the Christians was, what 
God they worshipped, and how this worship made 
them despise the world and death, and neither believe 
in the gods of the Greeks nor observe the superstition 
of the Jews ; and what was this love to one another 
which they had, and why this new kind of religion 
was introduced now and not before. My friend Mr. 
Jenkins, rector of Lyminge in Kent, has suggested to 
me that this Diognetus may have been the tutor of 
M. Antoninus. 



Book L] /Bbarcue Bureltus Bntonfnus* 103 

about trifling things, and not to give credit to 
what was said by miracle- workers and jugglers 
about incantations and the driving away of 
daemons and such things ; and not to breed 
quails [for fighting], nor to give myself up 
passionately to such things; and to endure 
freedom of speech; and to have become inti- 
mate with philosophy; and to have been a 
hearer, first of Bacchius, then of Tandasis and 
Marcianus; and to have written dialogues in 
my 3 r outh; and to have desired a plank bed 
and skin, and whatever else of the kind be- 
longs to the Grecian discipline. 

7. From Rusticus* I received the impres- 
sion that my character required improvement 
and discipline; and from him I learned not to 
be led astray to sophistic emulation, nor to 
writing on speculative matters, nor to deliver- 
ing little hortatory orations, nor to showing 
myself off as a man who practises much dis- 
cipline, or does benevolent acts in order to 
make a display; and to abstain from rhetoric, 
and poetry, and fine writing; and not to walk 
about in the house in my outdoor dress, nor to 

*Q. Junius Rusticuswas a Stoic philosopher, whom 
Antoninus valued highly, and often took his advice 
(Capitol. M. Antonin. iii). 

Antoninus says, rolq ^mKTTjTeioiQ vTTOfivTjfiaGtv, which 
must not be translated, "the writings of Epictetus," 
for Kpictetus wrote nothing. His pupil Arrian, who 
has preserved for us all that we know of Kpictetus, 
says, ravra kireipddTjv vnojuvy/LLara kjuavrti diatyvXdt-ac rfjq 
eneivov diavoiac (Ep. ad. Gell.) 



104 GbOUGbtS* [Book L 

do other things of the kind; and to write my 
letters with simplicity, like the letter which 
Rusticus wrote from Sinuessa to my mother; 
and with respect to those who have offended 
me by words, or done me wrong, to be easily 
disposed to be pacified and reconciled, as soon 
as they have shown a readiness to be recon- 
ciled; and to read carefully, and not to be 
satisfied with a superficial understanding of a 
book; nor hastily to give my assent to those 
who talk overmuch; and I am indebted to him 
for being acquainted with the discourses of 
Epictetus, which he communicated to me out 
of his own collection. 

8. From Apollonius* I learned freedom of 
will and undeviating steadiness of purpose; 
and to look to nothing else, not even for a 
moment, except to reason; and to be always 
the same, in sharp pains, on the occasion of 
the loss of a child, and in long illness; and to 
see clearly in a living example that the same 
man can be both most resolute and yielding, 
and not peevish in giving his instruction; and 
to have had before my eyes a man who clearly 
considered his experience and his skill in. ex- 
pounding philosophical principles as the small- 
est of his merits; and from him I learned how 
to receive from friends what are esteemed 
favors, without being either humbled by them 
or letting them pass unnoticed. 

* Apollonius of Chalcis came to Rome in the time 
of Pius to be Marcus' preceptor. He was a rigid 
Stoic. 



Book I.] Marcus Hureliue Sntcmfnus* 105 

9. From Sextus,* a benevolent disposition, 
and the example of a family governed in a 
fatherly manner, and the idea of living con- 
formably to nature; and gravity without affec- 
tation, and to look carefully after the interests 
of friends, and to tolerate ignorant persons, 
and those who form opinions without consid- 
eration :+ he had the pow T er of readily ac- 
commodating himself to all, so that intercourse 
with him was more agreeable than any flattery; 
and at the same time he was most highly ven- 
erated by those who associated with him: and 
he had the faculty both of discovery and order- 
ing, in an intelligent and methodical way, the 
principles necessary for life; and he never 
showed anger or any other passion, but was 
entirely free from passion, and also most affec- 
tionate; and he could express approbation 
without noisy display, and he possessed much 
knowledge without ostentation. 

10. From Alexander f the grammarian, to 
refrain from fault-finding, and not in a reproach- 
ful way to chide those who uttered any barbar- 
ous or solecistic or strange-sounding expression; 
but dexterously to introduce the very expres- 
sion which ought to have been used, and in the 

*Sextus of Chaeronea, a grandson of Plutarch, or 
nephew, as some say ; but more probably a grandson. 

f Alexander was a Grammaticus, a native of Phrygia. 
He wrote a commentary on Homer ; and the rhetori- 
cian Aristides wrote a panegyric on Alexander in a 
funeral oration. 



106 GbOUflbtS, [Book I. 

way of answer or giving confirmation, or join- 
ing in an inquiry about the thing itself, not 
about the word, or by some other fit sugges- 
tion. 

1 1 . From Fronto * I learned to observe what 
envy and duplicity and hypocrisy are in a ty- 
rant, and that generally those among us who 
are called Patricians are rather deficient in pa- 
ternal affection. 

12. From Alexander the Platonic, not fre- 
quently nor without necessity to say to any one, 
or to write in a letter, that I have no leisure; 
nor continually to excuse the neglect of duties 
required by our relation to those with whom 
we live, by alleging urgent occupations. 

13. From Catulus,t not to be indifferent 
when a friend finds fault, even if he should find 
fault without reason, but to try to restore him 
to his usual disposition; and to be ready to 
speak well of teachers, as it is reported of 
Domitius and Athenodotus; and to love my 
children truly. 

14. From my brother J Severus, to love my 

*M. Cornelius Fronto was a rhetorician, and in 
great favor with Marcus. There are extant various 
letters between Marcus and Fronto. 

f Cinna Catulus, a Stoic philosopher. 

J The word brother may not be genuine. Antoni- 
nus had no brother. It has been supposed that he 
may mean some cousin. Schultz in his translation 
omits "brother," and says that this Severus is prob- 
ably Claudius Severus, a peripatetic. 



Book I.] dfcatcus Burelius Bntoninus* 107 

kin, and to love truth, and to love justice; and 
through him I learned to know Thrasea, Hel- 
vidius, Cato, Dion, Brutus;* and from him I 
received the idea of a polity in which there is 
the same law for all, a polity administered with 
regard to equal rights and equal freedom of 
speech, and the idea of a kingly government 
which respects most of all the freedom of the 
governed; I learned from him also + consist- 
ency and undeviating steadiness in my regard 
for philosophy; and a disposition to do good, 
and to give to others readily, and to cherish 
good hopes, and to believe that I am loved by 
my friends; and in him I observed no conceal- 
ment of his opinions with respect to those 
whom he condemned, and that his friends had 
no need to conjecture what he wished or did 
not wish, but it was quite plain. 

15. From Maximusf I learned self-govern- 
ment, and not to be led aside by anything; and 
cheerfulness in ail circumstances, as well as in 
illness; and a just admixture in the moral 
character of sweetness and dignity, and to do 

*We know, from Tacitus (Annal. xiii., xvi. 21; 
and other passages), who Thrasea and Helvidius 
were. Plutarch has written the lives of the two Catos, 
and of Dion and Brutus. Antoninus probably alludes 
to Cato of Utica, who was a Stoic. 

t Claudius Maximus was a Stoic philosopher, who 
was highly esteemed also by Antoninus Pius, Marcus' 
predecessor. The character of Maximus is that of a 
perfect man. (See viii. 25,) 



io8 GbOU0bt0* [BookL 

what was set before me without complaining. 
I observed that everybody believed that he 
thought as he spoke, and that in all that he 
did he never had any bad intention; and he 
never showed amazement and surprise, and was 
never in a hurry, and never put off doing a 
thing, nor was perplexed nor dejected, nor did 
he ever laugh to disguise his vexation, nor, on 
the other hand, was he ever passionate or sus- 
picious. He was accustomed to do acts of 
beneficence, and was ready to forgive, and was 
free from all falsehood; and he presented the 
appearance of a man who could not be diverted 
from right, rather than of a man who had been 
improved. I observed, too, that no man could 
ever think that he was despised by Maxim us, 
or ever venture to think himself a better man. 
He had also the art of being humorous in an 
agreeable way.+ 

16. In my father* I observed mildness of 
temper, and unchangeable resolution in the 
things which he had determined after due de- 
liberation; and no vain-glory in those things 
which men call honors; and a love of labor and 
perseverance; and a readiness to listen to those 
who had anything to propose for the common 
weal; and undeviating firmness in giving to 
every man according to his deserts; and a 
knowledge derived from experience of the oc- 

* He means his adoptive father, his predecessor, the 
Emperor Antoninus Pius. Compare vi. 30. 



Book I.] dfcarcus Bureltus Hntonfnus* 109 

casions for vigorous action and for remission. 
And I observed that he had overcome all pas- 
sion for boys; and he considered himself no 
more than any other citizen;* and he released 
his friends from all obligation to sup with him 
or to attend him of necessity when he went 
abroad, and those who had failed to accompany 
him, by reason of any urgent circumstances, 
always found him the same. I observed too 
his habit of careful inquiry in all matters of de- 
liberation, and his persistency, and that he 
never stopped his investigation through being 
satisfied with appearances which first present 
themselves; and that his disposition was to 
keep his friends, and not to be soon tired of 
them, nor yet to be extravagant in his affection; 
and to be satisfied on all occasions, and cheer- 
ful; and to foresee things a long way off, and to 
provide for the smallest without display; and to 
check immediately popular applause and all 
flattery; and to be ever watchful over the 
things which were necessary for the administra- 
tion of the empire, and to be a good manager 
of the expenditure, and patiently to endure the 
blame which he got for such conduct; and he 
was neither superstitious with respect to the 
gods, nor did he court men by gifts or by trying 
to please them, or by flattering the populace; 
but he showed sobriety in all things, and firm- 
ness, and never any mean thoughts or action, 

*He uses the word kolvovo^/xogvv^. See Gataker's 
note. 



HO XlbOMQbtB. [Book I. 

nor love of novelty. And the things which 
conduce in any way to the commodity of life, 
and of which fortune gives an abundant supply, 
he used without arrogance and without excusing 
himself; so that when he had them, he enjoyed 
them without affectation, and when he had 
them not, he did not want them. No one 
could ever say of him that he was either a 
sophist or a [home-bred] flippant slave or a 
pedant; but every one acknowledged him to be 
a man ripe, perfect, above flattery, able to man- 
age his own and other men's affairs. Besides 
this, he honored those who were true philoso- 
phers, and he did not reproach those who pre- 
tended to be philosophers, nor yet was he easily 
led by them. He was also easy in conversation, 
and he made himself agreeable without any 
offensive affectation. He took a reasonable 
care of his body's health, not as one who was 
greatly attached to life, nor out of regard to 
personal appearance, nor yet in a careless way, 
but so that through his own attention he very 
seldom stood in need of the physician's art or 
of medicine or external applications. He was 
most ready to give without envy to those who 
possessed any particular faculty, such as that 
of eloquence or knowledge of the law or of 
morals, or of anything else; and he gave them 
his help, that each might enjoy reputation ac- 
cording to his deserts; and he always acted con- 
formably to the institutions of his country, 
without showing any affectation of doing so. 



Book I.] Marcus Bureltus Bntonfnus* m 

Further, tie was not fond of change nor un- 
steady, but he loved to stay in the same places, 
and to employ himself about the same things; 
and after his paroxysms of headache he came 
immediately fresh and vigorous to his usual 
occupations. His secrets were not many, but 
very few and very rare, and these only about 
public matters; and he showed prudence and 
economy in the exhibition of the public 
spectacles and the construction of public build- 
ings, his donations to the people, and in such 
things, for he was a man who looked to what 
ought to be done, not to the reputation which 
is got by a man's acts. He did not take the 
bath at unseasonable hours; he was not fond of 
building houses, nor curious about what he 
ate, nor about the texture and color of his 
clothes, nor about the beauty of his slaves.* 
His dress came from Lorium, his villa on the 
coast, and from Iyanuvium generally. f We 
know how he behaved to the toll-collector at 
Tusculum who asked his pardon; and such was 
all his behavior. There was in him nothing 
harsh, nor implacable, nor violent, nor, as one 
may say, anything carried to the sweating 
point; but he examined all things severally, as 
if he had abundance of time, and without con- 

* This passage is corrupt, and the exact meaning is 
uncertain. 

f Lorium was a villa on the coast north of Rome, 
and there Antoninus was brought up, and he died 
there. This also is corrupt. 



112 GbOUGbtS* [Book I. 

fusion, in an orderly way, vigorously and con- 
sistently. And that might be applied to him 
which is recorded of Socrates,* that he was able 
both to abstain from, and to enjoy, those 
things which many are too weak to abstain 
from, and cannot enjoy without excess. But 
to be strong enough both to bear the one and 
to be sober in the other is the mark of a man 
who has a perfect and invincible soul, such as 
he showed in the illness of Maximus. 

17. To the gods I am indebted for having 
good grandfathers, good parents, a good sister, 
good teachers, good associates, good kinsmen 
and friends, nearly everything good. Further, 
I owe it to the gods that I was not hurried into 
any offence against any of them, though I had 
a disposition which, if opportunity had offered, 
might have led me to do something of this 
kind ; but, through their favor, there never 
was such a concurrence of circumstances as put 
me to the trial. Further, I am thankful to the 
gods that I was not longer brought up with my 
grandfather's concubine, and that I preserved 
the flower of my youth, and that I did not 
make proof of my virility before the proper 
season, but even deferred the time ; that I was 
subjected to a ruler and father who was able to 
take away all pride from me, and to bring me 
to the knowledge that it is possible for a man 
to live in a palace without wanting either 

*Xenophon, Memorab. i. 3, 15. 



Book I.] /ifcarcus Burelius Sntonfnus* 113 

guards or embroidered dresses, or torches and 
statues, and such-like show ; but that it is in 
such a man's power to bring himself very near 
to the fashion of a private person, without be- 
ing for this reason either meaner in thought, 
or more remiss in action, with respect to the 
things which must be done for the public in- 
terest in a manner that befits a ruler. I thank 
the gods for giving me such a brother,* who 
was able by his moral character to rouse me to 
vigilance over myself, and who at the same 
time pleased me by his respect and affection ; 
that my children have not been stupid nor de- 
formed in body ; that I did not make more pro- 
ficiency in rhetoric, poetry, and the other 
studies, in which I should perhaps have been 
completely engaged, if I had seen that I was 
making progress in them; that L made haste 
to place those who brought me up in the 
station of honor, which they seemed to desire, 
without putting them off with hope of my do- 
ing it some other time after, because they 
were then still young; that I knew Apollonius, 
Rusticus, Maximus ; that I received clear and 
frequent impressions about living according to 
nature, and what kind of a life that is, so that, 
so far as depended on the gods, and their gifts, 
and help, and inspirations, nothing hindered 
me from forthwith living according to nature, 

* The emperor had no brother except L,. Verus, his 
brother by adoption. 



H4 Gbougbts, [BookL 

though I still fall short of it through my own 
fault, and through not observing the admoni- 
tions of the gods, and, I may almost say, theii 
direct instructions ; that my body has held out 
so long in such a kind of life ; that I never 
touched either Benedicta or Theodotus, and 
that, after having fallen into amatory passions, 
I was cured, and, though I was often out of 
humor with Rusticus, I never did anything of 
which I had occasion to repent; that, though 
it was my mother's fate to die young, she 
spent the last years of her life with me ; that, 
whenever I wished to help any man in his 
need, or on any other occasion, I was never 
told that I had not the means of doing it ; and 
that to myself the same necessity never hap- 
pened, to receive anything from another ; that 
I have such a wife,* so obedient, and so affec- 
tionate, and so simple ; that I had abundance 
of good masters for my children ; and that 
remedies have been shown to me by dreams, 
both others, and against bloodspitting and 
giddiness f . . . ; and that, when I had an in- 
clination to philosophy, I did not fall into the 
hands of any sophist, and that I did not waste 
my time on writers [of histories], or in the 
resolution of syllogisms, or occupy myself 
about the investigation of appearances in the 
heavens ; for all these things require the help 
of the gods and fortune. 

* vSee the Life of Antoninus. 
t This is corrupt. 



Book I.] dftarcus Bureltus Bntonfnus, 115 

Among the Quadi at the Granua.* 

*The Quadi lived in the southern part of Bohemia 
and Moravia ; and Antoninus made a campaign against 
them. (See the Life.) Granua is probably the river 
Graan, which flows into the Danube. 

If these words are genuine, Antoninus may have 
written this first book during the war with the Quadi. 
In the first edition of Antoninus, and in the older 
editions, the first three sections of the second book 
make the conclusion of the first book. Gataker 
placed them at the beginning of the second book. 



n6 Gbougbte. [BookIL 



II. 

BEGIN the morning by saying to thyself, I 
shall meet with the busybody, the un- 
grateful, arrogant) deceitful, envious, unsocial. 
All these things happen to them by reason of 
their ignorance of what is good and evil. But 
I who have seen the nature of the good that it 
is beautiful, and of the bad that it is ugly, and 
the nature of him who does wrong, that it is 
akin to me; not [only] of the same blood or 
seed, but that it participates in [the same] in- 
telligence and [the same] portion of the divin- 
ity, I can neither be injured by any of them, 
for no one can fix on me what is ugly, nor can 
I be angry with my kinsman, nor hate him. 
For we are made for co-operation, like feet, like 
hands, like eyelids, like the rows of the upper 
and lower teeth.* To act against one another, 
then, is contrary to nature; and it is acting 
against one another to be vexed and to turn 
away. 

2. Whatever this is that I am, it is a little 
flesh and breath, and the ruling part. Throw 
away thy books; no longer distract thyself: it 
is not allowed; but as if thou wast now dying, 
despise the flesh; it is blood and bones and 

*Xenophon, Mem. ii. 3. 18. 



Book II.] jflRarcus Bureliue Bntonfnus* nj 

network, a contexture of nerves, veins, and 
arteries. See the breath also, what kind ot a 
thing it is; air, and not always the same, but 
every moment sent out and again sucked in. 
The third, then, is the ruling part; consider 
thus: Thou art an old man; no longer let this 
be a slave, no longer be pulled by the strings 
like a puppet to unsocial movements, no longer 
be either dissatisfied with thy present lot, or 
shrink from the future. 

3. All that is from the gods is full of provi- 
dence. That which is from fortune is not sep- 
arated from nature or without an interweaving 
and involution with the things which are 
ordered by providence. From thence all things 
flow; and there is besides necessity, and that 
which is for the advantage of the whole universe, 
of which thou art a part. But that is good for 
every part of nature which the nature of the 
whole brings, and what serves to maintain this 
nature. Now the universe is preserved, as by 
the changes of the elements so by the changes 
of things compounded of the elements. Let 
these principles be enough for thee; let them 
always be fixed opinions. But cast away the 
thirst after books, that thou mayest not die 
murmuring, but cheerfully, truly, and from thy 
heart thankful to the gods. 

4. Remember how long thou hast been put- 
ting off these things, and how often thou hast 
received an opportunity from the gods, and yet 
dcst not use it. Thou must now at last per- 



1 1 8 GbOU0btS, [Book II. 

ceive of what universe thou art a part, and of 
what administrator of the universe thy exist- 
ence is an efflux, and that a limit of time is 
fixed for thee, which if thou dost not use for 
clearing away the clouds from thy mind, it will 
go and thou wilt go, and it will never return. 

5. Every moment think steadily as a Roman 
and a man to do what thou hast in hand with 
perfect and simple dignity, and feeling of af- 
fection, and freedom, and justice, and to give 
thyself relief from all other thoughts. And 
thou wilt give thyself relief if thou doest every 
act of thy life as if it were the last, laying aside 
all carelessness and passionate aversion from 
the commands of reason, and all hypocrisy, 
and self-love, and discontent with the portion 
which has been given to thee. Thou seest 
how few the things are, the which if a man 
lays hold of, he is able to live a life which flows 
in quiet, and is like the existence of the gods; 
for the gods on their part will require nothing 
more from him who observes these things. 

6. Do wrong* to thyself, do wrong to thy- 
self, my soul; but thou wilt no longer have the 
opportunity of honoring thyself. Every man's 
life is sufficient. + But thine is nearly finished, 
though thy soul reverences not itself, but places 
thy felicity in the souls of others. 

7. Do the things external which fall upon 

* Perhaps it should be, " thou art doing violence to 
thyself." vf]pi£ei£, not v[3pt£e. 



Book II] Marcus Burelfus Bntoninus, ng 

thee distract thee ? Give thyself time to learn 
something new and good, and cease to be 
whirled around. But then thou must also 
avoid being carried about the other way; for 
those too are triflers who have wearied them- 
selves in life by their activity, and yet have no 
object to which to direct every movement, and, 
in a word, all their thoughts. 

8. Through not observing what is in ttr 
mind of another a man has seldom been seen 
to be unhappy; but those who do not observe 
the movements of their own minds must of ne- 
cessity be unhappy. 

9. This thou must always bear in mind, 
what is the nature of the whole, and what is 
my nature, and how this is related to that, and 
what kind of a part it is of what kind of a 
whole, and that there is no one who hinders 
thee from always doing and saying the things 
which are according to the nature of which 
thou art a part. 

10. Theophrastus, in his comparison of bad 
acts — such a comparison as one -would make in 
accordance with the common notions of man- 
kind — says, like a true philosopher, that the 
offenses which are committed through desire are 
more blamable than those which are committed 
through anger. For he who is excited by 
anger seems to turn away from reason with a 
certain pain and unconscious contraction; but 
he who offends through desire, being overpow- 
ered by pleasure, seems to be in a manner more 



120 abouflbts* [Book tt 

intemperate and more womanish in his offences. 
Rightly, then, and in a way worthy of phil- 
osophy, he said that the offence which is com- 
mitted with pleasure is more blamable than 
that which is committed with pain; and on the 
whole the one is more like a person who has 
been first wronged and through pain is com- 
pelled to be angry, but the other is moved by 
his own impulse to do wrong, being carried to- 
wards doing something by desire. 

ii. Since it is possible* that thou mayest 
depart from life this very moment, regulate every 
act and thought accordingly, f But to go away 
from among men, if there are gods, is not a 
thing to be afraid of, for the gods will not in- 
volve thee in evil; but if indeed they do not 
exist, or if they have no concern about human 
affairs, what is it to me to live in a universe 
devoid of gods or devoid of providence ? But 
in truth they do exist, and they do care for 
human things, and they have put all the means 
in man's power to enable him not to fall into 
real evils. And as to the rest, if there was any- 
thing evil, they would have provided for this 
also, that it should be altogether in a man's 
power not to fall into it. Now that which does 
not make a man worse, how can it make a man's 
life worse ? But neither through ignorance, nor 

* Or it may mean, " since it is in thy power to de- 
part;" which gives a meaning somewhat different. 

t-See Cicero, Tuscul., i. 49. 



BooklL] /Hbarcus Butelfus Bntontnue* 121 

having the knowledge but not the power to 
guard against or correct these things, is it pos- 
sible that the nature of the universe has over- 
looked them; nor is it possible that it has made 
so great a mistake, either through want of 
power or want of skill, that good and evil 
should happen indiscriminately to the good and 
the bad. But death certainly, and life, honor 
and dishonor, pain and pleasure, — all these 
"-"Hings equally happen to good men and bad, 
bein£ things which make us neither better nor 
worse. Therefore they are neither good nor 
evil. 

12. How quickly all things disappear, — in 
fie universe the bodies themselves, but in time 
the remembrance of them. What is the nature 
of all sensible things, and particularly those 
which attract with the bait of pleasure or terrify 
by pain, or are noised abroad by vapory fame; 
how worthless, and contemptible, and sordid, 
and perishable, and dead they are, — all this it 
is the part of the intellectual faculty to observe. 
To observe too who these are whose opinions 
and voices give reputation; what death is, and 
the fact that, if a man looks at it in itself, and 
by the abstractive power of reflection resolves 
into their parts all the things which present 
themselves to the imagination in it, he will then 
consider it to be nothing else than an operation 
of nature; and if any one is afraid of an opera- 
tion of nature, he is a child. This, however, 
is not only an operation of nature, but it is also 



122 GbOU0bt0* [Bookll. 

a thing which conduces to the purposes of na- 
ture. To observe too how man comes near to the 
Deity, and by what part of him, and when this 
part of man is so disposed -f (vi. 28). 

13. Nothing is more wretched than a man 
who traverses everything in a round, and pries 
into the things beneath the earth, as the poet* 
sa}^s, and seeks , by conjecture what is in the 
minds of his neighbors, without perceiving 
that it is sufficient to attend to the daemon 
within him, and to reverence it sincerely. And 
reverence of the daemon consists in keeping it 
pure from passion and thoughtlessness, and 
dissatisfaction with what comes from gods and 
men. For the things from the gods merit 
veneration for their excellence; and the things 
from men should be dear to us by reason of 
kinship; and sometimes even, in a manner, 
they move our pity by reason of men's igno- 
rance of good and bad; this defect being not 
less than that which deprives us of the power 
of distinguishing things that are white and 
black. 

14. Though thou shouldest be going to live 
three thousand years and as many times ten 
thousand years, still remember that no man 
loses any other life than this which he now 
lives, nor lives any other than this which he 
now loses. The longest and shortest are thus 
brought to the same. For the present is the 

* Pindar, in the Theaetetus of Plato. See xi. 1. 



Book II.] /irsavcue BureHus Bntoninus* 123 

same to all, though that which perish is not 
the same;+* and so that which is lost appears 
to be a mere moment. For a man cannot lose 
eithei the past or the future: for what a man 
has not, how can any one take this from him ? 
These two things then thou must bear in mind; 
the one, that all things from eternity are of 
like forms and come round in a circle, and that 
it makes no difference whether a man shall see 
the same things during a hundred years, or 
two hundred, or an infinite time; and the sec- 
ond, that the longest liver and he who will die 
soonest lose just the same. For the present is 
the only thing of which a man can be deprived, 
if it is true that this is the only thing which he 
has, and that a man cannot lose a thing if he 
has it not. 

15. Remember that all is opinion. For what 
was said by the Cynic Monimus is manifest : 
and manifest too is the use of what was said, if 
a man receives what may be got out of it as fat 
as it is true. 

16. The soul of man does violence to itself, 
first of all, when it becomes an abscess, and, as 
it were, a tumor on the universe, so far as it 
can. For to be vexed at anything which hap- 
pens is a separation of ourselves from nature, 
in some part of which the natures of all other 
things are contained. In the next place, the 
soul does violence to itself when it turns away 

* See Gataker's note. 



124 GbOU0bt0, [BookIL 

from any man, or even moves towards him with 
the intention of injuring, such as are the souls 
of those who are angry. In the third place, 
the soul does violence to itself when it is over- 
powered by pleasure or by pain. Fourthly, 
when it plays a part, and does or says anything 
insincerely and untruly. Fifthly, when it al- 
lows any act of its own and any movement to 
be without an aim, and does anything thought- 
lessly and without considering what it is, it 
being right that even the smallest things be 
done with reference to an end; and the end of 
rational animals is to follow the reason and the 
law of the most ancient city and polity. 

17. Of human life the time is a point, and 
the substance is in a flux, and the perception 
dull, and the composition of the whole body 
subject to putrefaction, and the soul a whirl, 
and fortune hard to divine, and fame a thing 
devoid of judgment. And, to say all in a word, 
everything which belongs to the body is a 
stream, and what belongs to the soul is a dream 
and vapor, and life is a warfare and a stranger's 
sojourn, and after-fame is oblivion. What then 
is that which is able to conduct a man ? One 
thing, and only one, philosophy. But this 
consists in keeping the daemon within a man 
free from violence and unharmed, superior to 
pains and pleasures, doing nothing without a 
purpose, nor yet falsely and with hypocrisy, 
not feeling the need of another man's doing or 
not doing anything; and besides, accepting all 



Book II.] jflfcarcua Burelfus Bntonfnus* 125 

that happens, and all that is allotted, as com- 
ing from thence, wherever it is, from whence 
he himself came; and, finally, waiting for death 
with a cheerful mind, as being nothing else 
than a dissolution of the elements of which 
every living being is compounded. But if there 
is no harm to the elements themselves in each 
continually changing into another, why should 
a man have any apprehension about the change 
and dissolution of all the elements ? For it is 
according to nature, and nothing is evil which 
is according to nature. 
This in Carnuntum.* 

* Carnuntum was a town of Pannonia, on the south 
side of the Danube, about thirty miles east of Vindo- 
bona (Vienna). Orosius (vii. 15) and Butropius (viii. 
13) say that Antoninus remained three years at Car- 
numtum during his war with the Marcomanni. 



126 GbOU0bt6* [Book III. 



III. 

WE ought to consider not only that our life 
is daily wasting away and a smaller part 
of it is left, but another thing also must be 
taken into the account, that if a man should 
live longer, it is quite uncertain whether the un- 
derstanding will still continue sufficient for the 
comprehension of things, and retain the power 
of contemplation which strives to acquire the 
knowledge of the divine and the human. For 
if he shall begin to fall into dotage, perspiration 
and nutrition and imagination and appetite, and 
whatever else there is of the kind, will not fail; 
but the power of making use of ourselves, and 
filling up the measure of our duty, and clearly 
separating all appearances, and considering 
whether a man should now depart from life, 
and whatever else of the kind absolutely re- 
quires a disciplined reason, — all this is already 
extinguished. We must make haste, then, not 
only because we are daily nearer to death, but 
also because the conception of things and the 
understanding of them cease first. 

2. We ought to observe also that even the 
things which follow after the things which 
are produced according to nature contain 
something pleasing and attractive. For in- 
stance, when bread is baked some parts are 



Book in.] flfcarcus Surelius Sntontnus* 127 

split at the surface, and these parts which 
thus open, and have a certain fashion contrary 
to the purpose of the baker's art, are beautiful in 
a manner, and in a peculiar way excite a desire 
for eating. And again, figs, when they are 
quite ripe, gape open; and in the ripe olives the 
very circumstance of their being near to rotten- 
ness adds a peculiar beauty to the fruit. And 
the ears of corn bending down, and the lion's 
eyebrows, and the foam which flows from the 
mouth of wild boars, and many other things, — 
though they are far from being beautiful if a 
man should examine them severally, — still, be- 
cause they are consequent upon the things 
which are formed by nature, help to adorn 
them, and they please the mind; so that if a 
man should have a feeling and deeper insight 
with respect to the things which are produced 
in the universe, there is hardly one of those 
w T hich follow by way of consequence which 
will not seem to him to be in a manner dis- 
posed so as to give pleasure. And so he will 
see even the real gaping jaws of wild beasts 
with no less pleasure than those which painters 
and sculptors show by imitation; and in an old 
woman and an old man he will be able to see a 
certain maturity and comeliness; and the at- 
tractive loveliness of young persons he will be 
able to look on with chaste eyes; and many 
such things will present themselves, not pleas- 
ing to every man, but to him only who has be- 
come truly familiar with Nature and her works. 



128 ZbOUQbtB. [Book III. 

3. Hippocrates, after curing many diseases, 
himself fell sick and died. The Chaldaei fore- 
told the deaths of many, and then fate caught 
them too. Alexander and Pompeius, and 
Caius Caesar, after so often completely destroy- 
ing whole cities, and in battle cutting to pieces 
many ten thousands of cavalry and infantry, 
themselves too at last departed from life. 
Heraclitus, after so many speculations on the 
conflagration of the universe, was filled with 
water internally and died smeared all over with 
mud. And lice destroyed Democritus; and 
other lice killed Socrates. What means all 
this? Thou hast embarked, thou hast made 
the voyage, thou art come to shore; get out. 
If indeed to another life, there is no want of 
gods, not even there; but if to a state without 
sensation, thou wilt cease to be held by pains 
and pleasures, and to be a slave to the vessel, 
which is as much inferior as that which serves 
it is superior :+ for the one is intelligence and 
deity; the other is earth and corruption. 

4. Do not waste the remainder of thy life in 
thoughts about others, when thou dost not 
refer thy thoughts to some object of common 
utility. For thou losest the opportunity of 
doing something else when thou hast such 
thoughts as these, — What is such a person 
doing, and why, and what is he saying, and 
what is he thinking of, and what is he contriv- 
ing, and whatever else of the kind makes us 
wander away from the observation of our own 



Book in. j dfcarcua Bureltus Bntcmfnus* * 129 

ruling power. We ought then to check in the 
series of our thoughts everything that is with- 
out a purpose and useless, but most of all the 
over-curious feeling and the malignant; and a 
man should use himself to think of those 
things only about which if one should sudden- 
ly ask, What hast thou now in thy thoughts ? 
with perfect openness thou mightest immedi- 
ately answer, This or That; so that from thy 
words it should be plain that everything in 
thee is simple and benevolent, and such as be- 
fits a social animal, and one that cares not for 
thoughts about pleasure or sensual enjoyments 
at all, nor has any rivalry or envy and sus- 
picion, or anything else for which thou wouldst 
blush if thou shouldst say that thou hadst it in 
thy mind. For the man who is such, and no 
longer delays being among the number of the 
best, is like a priest and minister of the gods, 
using too the [deity] which is planted within 
him, which makes the man uncontaminated by 
pleasure, unharmed by any pain, untouched by 
any insult, feeling no wrong, a fighter in the 
noblest fight, one who cannot be overpowered 
by any passion, dyed deep with justice, accept- 
ing with all his soul everything which happens 
and is assigned to him as his portion; and not 
often, nor yet without great necessity and 
for the general interest, imagining what an- 
other says, or does, or thinks. For it is only 
what belongs to himself that he makes the 
matter for his activity; and he constantly 



13c Gbougbte. [Book III 

thinks of that which is allotted to himself out 
of the sum total of things, and he makes his 
own acts fair, and he is persuaded that his own 
portion is good. For the lot which is assigned 
to each man is carried along with him and 
carries him along with it.+ And he remem- 
bers also that every rational animal is his kins- 
man, and that to care for all men is according 
to man's nature ; and a man should hold on to 
the opinion not of all, but of those only who 
confessedly live according to nature. But as to 
those who live not so, he always bears in mind 
what kind of men they are both at home and 
from home, both by night and by day, and 
what they are, and with what men they live 
an impure life. Accordingly, he does not value 
at all the praise which comes from such men, 
since they are not even satisfied with them- 
selves. 

5. Labor not unwillingly, nor without regard 
to the common interest, nor without due con- 
sideration, nor with distraction ; nor let studied 
ornament set off thy thoughts, and be not 
either a man of many words, or busy about too 
many things. And further, let the deity which 
is in thee be the guardian of a living being, 
manly and of ripe age, and engaged in matter 
political, and a Roman, and a ruler, who has 
taken his post like a man waiting for the signal 
which summons him from life, and ready to go, 
having need neither of oath nor of any man's 
testimony. Be cheerful also, and seek not ex- 



Book in.] /ifcarcus Burelius Iftntontnus* 131 

ternal help nor the tranquillity which others 
give. A man then must stand erect s not be 
kept erect by others. 

6. If thou findest in human life anything 
better than justice, truth, temperance, fortitude, 
and, in a word, anything better than thy own 
mind's self-satisfaction in the things which it 
enables thee to do according to right reason, 
and in the condition that is assigned to thee 
without thy own choice ; if, I say, thou seest 
anything better than this, turn to it with all 
thy soul, and enjoy that which thou hast found 
to be the best. But if nothing appears to be 
better than the Deity which is planted in thee : 
which has subjected to itself all thy appetites, 
and carefully examines all the impressions, and, 
as Socrates said, has detached itself from the 
persuasions of sense, and has submitted itself 
to the gods, and cares for mankind; if thou 
findest everything else smaller and of less value 
than this, give place to nothing else, for if thou 
dost once diverge and incline to it, thou wilt 
no longer without distraction be able to give 
the preference to that good thing which is thy 
proper possession and thy own ; for it is not 
right that anything of any other kind, such as 
praise from the many, or power, or enioyment 
of pleasure, should come into competition with 
that which is rationally and politically [or, 
practically] good. All these things, even 
though they may seem to adapt themselves 
[to the better things] in a small degree, obtain 



13? GbOU0bt0, [BookUL 

the superiority all at once, and carry us away. 
But do thou, I say, simply and freely choose 
the better, and hold to it. — But that which is 
useful is the better. — Well, then, if it is useful 
to thee as a rational being, keep to it; but if it 
is only useful to thee as an animal, say so, and 
maintain thy judgment without arrogance: only 
take care that thou makest the inquiry by a 
sure method. 

7. Never value anything as profitable to thy- 
self which shall compel thee to break thy prom- 
ise, to lose thy self-respect, to hate any man, to 
suspect, to curse, to act the hypocrite, to desire 
anything which needs walls and curtains: for 
he who has preferred to everything else his own 
intelligence and daemon and the worship of its 
excellence, acts no tragic part, does not groan, 
will not need either solitude or much company; 
and, what is chief of all, he will live without 
either pursuing or flying from [death];* but 
whether for a longer or a shorter time he shall 
have the soul enclosed in the body, he cares 
not at all: for even if he must depart immedi- 
ately, he will go as readily as if he were going 
to do anything else which can be done with 
decency and order; taking care of this only all 
through life, that his thoughts turn not away 
from anything which belongs to an intelligent 
animal and a member of a civil community. 

8. In the mind of one who is chastened and 

* Comp. ix. 3. 



Book III] /Ubarcus Bureliue antonfnus* 133 

purified thou wilt find no corrupt matter, nor 
impurity, nor any sore skinned over. Nor is 
his life incomplete when fate overtakes him, as 
one may say of an actor who leaves the stage 
before ending and finishing the play. Besides, 
there is in him nothing servile, nor affected, 
nor too closely bound [to other things], nor yet 
detached* [from other things], nothing worthy 
of blame, nothing which seeks a hiding-place. 

9. Reverence the faculty which produces 
opinion. On this faculty it entirely depends 
whether there shall exist in thy ruling part any 
opinion inconsistent with nature and the con- 
stitution of the rational animal. And this 
faculty promises freedom from hasty judgment, 
and friendship towards men, and obedience to 
the gods. 

10. Throwing away then all things, hold to 
these only which are few; and besides, bear in 
mind that every man lives only this present 
time, which is an indivisible point, and that 
all the rest of his life is either past or it is un- 
certain. Short then is the time which every 
man lives; and small the nook of the earth 
where he lives; and short too the longest post- 
humous fame, and even this only continued by a 
succession of poor human beings, who will very 
soon die, and who know not even themselves, 
much less him who died long ago. 

1 1 . To the aids which have been mentioned 

*viii. 34. 



134 WbOttflMS. [Book III. 

let this one still be added: Make for thyself a 
definition or description of the thing which is 
presented to thee, so as to see distinctly what 
kind of a thing it is in its substance, in its nud- 
ity, in its complete entirety, and tell thyself its 
proper name, and the names of the things of 
which it has been compounded, and into which 
it will be resolved. For nothing is so produc- 
tive of elevation of mind as to be able to exam- 
ine methodically and truly every object which 
is presented to thee in life, and always to look 
at things so as to see at the same time what 
kind of universe this is, and what kind of use 
everything performs in it, and what value 
everything has with reference to the whole, 
and what with reference to man, who is a citi- 
zen of the highest city, of which all other cities 
are like families; what each thing is, and of 
what it is composed, and how long it is the 
nature of this thing to endure which now 
makes an impression on me, and what virtue I 
have need of with respect to it, such as gentle- 
ness, manliness, truth, fidelity, simplicity, con- 
tentment, and the rest. Wherefore, on every 
occasion a man should say: This comes from 
god; and this is according to the apportion- 
ment + and spinning of the thread of destiny, 
and such-like coincidence and chance; and this 
is from one of the same stock, and a kinsman 
arid partner, one who knows not, however, 
what is according to his nature. But I know; 
for this reason I behave towards him according 



Book III.] /Hbarcus Burelfue Bntoninus, 135 

to the natural law of fellowship with benevo- 
lence and justice. At the same time, however, 
in things indifferent* I attempt to ascertain 
the value of each. 

12. If thou workest at that which is before 
thee, following right reason seriously, vigor- 
ously, calmly, without allowing anything else 
to distract thee, but keeping thy divine part 
pure, as if thou shouldst be bound to give it 
back immediately; if thou holdest to this, ex- 
pecting nothing, fearing nothing, but satisfied 
with thy present activity according to nature, 
and with heroic truth in every word and sound 
which thou utterest, thou wilt live happy. 
And there is no man who is able to prevent 
this. 

13. As physicians have always their instru- 
ments and knives ready for cases which sud- 
denly require their skill, so do thou have prin- 
ciples ready for the understanding of things 
divine and human, and for doing everything, 
even the smallest, with a recollection of the 
bond which unites the divine and human to 
one another. For neither wilt thou do any- 
thing well which pertains to man without at 
the same time having a reference to things 
divine; nor the contrary. 

14. No longer wander at hazard ; for neither 
wilt thou read thy own memoirs, f nor the acts 

* Est et horum quae media appellamus grande dis- 
crimen. — Seneca, Kp. 82. 

f vTTOfivrjiiaTa: or memoranda, notes, and the like. 
See i. 17. 



136 GbOU0bt0* [Book III. 

of the ancient Romans and Hellenes, and the 
selections from books which thou wast reserv- 
ing for thy old age.* Hasten then to the end 
which thou hast before thee, and, throwing 
aw T ay idle hopes, come to thy own aid, if thou 
carest at all for thyself, while it is in thy 
power. 

15. They know not how many things are 
signified by the words stealing, sowing, buy- 
ing, keeping quiet, seeing what ought to be 
done ; for this is not effected by the eyes, but 
by another kind of vision. 

16. Body, soul, intelligence: to the body be- 
long sensation, to the soul appetites, to the 
intelligence principles. To receive the impres- 
sions of forms by means of appearances belongs 
even to animals ; to be pulled by the stringsf 
of desire belongs both to wild beasts and to 
men who have made themselves into women, 
and to a Phalaris and a Nero : and to have the 
intelligence that guides to the things which 
appear suitable belongs also to those who do 
not believe in the gods, and who betray their 
country, and do their impure deeds when they 
have shut the doors. If then everything else 

* Compare Fronto, ii. 9; a letter of Marcus to 
Fronto, who was then consul: " Feci tamen mihi per 
hos dies excerpta ex libris sexaginta in quinque 
tomis." But he says some of them were small books. 

f Compare Plato, De Legibus, i. p. 644, hri ravra to. 
TraJdr/ etc.; and Antoninus, ii. 2; vii. 3; xii. 19. 



Book ill.] Aarcus Burelfus antonfnus* 137 

is common to all that I have mentioned, there 
remains that which is peculiar to the good man, 
to be pleased and content with what happens, 
and with the thread which is spun for him ; 
and not to defile the divinity which is planted 
in his breast, nor disturb it by a crowd of 
images, but to preserve it tranquil, following 
it obediently as a god, neither saying anything 
contrary to the truth, nor doing anything con- 
trary to justice. And if all men refuse to be- 
lieve that he lives a simple, modest, and con- 
tented life, he is neither angry with any of 
them, nor does he deviate from the way which 
leads to the end of life, to which a man ought 
to come pure, tranquil, ready to depart, and 
without any compulsion perfectly reconciled to 
his lot. 



138 CbOUgbte* [Book IV. 



IV. 

THAT which rules within, when it is accord- 
ing to nature, is so affected with respect to 
the events which happened, that it always easily 
adapts itself to that which is possible and is 
presented to it. For it requires no definite 
material, but it moves towards its purpose,^ 
under certain conditions, however; and it 
makes a material for itself out of that which 
opposes it, as fire lays hold of what falls into 
it, by which a small light would have been ex- 
tinguished; but when the fire is strong, it soon 
appropriates to itself the matter which is heaped 
on it, and consumes it, and rises higher by 
means of this very material. 

2. Let no act be done without a purpose, nor 
otherwise than according to the perfect princi- 
ples of art. 

3. Men seek retreats for themselves, houses 
in the country, sea-shores, and mountains; and 
thou too art wont to desire such things very 
much. But this is altogether a mark of the 
most common sort of men, for it is in thy 
power whenever thou shalt choose to retire 

* wpbg tcl yyov/ieva, literally ''towards that which 
leads." The exact translation is doubtful. See 
Gataker's note- 



Book IV.] /ifcarcus Burelius Bntoninus* 139 

into thj^self. For nowhere either with more 
quiet or more freedom from trouble does a man 
retire than into his own soul, particularly when 
he has within him such thoughts that by look- 
ing into them he is immediately in perfect 
tranquillity; and I affirm that tranquillity is 
nothing else than the good ordering of the 
mind. Constantly then give to thyself this 
retreat, and renew thyself; and let thy princi- 
ples be brief and fundamental, which, as soon 
as thou shalt recur to them, will be sufficient 
to cleanse the soul completely, and to send 
thee back free from all discontent with the 
things to which thou returnest. For with 
what art thou discontented ? With the badness 
of men ? Recall to thy mind this conclusion, 
that rational animals exist for one another, and 
that to endure is a part of justice, and that men 
do wrong involuntarily; and consider how many 
already, after mutual enmity, suspicion, hatred, 
and fighting, have been stretched dead, reduced 
to ashes; and be quiet at last. — But perhaps 
thou art dissatisfied with that which is as- 
signed to thee out of the universe. — Recall to 
thy recollection this alternative; either there is 
providence or atoms [fortuitous concurrence of 
things]; or remember the arguments by which 
it has been proved that the world is a kind of 
political community [and be quiet at last]. — 
But perhaps corporeal things will still fasten 
upon thee. — Consider then further that the 
mind mingles not with the breath, whether 



140 CbOU0bt0* [Book IV. 

moving gently or violently, when it has once 
drawn itself apart and discovered its own 
power, and think also of all that thou hast 
heard and assented to about pain and pleasure 
[and be quiet at last]. — But perhaps the desire 
of the thing called fame will torment thee. — 
See how soon everything is forgotten, and look 
at the chaos of infinite time on each side of [the 
present], and the emptiness of applause, and 
the changeableness and want of judgment in 
those who pretend to give praise, and the nar- 
rowness of the space within which it is circum- 
scribed [and be quiet at last]. For the whole 
earth is a point, and how small a nook in it is 
this thy dwelling, and how few are there in it, 
and what kind of people are they who will 
praise thee. 

This then remains : Remember to retire into 
this little territory of thy own,* and above all 
do not distract or strain thyself, but be free, 
and look at things as a man, as a human being, 
as a citizen, as a mortal. But among the 
things readiest to thy hand to which thou shalt 
turn, let there be these, which are two. One is 
that things do not touch the soul, tor they are 
external and remain immovable ; but our per- 
turbations come only from the opinion which is 
within. The other is that all these things, 
which thou seest, change immediately and will 
no longer be ; and constantly bear in mind how 

* Tecum habita, noris quam sit tibi curta supellex. 
— Persius, iv. 52. 



Book iv.] fl&arcus aurelfus antoninus* 141 

many of these changes thou hast already wit- 
nessed. The universe is transformation : life is 
opinion. 

4. If our intellectual part is common, the 
reason also, in respect of which we are rational 
beings, is common : if this is so, common also is 
the reason which commands us what to do, and 
what not to do ; if this is so, there is a common 
law also ; if this is so, we are fellow-citizens ; if 
this is so, we are members of some political 
community ; if this is so, the world is in a man- 
ner a state.* For of what other common politi- 
cal community will any one say that the whole 
human race are members? And from thence, 
from this common political community, comes 
also our very intellectual faculty and reasoning 
faculty and our capacity for law ; or whence do 
they come ? For as my earthly part is a por- 
tion given to me from certain earth, and that 
which is watery from another element, and that 
which is hot and fiery from some peculiar 
source (for nothing comes out of that which is 
nothing, as nothing also returns to non-exist- 
ence), so also the intellectual part comes from 
some source. 

5. Death is such as generation is, a mystery 
of nature; composition out of the same elements, 
and a decomposition into the same ; and al- 
together not a thing of which any man should 
be ashamed, for it is not contrary to [the nature 

* Compare Cicero De I^egibus, i. 7. 



142 {TbOUflbtS, [Book IV. 

of] a reasonable animal, and not contrary to 
the reason of our constitution. 

6. It is natural that these things should be 
done by such persons, it is a matter of necessity; 
and if a man will not have it so, he will not 
allow the fig-tree to have juice. But by all 
means bear this in mind, that within a very 
short time both thou and he will be dead ; and 
soon not even your names will be left behind. 

7. Take away thy opinion, and then there is 
taken away the complaint, ''I have been 
harmed." Take away the complaint, " I have 
been harmed/' and the harm is taken away. 

8. That- which does not make a man worse 
than he was, also does not make his life worse, 
nor does it harm him either from without or 
from within. 

9. The nature of that which is [universally] 
useful has been compelled to do this. 

10. Consider that everything which happens, 
happens justly, and if thou observest carefully, 
thou wilt find it to be so. I do not say only 
with respect to the continuity of the series of 
things, but with respect to what is just, and as 
if it were done by one who assigns to each 
thing its value. Observe then as thou hast be- 
gun ; and whatever thou doest, do it in con- 
junction with this, the being good, and in the 
sense in which a man is properly understood to 
be good. Keep to this in every action. 

11. Do not have such an opinion of things as 
he has who does thee wrong, or such as he 



Book IY.] /iftarcus Bureltus Bntontnus* 143 

wishes thee to have, but look at them as they 
are in truth. 

12. A man should always have these two 
rules in readiness ; the one to do only whatever 
the reason of the ruling and legislating faculty 
may suggest for the use of men ; the other, to 
change thy opinion, if there is any one at hand 
who sets thee right and moves thee from any 
opinion. But this change of opinion must pro- 
ceed only from a certain persuasion, as of what 
is just or of common advantage, and the like, 
not because it appears pleasant or brings repu- 
tation. 

13. Hast thou reason? I have. — Why then 
dost not thou use it ? For if this does its own 
work, what else dost thou wish ? 

14. Thou hast existed as a part. Thou shalt 
disappear in that which produced thee; but 
rather thou shalt be received back into its semi- 
nal principle by transmutation. 

15. Many grains of frankincense on the same 
altar : one falls before, another falls after ; but 
it makes no difference. 

16. Within ten days thou wilt seem a god 
to those to whom thou art now a beast and an 
ape, if thou wilt return to thy- principles and 
the worship of reason. 

17. Do not act as if thou wert going to live 
ten thousand years. Death hangs over thee. 
While thou livest, while it is in thy power, be 
good. 

18. How much trouble he avoids who does 



144 GbOUflbtS. [Book IV. 

not look to see what his neighbor says or does 
or thinks, but only to what he does himself, 
that it may be just and pure ; or, as Agathon-f 
says, look not round at the depraved morals of 
others, but run straight along the line without 
deviating from it. 

19. He who has a vehement desire for 
posthumous fame does not consider that every 
one of those who remember him will himself 
also die very soon; then again also they who 
have succeeded them, until the whole remem- 
brance shall have been extinguished as it is 
transmitted through men who foolishly admire 
and perish. But suppose that those who will 
remember are even immortal, and that the re- 
membrance will be immortal, what then is this 
to thee ? And I say not what is it to the dead, 
but what is it to the living ? What is praise, 
except + indeed so far as it has+ a certain 
utility? For thou now rejectest unseasonably 
the gift of nature, clinging to something else 
. . . +. 

20. Everything which is in any way beauti- 
ful is beautiful in itself, and terminates in itself, 
not having praise as part of itself. Neither 
worse then nor better is a thing made by being 
praised. I affirm this also of the things which 
are called beautiful by the vulgar, for example, 
material things and works of art. That w T hich 
is really beautiful has no need of anything; 
not more than law, not more than truth, not 
more than benevolence or modesty. Which of 




Marcus 3 



INTERIOR OF THE PARTHENON 



Book IV.] /iftarcus Bureiiu« antoninus* 145 

these things is beautiful because it is praised, 
or spoiled by being blamed ? Is such a thing 
as an emerald made worse than it was, if it is 
not praised? or gold, ivory, purple, a lyre, a 
little knife, a flower, a shrub ? 

21. If souls continue to exist, how does the 
air contain them from eternity ? — But how does 
the earth contain the bodies of those who have 
been buried from time so remote ? For as here 
the mutation of these bodies after a certain con- 
tinuance, whatever it may be, and their disso- 
lution, make room for other dead bodies, so the 
souls which are removed into the air after sub- 
sisting for some time are transmuted and 
diffused, and assume a fiery nature by being re- 
ceived into the seminal intelligence of the uni- 
verse, and in this way make room for the fresh 
souls which come to dwell there. And this is 
the answer which a man might give on the 
hypothesis of souls continuing to exist. But 
we must not only think of the number of 
bodies which are thus buried, but also of the 
number of animals which are daily eaten by us 
and the other animals. For what a number is 
consumed, and thus in a manner buried in the 
bodies of those who feed on them! And never- 
theless this earth receives them by reason of the 
changes [of these bodies] into blood, and the 
transformations into the aerial or the fiery 
element. 

What is the investigation into the truth in 
this matter? The division into that which 
10 



146 GbOUGbt6* [Book IV. 

is material and that which is the cause of form 
[the formal], (vii. 29.) 

22. Do not be whirled about, but in every 
movement have respect to justice, and on the 
occasion of every impression maintain the 
faculty of comprehension [or understanding]. 

23. Everything harmonizes with me, which 
is harmonious to thee, O Universe. Nothing 
for me is too early nor too late, which is in due 
time for thee. Everything is fruit to me which 
thy seasons bring, O Nature : from thee are all 
things, in thee are all things, to thee all things 
return. The poet says, Dear city of Cecrops ; 
and wilt not thou say, Dear city of Zeus ? 

24. Occupy thyself with few things, says the 
philosopher, if thou wouldst be tranquil. — But 
consider if it would not be better to say, Do 
what is necessary, and whatever the reason of 
the animal which is naturally social requires, 
and as it requires. For this brings not only 
the tranquillity which comes from doing well, 
but also that which comes from doing few 
things. For the greatest part of what we say 
and do being unnecessary, if a man takes this 
away, he will have more leisure and less un- 
easiness. Accordingly, on every occasion a 
man should ask himself, Is this one of the un- 
necessary things? Now a man should take 
away not only unnecessary acts, but also un- 
necessary thoughts, for thus superfluous acts 
will not follow after. 

25. Try how the life of the good man suits 



Book IV.] Marcus Bureltua Bntontnus* 147 

thee, the life of him who is satisfied with his 
portion out of the whole, and satisfied with his 
own just acts and benevolent disposition. 

26. Hast thou seen those things ? Look also 
at these. Do not disturb thyself. Make thy- 
self all simplicity. Does any one do wrong? 

J It is to himself that he does the wrong. ' Has 
I anything happened to thee ? Well ; out of the 
universe from the beginning everything which 
happens has been apportioned and spun out to 
thee. In a word, thy life is short. Thou 
must turn to profit the present by the aid of 
reason and justice. Be sober in thy relaxa- 
tion. 

27. Either it is a well-arranged universe* or 
a chaos huddled together, but still a universe. 
But can a certain order subsist in thee, and 
disorder in the All ? And this too when all 
things are so separated and diffused and sym- 
pathetic. 

28. A black character, a womanish char- 
acter, a stubborn character, bestial, childish, 
animal, stupid, counterfeit, scurrilous, fraudu- 
lent, tyrannical. 

29. If he is a stranger to the universe who 
does not know what is in it, no less is he a 
stranger who does not know what is going on 
in it. He is a runaway, who flies from social 
reason ; he is blind, who shuts the eyes of un- 

* Antoninus here uses the word adafioq both in the 
sense of the Universe and of Order; and it is difficult 
to express his meaning. 



148 GbOU0bt0. [Book IV. 

derstauding ; he is poor, who has need of an- 
other, and has not from himself all things 
which are useful for life. He is an abscess on 
the universe who withdraws and separates 
himself from the reason of our common nature 
through being displeased with the things 
which happen, for the same nature produces 
this, and has produced thee too : he is a piece 
rent asunder from the state, who tears his own 
soul from that of reasonable animals, which is 
one. 

30. The one is a philosopher without a tunic, 
and the other without a book: here is another 
half naked: Bread I have not, he says, and I 
abide by reason — and I do not get the means 
of living out of my learning, + and I abide [by 
my reason]. 

31. Love the art, poor as it may be, which 
thou hast learned, and be content with it; and 
pass through the rest of life like one who has 
intrusted to the gods with his whole soul all 
that he has, making thyself neither the tyrant 
nor the slave of any man. 

32. Consider, for example, the times of Ves- 
pasian. Thou wilt see all these things, people 
marrying, bringing up children, sick, dying, 
warring, feasting, trafficking, cultivating the 
ground, flattering, obstinately arrogant, suspect- 
ing, plotting, wishing for some to die, grumbling 
about the present, loving, heaping up treas- 
ure, desiring consulship, kingly power. Well, 
then, that life of these people no longer exists 



Book iv.] Aarcus Bureltue Bntonmus* 149 

at all. Again, remove to the times of Trajan. 
Again, all is the same. Their life too is gone. 
In like manner view also the other epochs of 
time and of whole nations, and see how many 
after great efforts soon fell and were resolved 
into the elements. But chiefly thou shouldst 
think of those whom thou hast thyself known 
distracting themselves about idle things, ne- 
glecting to do what was in accordance with their 
proper constitution, and to hold firmly to this 
and to be content w r ith it. And herein it is 
necessary to remember that the attention given 
to everything has its proper value and propor- 
tion. For thus thou wilt not be dissatisfied, if 
thou appliest thyself to smaller matters no fur- 
ther than is fit. 

33. The words which were formerly familiar 
are now antiquated: so also the names of those 
who were famed of old, are now 7 in a manner 
antiquated, Camillus, Caeso, Volesus, Leon- 
natus, and a little after also Scipio and Cato, 
then Augustus, then also Hadrianus and An- 
toninus. For all things soon pass away and be- 
come a mere tale, and complete oblivion soon 
buries them. And I say this of those who have 
shone in a wondrous way. For the rest, as 
soon as they have breathed out their breath 
they are gone, and no man speaks of them. 
And, to conclude the matter, what is even an 
eternal remembrance ? A mere nothing. What 
then is that about which we ought to employ 
our serious pains? This one thing, thoughts 



150 GbOUgbtS, [Book IV. 

just, and acts social, and words which never 
lie, and a disposition which gladly accepts all 
that happens, as necessary, as usual, as flowing 
from a principle and source of the same kind. 

34. Willingly give thyself up to Clotho [one 
of the fates], allowing her to spin thy thread + 
into whatever things she pleases. 

35. Everything is only for a day, both that 
which remembers and that which is remem- 
bered. 

36. Observe constantly that all things take 
place by change, and accustom thyself to con- 
sider that the nature of the universe loves noth- 
ing so much as to change the things which are 
and to make new things like them. For 
everything that exists is in a manner the seed 
of that which will be. But thou art thinking 
only of seeds which are cast into the earth or 
into a womb: but this is a very vulgar notion. 

37. Thou wilt soon die, and thou art not yet 
simple, nor free from perturbations, nor with- 
out suspicion of being hurt by external things, 
nor kindly disposed towards all; nor dost thou 
yet place wisdom only in acting justly. 

38. Examine men's ruling principles, even 
those of the wise, what kind of things they 
avoid, and what kind they pursue. 

39. What is evil to thee does not subsist in 
the ruling principle of another; nor yet in any 
turning and mutation of thy corporeal cover- 
ing. Where is it then ? It is in that part of 
thee in which subsists the power of forming 



Book IV.] dfcarcus Burelius Bntoninue* 151 

opinions about evils. Let this power then not 
form [such] opinions, and all is well. And if 
that which is nearest to it, the poor body, is 
cut, burnt, filled with matter and rottenness, 
nevertheless let the part which forms opinions 
about these things be quiet; that is, let it 
judge that nothing is either bad or good which 
can happen equally to the bad man and the 
good. For that which happens equally to him 
who lives contrary to nature and to him who 
lives according to nature, is neither according 
to nature nor contrary to nature. 

40. Constantly regard the universe as one 
living being, having one substance and one 
soul; and observe how all things have reference 
to one perception, the perception of this one 
living being; and how all things act with one 
movement; and how all things are the co- 
operating causes of all things which exist; ' 
observe too the continuous spinning of the) 
thread and the contexture of the web. 

41. Thou art a little soul bearing about a 
corpse, as Epictetus used to say (i. c. 19). 

42. It is no evil for things to undergo change, 
and no good for things to subsist in conse- 
quence of change. 

43. Time is like a river made up of the 
events which happen, and a violent stream; for 
as soon as a thing has been seen, it is carried 
away, and another comes in its place, and this 
will be carried away too. 

44. Everything which happens is as familiar 



152 GbOU0bt6* [Book IV. 

and well known as the rose in spring and the 
fruit in summer; for such is disease, and death, 
and calumny, and treachery, and whatever else 
delights fools or vexes them. 

45. In the series of things, those which follow 
are always aptly fitted to those which have 
gone before: for this series is not like a mere 
enumeration of disjointed things, which has 
only a necessary sequence, but it is a rational 
connection: and as all existing things are ar- 
ranged together harmoniously, so the things 
which come into existence exhibit no mere suc- 
cession, but a certain wonderful relationship 
(vi. 38; vii. 9; vii, 75, note). 

46. Always remember the saying of Hera- 
clitus, that the death of earth is to become 
water, and the death of water is to become air, 
and the death of air is to become fire, and re- 
versely. And think too of him who forgets 
whither the way leads, and that men quarrel 
with that with which they are most constantly 
in communion, the reason which governs the 
universe; and the things which they daily meet 
with seem to them strange: and consider that we 
ought not to act and speak as if we were asleep, 
for even in sleep we seem to act and speak; 
and that + we ought not, like children who 
learn from their parents, simply to act and speak 
as we have been taught. + 

47. If any god told thee that thou shalt die 
to-morrow, or certainly on the day after to-mor- 
row, thou wouldst not care much whether it 



Book IV.] jflfcarcus Bureltus Bntoninue* 153 

was on the third day or on the morrow, unless 
thou wast in the highest degree mean-spirited; 
for how small is the difference ! So think it no 
great thing to die after as many years as thou 
canst name rather than to-morrow. 

48. Think continually how many physicians 
are dead after often contracting their eyebrows 
over the sick; and how many astrologers after 
predicting with great pretensions the deaths of 
others; and how many philosophers after end- 
less discourses on death or immortality; how 
many heroes after killing thousands; and how 
many tyrants who have used their power over 
men's lives with terrible insolence, as if they 
were immortal; and how many cities are entirely 
dead, so to speak, Helice* and Pompeii and 
Herculaneum, and others innumerable. Add to 
the reckoning all whom thou hast known, one 
after another. One man after burying another 
has been laid out dead, and another buries 
him; and all this in a short time. To conclude, 
always observe how ephemeral and worthless 
human things are, and what was yesterday a 
little mucus, to-morrow will be a mummy or 
ashes. Pass then through this little space of 
time conformably to nature, and end thy jour- 
ney in content, as an olive falls off when it is 
ripe, blessing nature who produced it, and 
thanking the tree on which it grew. 

* Ovid, Met. xv. 293: — 

" Si quaeras Helicen et Burin Achaidas urbes, 
Invenies sub aquis. ' ' 



154 GbOUflbtS* [Book I?. 



— 



49. Be like the promontory against which 
the waves continually break, but it stands firm 
and tames the fury of the water around it. 

Unhappy am I because this has happened to 
me ? Not so, but happy am I, though this has 
happened to me, because I continue free from 
pain, neither crushed by the present nor fear- 
ing the future. For such a thing as this might 
have happened to every man; but every man 
would not have continued free from pain on 
such an occasion. Why then is that rather a 
misfortune than this a good fortune ? And dost 
thou in all cases call that a man's misfortune 
which is not a deviation from man's nature? 
And does a thing seem to thee to be a. deviation 
from man's nature, when it is not contrary to 
the will of man's nature ? Well, thou knowest 
the will of nature. Will then this which has 
happened prevent thee from being just, mag- 
nanimous, temperate, prudent, secure against 
inconsiderate opinions and falsehood; will it 
prevent thee from having modesty, freedom, 
and everything else, by the presence of which 
man's nature obtains all that is its own ? Re- 
member too on every occasion which leads thee 
to vexation to apply this principle; not that 
this is a misfortune, but that to bear it nobly is 
good fortune. 

50. It is a vulgar, but still a useful help 
towards contempt of death, to pass in review 
those who have tenaciously stuck to life. 
What more then have they gained than those 



Book IV.] flbarcus Bureltus Bntoninus* 155 

who have died early? Certainly they lie in 
their tombs somewhere at last, Cadicianus, 
Fabius, Julianus, Lepidus, or any one else like 
them, who have carried out many to be buried, 
and then were carried out themselves. Alto- 
gether the interval is small [between birth and 
death] ; and consider with how much trouble, 
and in company with what sort of people, and 
in what a feeble body, this interval is labor- 
iously passed. Do not then consider life a 
thing of any value. + For look to the im- 
mensity of time behind thee, and to the time 
which is before thee, another boundless space. 
In this infinity then what is the difference be- 
tween him who lives three days and him who 
lives three generations ?* 

51. Always run to the short way; and the 
short way is the natural: accordingly say and 
do everything in conformity with the soundest 
reason. For such a purpose frees a man from 
trouble, + and warfare, and all artifice and 
ostentatious display. 

*An allusion to Homer's Nestor, who was living at 
the war of Troy among the third generation, like old 
Parr with his hundred and fifty-two years, and some 
others in modern times who have beaten Parr by 
twenty or thirty years if it is true; and yet they died 
at last. The word is rpLyepijviov in Antoninus. Nestor 
is named rpiyepov by some writers; but here perhaps 
theie is an allusion to Homer's VepTjvtog innoTa Near up. 



156 GbOU$bt6* [BookV. 



V. 

IN the morning when thou risest unwillingly, 
let this thought be present, — I am rising to 
the work of a human being. Why then am I 
dissatisfied if I am going to do the things for 
which I exist and for which I was brought into 
the world ? Or have I been made for this, to 
lie in the bed-clothes and keep myself warm ? 
■ — But this is more pleasant. — Dost thou exist 
then to take thy pleasure, and not at all for 
action or exertion ? Dost thou not see the little 
plants, the little birds, the ants, the spiders, 
the bees working together to put in order their 
several parts of the universe ? And art thou 
unwilling to do the work of a human being, 
and dost thou not make haste to do that which 
is according to thy nature ? But it is necessary 
to take rest also. — It is necessary. However, 
Nature has fixed bounds to this too: she has 
fixed bounds to eating and drinking, and yet 
thou goest beyond these bounds, beyond what 
is sufficient; yet in thy acts it is not so, but 
thou stoppest short of what thou canst do. So 
thou lovest not thyself, for if thou didst, thou 
wouldst love thy nature and her will. But 
those who love their several arts exhaust 
themselves in working at them unwashed and 



Book v.] /Dbarcue Bureltue Bntontnus* 157 

without food; but thou valuest thy own nature 
less than the turner values the turning art, or 
the dancer the dancing art, or the lover of 
money values his money, or the vain-glorious 
man his little glory. And such men, when 
they have a violent affection to a thing, choose 
neither to eat nor to sleep rather than to perfect 
the things which they care for. But are the 
acts which concern society more vile in thy 
eyes and less worthy of thy labor ? 

2. How easy it is to repel and to wipe away 
every impression which is troublesome or un- 
suitable, and immediately to be in all tran- 
quillity. 

3. Judge every word and deed which are ac- 
cording to nature to be fit for thee; and be not 
diverted by the blame which follows from any 
people, nor by their words, but if a thing is 
good to be done or said, do not consider it un- 
worthy of thee. For those persons have their 
peculiar leading principle and follow their pe- 
culiar movement; which things do not thou 
regard, but go straight on, following thy own 
nature and the common nature; and the way 
of both is one. 

4. I go through the things which happen ac- 
cording to nature until I shall fall and rest, 
breathing out my breath into that element out 
of which I daily draw it in, and falling upon 
that earth out of which my father collected the 
seed, and my mother the blood, and my nurse 
the milk; out of which during so many years 



158 CbOUSbtS. [BookV. 

I have been supplied with food and drink; 
which bears me when I tread on it and abuse 
it for so many purposes. 

5. Thou sayest, Men cannot admire the 
sharpness of thy wits. — Be it so : but there are 
many other things of which thou canst not 
say, I am not formed from them by nature. 
Show those qualities then which are altogether 
in thy power, sincerity, gravity, endurance of 
labor, aversion to pleasure, contentment with 
thy portion and with few things, benevolence, 
frankness, no love of superfluity, freedom from 
trifling, magnanimity. Dost thou not see how 
many qualities thou art immediately able to 
exhibit, in which there is no excuse of natural 
incapacity and unfitness, and yet thou still re- 
mainest voluntarily below the mark ? or art 
thou compelled through being defectively fur- 
nished by nature to murmur, and to be stingy, 
and to flatter, and to find fault with thy poor 
body, and to try to please men, and to make 
great display, and to be so restless in thy 
mind ? No, by the gods ; but thou mi gh test 
have been delivered from these things long 
ago. Only if in truth thou canst be charged 
with being rather slow and dull of comprehen- 
sion, thou must exert thyself about this also, 
not neglecting it nor yet taking pleasure in thy 
dullness. 

6. One man, when he has done a service to 
another, is ready to set it down to his account 
as a favor conferred. Another is not ready to 



Book v.] Marcus Burelius Bntontnus* 159 

do this, but still in his own mind he thinks of 
the man as his debtor, and he knows what he 
has done. A third in a manner does not even 
know what he has done, but he is like a vine 
which has produced grapes, and seeks for no- 
thing more after it has once produced its 
proper fruit. As a horse when he has run, a 
dog when he has tackled the game, a bee when 
it has made the honey, so a man when he has 
done a good act does not call out for others to 
come and see, but he goes on to another act, 
as a vine goes on to produce again the grapes 
in season. — Must a man then be one of these, 
who in a manner act thus without observing 
it? — Yes.— But this very thing is necessary, 
the observation of what a man is doing : for, it 
may be said, it is characteristic of the social 
animal to perceive that he is working in a 
social manner, and indeed to wish that his 
social partner also should perceive it. — It is 
true that thou sayest, but thou dost not rightly 
understand what is now said : and for this 
reason thou wilt become one of those of whom 
I spoke before, for even they are misled by a 
certain show of reason. But if thou wilt 
choose to understand the meaning of what is 
said, do not fear that for this reason thou wilt 
omit any social act. 

7. A prayer of the Athenians: Rain, rain, O 
dear Zeus, down on the ploughed fields of the 
Athenians and on the plains.-— In truth we 
ought not to pray at all, or we ought to pray 
in this simple and noble fashion. 



i6o £bOU0btS, [Book?. 

8. Just as we must understand when it is 
said, That Aesculapius prescribed to this man 
horse-exercise, or bathing in cold water, or go- 
ing without shoes, so we must understand it 
when it is said, That the nature of the universe 
prescribed to this man disease, or mutilation, 
or loss, or anything else of the kind. For in 
the first case Prescribed means something like 
this: he prescribed this for this man as a 
thing adapted to procure health; and in the 
second case it means, That which happens * to 
[or suits] every man is fixed in a manner for 
him suitably to his destiny. For this is what 
we mean when we say that things are suitable 
to us, as the workmen say of squared stones in 
walls or the pyramids, that they are suitable, 
when they fit them to one another in some kind 
of connection. For there is altogether one fit- 
ness [harmony]. And as the universe is made 
up out of all bodies to be such a body as it is, 
so out of all existing causes necessity [destiny] 
is made up to be such a cause as it is. And 
even those who are completely ignorant under- 
stand what I mean; for they say, It [necessity, 
destiny] brought this to such a person. — This 
then was brought and this was prescribed to 
him. Let us then receive these things, as well 
as those which Aesculapius prescribes. Many 
as a matter of course even among his prescrip- 
tions are disagreeable, but we accept them in 

* In this section there is a play on the meaning of 

ov/iftaiveLv. 



H 
X 
w 

n 

> 

l-H 

H 

O 

> 

d 
H 

w 



« — i 
a 

i— i 

H 

W 

53 




Book v.] dfcarcus Butelfus Bntontnus* 161 

the hope of health. Let the perfecting and 
accomplishment of the things which the com- 
mon nature judges to be good, be judged by 
thee to be of the same kind as thy health. 
And so accept everything which happens, even 
if it seem disagreeable, because it leads to this, 
to the health of the universe and to the pros- 
perity and felicity of Zeus [the universe]. For 
he would not have brought on any man what 
he has brought, if it were not useful for the 
whole. Neither does the nature of anything, 
whatever it may be, cause anything which is 
not suitable to that which is directed by it. 
For two reasons then it is right to be content 
with that which happens to thee; the one, be- 
cause it was done for thee and prescribed for 
thee, and in a manner had reference to thee, 
originally from the most ancient causes spun 
with thy destiny; and the other, because even 
that which comes severally to every man is to 
the power which administers the universe a 
cause of felicity and perfection, nay even of its 
very continuance. For the integrity of the 
whole is mutilated, if thou cuttest off anything 
whatever from the conjunction and the contin- 
uity either of the parts or of the causes. And 
thou dost cut off, as far as it is in thy power, 
when thou art dissatisfied, and in a manner 
triest to put anything out of the way. 

9. Be not disgusted, nor discouraged, nor 
dissatisfied, if thou dost not succeed in doing 
everything according to right principles, but 
11 



1 62 GbOUGbtS, [BookV. 

when thou hast failed, return back again, and 
be content if the greater part of what thou 
doest is consistent with man's nature, and love 
this to which thou returnest; and do not return 
"to philosophy as if she were a master, but act 
like those who have sore eyes and apply a bit 
of sponge and egg, or as another applies a 
plaster, or drenching with water. For thus 
thou wilt not fail to + obey reason, and thou 
wilt repose in it. And remember that philos- 
ophy requires only things which thy nature re- 
quires; but thou wouldst have something else 
which is not according to nature. — It may be 
objected, Why, what is more agreeable than 
this [which I am doing] ? But is not this the 
very reason why pleasure deceives us ? And 
consider if magnanimity, freedom, simplicity, 
equanimity, piety, are not more agreeable. 
For what is more agreeable than wisdom itself, 
when thou thinkest of the security and the 
happy course of all things which depend on the 
faculty of understanding and knowledge ? 

10. Things are in such a kind of envelop- 
ment that they have seemed to philosophers, 
not a few nor those common philosophers, alto- 
gether unintelligible; nay even to the Stoics 
themselves they seem difficult to understand. 
And all our assent is changeable; for where is 
the man who never changes? Carry thy 
thoughts then to the objects themselves, and 
consider how short-lived they are and worth- 
less, and that they may be in the possession of 



Book v.] -flfcarcus Burelius Bntontnus* 163 

a filthy wretch or a whore or a robber. Then 
turn to the morals of those who live with thee, 
and it is hardly possible to endure even the 
most agreeable of them, to say nothing of a man 
being hardly able to endure himself. In such 
darkness then and dirt, and in so constant a 
flux both of substance and of time, and of 
motion and of things moved, what there is 
worth being highly prized, or even an object 
of serious pursuit, I cannot imagine. But on 
the contrary it is a man's duty to comfort him- 
self, and to wait for the natural dissolution, and 
not to be vexed at the delay, but to rest in 
these principles only: the one, that nothing 
will happen to me which is not conformable to 
the nature of the universe; and the other, that 
it is in my power never to act contrary to my 
god and daemon: for there is no man who will 
compel me to this. 

11. About what am I now employing my 
own soul? On every occasion I must ask my- 
self this question, and inquire, What have I 
now in this part of me which they call the rul- 
ing principle? and whose soul have I now, — 
that of a child, or of a young man, or of a 
feeble woman, or of a tyrant, or of a domestic 
animal, or of a wild beast? 

12. What kind of things those are which ap- 
pear good to the many, we may learn even 
from this. For if any man should conceive 
certain things as being really good, such as 
prudence, temperance, justice, fortitude, he 



1 64 GbOU0btS, [BookV. 

would not after having first conceived these 
endure to listen to anything+ which should 
not be in harmony with what is really good.+ 
But if a man has first conceived as good the 
things which appear to the many to be good, 
he will listen and readily receive as very appli- 
cable that which was said by the comic writer. 
+Thus even the many perceive the difference. + 
For were it not so, this saying would not offend 
and would not be rejected [in the first case], 
while we receive it when it is said of wealth, 
and of the means which further luxury and 
fame, as said fitly and wittily. Go on then 
and ask if we should value and think those 
things to be good, to which after their first 
conception in the mind the words of the comic 
writer might be aptly applied, — that he who 
has them, through pure abundance has not a 
place to ease himself in. 

13. I am composed of the formal and the 
material ; and neither of them will perish into 
non-existence, as neither of them came into ex- 
istence out of non-existence. Every part of me 
then will be reduced by change into some part 
of the universe, and that again will change 
into another part of the universe, and so on for- 
ever. And by consequence of such a change I 
too exist, and those who begot me, and so on 
forever in the other direction. For nothing 
hinders us from saying so, even if the universe 
is administered according to definite periods 
[of revolution]. 



Book v.] /ibarcue Burelius Bntoninus* 165 

14. Reason and the reasoning art [philoso- 
phy] are powers which are sufficient for them- 
selves and for their own works. They move 
then from a first principle which is their own, 
and they make their way to the end which is 
proposed to them ; and this is the reason why 
such acts are named Catorthoseis or right acts, 
which word signifies that they proceed by the 
right road. 

15. None of these things ought to be called a 
man's, which do not belong to a man, as man. 
They are not required of a man, nor does 
man's nature promise them, nor are they the 
means of man's nature attaining its end. 
Neither then does the end of man lie in these 
things, nor yet that which aids to the accom- 
plishment of this end, and that which aids to- 
ward this end is that which is good. Besides, 
if any of these things did belong to man, it 
would not be right for a man to despise them and 
to set himself against them ; nor would a man 
be worthy of praise who showed that he did 
not want these things, nor would he who 
stinted himself in any of them be good, if in- 
deed these things were good. But now the 
more of these things a man deprives himself of, 
or of other things like them, or even when he 
is deprived of any of them, the more patiently 
he endures the loss, just in the same degree he 
is a better man. 

16. Such as are thy habitual thoughts, such 
also will be the character of thy mind; for the 



1 66 GbOU0btS. [Book?. 

soul is dyed by the thoughts. Dye it theu 
with a continuous series of such thoughts as 
these: for instance, that where a man can live, 
there he can also live well. But he must live 
in a palace; well then, he can also live well in 
a palace. And again, consider that for what- 
ever purpose each thing has been constituted, 
for this it has been constituted, and towards 
this it is carried; and its end is in that towards 
which it is carried; and where the end is, there 
also is the advantage and the good of each 
thing. Now the good for the reasonable ani- 
mal is society; for that we are made for society 
has been shown above.* Is it not plain that 
the inferior exists for the sake of the superior ? 
But the things which have life are superior to 
those which have not life, and of those which 
have life the superior are those which have 
reason. 

17. To seek what is impossible is madness: 
and it is impossible that the bad should not do 
something of this kind. 

18. Nothing happens to any man which he 
is not formed by nature to bear. The same 
things happen to another, and either because 
he does not see that they have happened, or 
because he would show a great spirit, he is 
firm and remains unharmed. It is a shame 
then that ignorance and conceit should be 
stronger than wisdom. 

19. Things themselves touch not the soul, 



Book v.] /iftarcus Burelius Bntomnus* 167 

not in the least degree; nor have they ad- 
mission to the soul, nor can they turn or move 
the soul: but the soul turns and moves itself 
alone, and whatever judgments it may think 
proper to make, such it makes for itself the 
things which present themselves to it. 

20. In one respect man is the nearest thing 
to me, so far as I must do good to men and en- 
dure them. But so far as some men make 
themselves obstacles to my proper acts, man 
becomes to me one of the things which are in- 
different, no less than the sun or wind or a wild 
beast. Now it is true that these may impede 
my action, but they are no impediments to my 
affects and disposition, which have the^ power 
of acting conditionally and changing: for the 
mind converts and changes every hindrance to 
its activity into an aid; and so that which is a 
hindrance is made a furtherance to an act; and 
that which is an obstacle on the road helps us 
on this road. 

21. Reverence that which is best in the uni- 
verse; and this is that which makes use of all 
things and directs all things. And in like 
manner also reverence that which is best in 
thyself; and this is of the same kind as that. 
For in thyself also, that which makes use of 
everything else is this, and thy life is directed 
by this. 

22. That which does no harm to the state, 
does no harm to the citizen. In the case of 
every appearance of harm apply this rule: if 



1 68 GbOU0bt0, [BookV. 

the state is not harmed by this, neither am I 
harmed. But if the state is harmed, thou must 
not be angry with him who does harm to the 
state. Show him where his error is. 

23. Often think of the rapidity with which 
things pass by and disappear, both the things 
which are and the things which are produced. 
For substance is like a river in a continual 
flow, and the activities of things are in con- 
stant change, and the causes work in infinite 
varieties; and there is hardly anything which 
stands still. And consider this which is near 
to thee, this boundless abyss of the past and of 
the future in which all things disappear. How 
then is he not a fool who is puffed up with 
such things or plagued about them and makes 
himself miserable? for they vex him only for a 
time, and a short time. 

24. Think of the universal substance, of 
which thou hast a very small portion; and 
of universal time, of which a short and indivis- 
ible interval has been assigned to thee; and of 
that which is fixed by destiny, and how small 
a part of it thou art. 

25. Does another do me wrong? Let him 
look to it. He has his own disposition, his 
own activity- I now have what the universal 
nature now wills me to have; and I do what 
my nature now wills me to do. 

26. Let the part of thy soul which leads and 
governs be undisturbed by the movements in 
the flesh, whether of pleasure or of pain; and 



Book v.] /ifoarcus Burelius Bntonfnus* 169 

let it not unite with them, but let it circum- 
scribe itself and limit those affects to their 
parts. But when these affects rise up to the 
mind by virtue of that other sympathy that 
naturally exists in a body which is all one, 
then thou must not strive to resist the sensa- 
tion, for it is natural: but let not the ruling part 
of itself add to the sensation the opinion that 
it is either good or bad. 

27. Live with the gods. And he does live 
with the gods who constantly shows to them 
that his own soul is satisfied with that which 
is assigned to him, and that it does all that the 
daemon wishes, which Zeus hath given to 
every man for his guardian and guide, a portion 
of himself. And this is every man's under- 
standing and reason. 

28. Art thou angry with him whose armpits 
stink ? art thou angry with him whose mouth 
smells foul? What good will this anger do 
thee? He has such a mouth, he has such arm- 
pits: it is necessary that such an emanation 
must come from such things: but the man has 
reason, it will be said, and he is able, if he 
takes pains, to discover wherein he offends; I 
wish thee well of thy discovery. Well then, 
and thou hast reason: by thy rational faculty 
stir up his rational faculty; show him his error, 
admonish him. For if he listens, thou wilt 
cure him, and there is no need of anger. 
[-{-Neither tragic actor nor whore. +]* 

*This is imperfect or corrupt, or both. There i» 



170 GbOUGbte, [BookV. 

29. As thou intendest to live when thou art 
gone out, . . . so it is in thy power to live 
here. But if men do not permit thee, then get 
away out of life, yet so as if thou wert suffering 
no harm. The house is smoky, and I quit it.* 
Why dost thou think that this is any trouble ? 
But so long as nothing of the kind drives me 
out, I remain, am free, and no man shall hin- 
der me from doing what I choose; and I choose 
to do what is according to the nature of the 
rational and social animal. 

30. The intelligence of the universe is social. 
Accordingly it has made the inferior things for 
the sake of the superior, and it has fitted the 
superior to one another. Thou seest how it 
has subordinated, co-ordinated, and assigned to 
everything its proper portion, and has brought 
together into concord with one another the 
things which are the best. 

31. How hast thou behaved hitherto to the 
gods, thy parents, brethren, children, teachers, 
to those who looked after thy infancy, to thy 
friends, kinsfolk, to thy slaves? Consider if 
thou hast hitherto behaved to all in such a way 
that this may be said of thee, — 

"Never has wronged a man in deed or word." 

also something wrong or incomplete in the beginning 
of S. 29, where he says ug eije/Bav Cv v diavorj, which 
Gataker translates "as if thou wast about to quit 
life;" but we cannot translate etjeW6v in that way. 
Other translations are not much more satisfactory. I 
have translated it literally and left it imperfect. 

*Epictetus, i. 25, 18. 



Book?.] /Ilbarcus Burelfus Bntoninu*^ 171 

And call to recollection both how many things 
thou hast passed through, and how many 
things thou hast been able to endure, and that 
the history of thy life is now complete and thy 
service is ended; and how many beautiful 
things thou hast seen; and how many pleasures 
and pains thou hast despised; and how many 
things called honorable thou hast spurned; 
and to how many ill-minded folks thou hast 
shown a kind disposition. 

32. Why do unskilled and ignorant souls 
disturb him who has skill and knowledge? 
What soul then has skill and knowledge? 
That which knows beginning and end, and 
knows the reason which pervades all substance, 
and though all time by fixed periods [revolu- 
tions] administers the universe. 

33. Soon, very soon, thou wilt be ashes, or 
a skeleton, and either a name or not even a 
name ; but name is sound and echo. And the 
things which are much valued in life are empty 
and rotten and trifling, and [like] little dogs 
biting one another, and little children quarrel- 
ing, laughing, and then straightway weeping. 
But fidelity and modesty and justice and truth 
are fled 

Up to Olympus from the wide-spread earth. 

Hksiod, Works, etc. v. 197. 

What then is there which still detains thee 
here, if the objects of sense are easily changed 
and never stand still, and the organs of per- 



172 XLbOVLQbtB. [BookV. 

ception are dull and easily receive false im- 
pressions, and the poor soul itself is an exha- 
lation from blood ? But to have good repute 
amid such a world as this is an empty thing. 
Why then dost thou not wait in tranquillity 
for thy end, whether it is extinction or removal 
to another state? And until that time comes, 
what is sufficient? Why, what else than to 
venerate the gods and bless them, and to do 
good to men, and to practise tolerance and 
self-restraint ; * but as to everything which is 
beyond. the limits of the poor flesh and breath, 
to remember that this is neither thine nor in 
thy power. 

34. Thou canst pass thy life in an equable 
flow of happiness, if thou canst go by the right 
w r ay, and think and act in the right way. 
These two things are common both to the soul 
of God and to the soul of man, and to the soul 
of every rational being: not to be hindered by 
another; and to hold good to consist in the 
disposition to justice and the practice of it, 
and in this to let thy desire find its termina- 
tion. 

35. If this is neither my own badness, nor 
an effect of my own badness, and the common 
weal is not injured, why am I troubled about 
it, and what is the harm to the common weal? 

*This is the Stoic precept avixov ml a-rrixov. The 
first part teaches us to be content with men and things 
as they are. The second part teaches us the virtue of 
self restraint, or the government of our passions. 



Book v.] Marcus Burelfus Bntoninus* 173 

36. Do not be carried along inconsiderately 
by the appearance of things, but give help [to 
all] according to thy ability and their fitness ; 
and if they should have sustained loss in mat- 
ters which are indifferent, do not imagine this 
to be a damage ; for it is a bad habit. But as 
the old man, when he went away, asked back 
his foster-child's top, remembering that it was 
a top, so do thou in this case also. 

When thou art calling out on the Rostra, 
hast thou forgotten, man, what these things 
are? — Yes; but they are objects of great con- 
cern to these people — wilt thou too then be 
made a fool for these things? I was once a 
fortunate man, but I lost it, I know not how. — 
But fortunate means that a man has assigned 
to himself a good fortune : and a good fortune 
is good disposition of the soul, good emotions, 
good actions.* 

*This section is unintelligible. Many of the words 
may be corrupt, and the general purport of the section 
cannot be discovered. Perhaps several things have 
been improperly joined in one section. I have trans- 
lated it nearly literally. Different translators give 
the section a different turn, and the critics have tried 
to mend what they cannot understand. 



174 GbOUflbtS* [Book VI. 



VI. 

THE substance of the universe is obedient 
and compliant; and the reason which 
governs it has in itself no cause for doing evil, 
for it has no malice, nor does it do evil to any- 
thing, nor is anything harmed b} 7- it. But all 
things are made and perfected according to this 
reason. 

2. Let it make no difference to thee whether 
thou art cold or warm, if thou art doing thy 
duty; and whether thou art drowsy or satis- 
fied with sleep; and whether ill-spoken of or 
praised; and whether dying or doing some- 
thing else. For it is one of the acts of life, 
this act by which we die; it is sufficient then 
in this act also to do well what we have in 
hand (vi. 22, 28). 

3. Look within. Let neither the peculiar 
quality of anything nor its value escape thee. 

4. All existing things soon change, and 
they will either be reduced to vapor, if indeed 
all substance is one, or they will be dispersed. 

5. The reason which governs knows what 
its own disposition is, and what it does, and 
on what material it works. 

6. The best way of avenging thyself is not 
to become like [the wrong-doer]. 



Book vi.] Marcus Bureliue antoninus* 175 

7. Take pleasure in one thing and rest in it, 
in passing from one social act to another social 
act, thinking of God. 

8. The ruling principle is that which rouses 
and turns itself, and while it makes itself such 
as it is and such as it wills to be, it also makes 
everything which happens appear to itself to 
be such as it wills. 

9. In conformity to the nature of the uni- 
verse every single thing is accomplished; for 
certainly it is not in conformity to any other 
nature that each thing is accomplished, either 
a nature which externally comprehends this, or 
a nature which is comprehended within this 
nature, or a nature external and independent 
of this (xi. 1; vi. 40; viii. 50). 

10. The universe is either a confusion, and 
a mutual involution of things, and a dispersion, 
or it is unity and order and providence. If 
then it is the former, why do I desire to tarry 
in a fortuitous combination of things and such 
a disorder ? and why do I care about anything 
else than how I shall at last become earth ? 
and why am I disturbed, for the dispersion of 
my elements will happen whatever I do ? But 
if the other supposition is true, I venerate, and 
I am firm, and I trust in him who governs 
(iv. 27). 

11. When thou hast been compelled by cir- 
cumstances to be disturbed in a manner, 
quickly return to thyself, and do not continue 
out of tune longer than the compulsion lasts; 



176 GbOU0bt0* [Book VI. 

for thou wilt have more mastery over the har- 
mony by continually recurring to it. 

12. If thou hadst a step-mother and a mother 
at the same time, thou wouldst be dutiful to 
thy step-mother, but still thou wouldst con- 
stantly return to thy mother. Let the court 
and philosophy now be to thee step-mother and 
mother: return to philosophy frequently and 
repose in her, through whom what thou meet- 
est with in the court appears to thee tolerable, 
and thou appearest tolerable in the court. 

13. When we have meat before us and such 
eatables, we receive the impression that this is 
the dead body of a fish, and this the dead body 
of a bird or of a pig; and again, that this Faler- 
nian is only a little grape-juice, and this purple 
robe some sheep's wool dyed with the blood of 
a shell-fish: such then are these impressions, 
and they reach the things themselves and pene- 
trate them, and so we see what kind of things 
they are. Just in the same way ought we to 
act all through life, and where there are things 
which appear most worthy of our approbation, 
we ought to lay them bare and look at their 
worthlessness and strip them of all the words 
by which they are exalted. For outward show 
is a wonderful perverter of the reason, and 
when thou art most sure that thou art em- 
ployed about things worth thy pains, it is then 
that it cheats thee most. Consider then what 
Crates says of Xenocrates himself. 

14. Most of the things which the multitude 



Book VI.] Marcus Burelius Bntonfnus* 177 

admire are referred to objects of the most gen- 
eral kind, those which are held together by 
cohesion or natural organization, such as 
stones, wood, fig-trees, vines, olives. But 
those which are admired by men, who are a 
little more reasonable, are referred to the things 
which are held together by a living principle, 
as flocks, herds. Those which are admired by 
men who are still more instructed are the 
things which are held together by a rational 
soul, not however a universal soul, but rational 
so far as it is a soul skilled in some art, or ex- 
pert in some other way, or simply rational so 
far as it possesses a number of slaves. But he 
who values a rational soul, a soul universal and 
fitted for political life, regards nothing else ex- 
cept this; and above all things he keeps his 
soul in a condition and in an activity conform- 
able to reason and social life, and he co-oper- 
ates to this end with those who are of the same 
kind as himself. 

15. Some things are hurrying into existence, 
and others are hurrying out of it; and of that 
which is coming into existence part is already 
extinguished. Motions and changes are con- 
tinually renewing the world, just as the unin- 
terrupted course of time is always renewing 
the infinite duration of ages. In this flowing 
stream then, on which there is no abiding, 
what is there of the things which hurry by on 
which a man would set a high price? It 
would be just as if a man should fall in love 
12 



178 GbOU0bt0. [Book VI. 

with one of the sparrows which fly by, but it 
has alread}^ passed out of sight. Something 
of this kind is the very life of every man, like 
the exhalation of the blood and the respiration 
of the air. For such as it is to have once 
drawn in the air and to have given it back, 
w r hich we do every moment, just the same is it 
with the whole respiratory power, which thou 
didst receive at thy birth yesterday and the 
day before, to give it back to the element from 
which thou didst first draw it. 

16. Neither is transpiration, as in plants, a 
thing to be valued, nor respiration, as in 
domesticated animals and wild beasts, nor the 
receiving of impressions by the appearances of 
things, nor being moved by desires as puppets 
by strings, nor assembling in herds, nor being 
nourished by food ; for this is just like the act 
of separating and parting with the useless part 
of our food. What then is worth being valued ? 
To be received with clapping of hands ? No. 
Neither must w 7 e value the clapping of tongues ; 
for the praise which comes from the many is a 
clapping of tongues. Suppose then that thou 
hast given up this worthless thing called fame, 
what remains that is worth valuing? This, in 
my opinion : to move thyself and to restrain 
thyself in conformity to thy proper constitu- 
tion, to which end both all employments and 
arts lead. For every art aims at this, that the 
thing which has been made should be adapted 
to the work for which it has been made ; and 



Book VI.] /ifcarcus Burelius Sntoninus* 175 

both the vine-planter who looks after the vine, 
and the horse-breaker, and he who trains th<? 
dog, seek this end. But the education and the 
teaching of youth aim at something. In thi? 
then is the value of the education and the 
teaching. And if this is well, thou wilt not 
seek anything else. Wilt thou not cease t(? 
value many other things too? Then thou wilt 
be neither free, nor sufficient for thy own hap- 
piness, nor without passion. For of necessity 
thou must be envious, jealous, and suspicious 
of those who can take away those things, and 
plot against those who have that which is 
valued by thee. Of necessity a man must be 
altogether in a state of perturbation who wants 
any of these things ; and besides, he must often 
find fault with the gods. But to reverence 
and honor thy own mind will make thee con- 
tent with thyself, and in harmony with society, 
and in agreement with the gods, that is, prais- 
ing all that they give and have ordered. 

17. Above, below, all around are the move- 
ments of the elements. But the motion of 
virtue is in none of these : it is something 
more divine, and advancing by a way hardly 
observed, it goes happily on its road. 

18. How strangely men act ! They will not 
praise those who are living at the same time 
and living with themselves ; but to be them- 
selves praised by posterity, by those whom 
they have never seen nor ever will see, this they 
set much value on. But this is very much the 



180 GbOU0btS. [BookYL 

same as if thou shouldst be grieved because 
those who have lived before thee did not praise 
thee. 

19. If a thing is difficult to be accomplished 
by thyself, do not think that it is impossible 
for man : but if anything is possible for man 
and conformable to his nature, think that this 
can be attained by thyself too. 

20. In the gymnastic exercises suppose that 
a man has torn thee with his nails, and by 
dashing against thy head has inflicted a wound. 
Well, we neither show any signs of vexation, 
nor are we offended, nor do we suspect him 
afterwards as a treacherous fellow ; and yet we 
are on our guard against him, not however as 
an enemy, nor yet w 7 ith suspicion, but we 
quietly get out of his way. Something like 
this let thy behavior be in all the other parts 
of life ; let us overlook many things in those 
who are like antagonists in the gymnasium. 
For it is in our power, as I said, to get out of 
the way, and to have no suspicion nor hatred. 

21. If any man is able to convince me and 
show me that I do not think cr act right, I 
will gladly change ; for I seek the truth, by 
which no man was ever injured. But he is 
injured who abides in his error and ignorance. 

22. I do my duty : other things trouble me 
not ; for they are either things without life, or 
things without reason, or things that have 
rambled and know not the way. 

23. As to the animals which have no reason, 



Book VI.] flBarcus Bureltus Bntontnus* 181 

and generally all things and objects, do thou, 
since thou hast reason and they have none, 
make use of them with a generous and liberal 
spirit. But towards human beings, as they 
have reason, behave in a social spirit. And 
on all occasions call on the gods, and do not 
perplex thyself about the length of time in 
which thou shalt do this ; for even three hours 
so spent are sufficient. 

24. Alexander the Macedonian and his groom 
by death were brought to the same state ; for 
either they were received among the same 
seminal principles of the universe, or they were 
alike dispersed among the atoms. 

25. Consider how many things in the same 
indivisible time take place in each of us, — 
things which concern the body and things 
which concern the soul : and so thou wilt not 
wonder if many more things, or rather all 
things which come into existence in that which 
is the one and all, which we call Cosmos, exist 
in it at the same time. 

26. If any man should propose to thee the 
question, how the name Antoninus is written, 
wouldst thou with a straining of the voice utter 
each letter? What then if they grow angry, 
wilt thou be angry too? Wilt thou not go on 
with composure and number every letter ? Just 
so then in this life also remember that every 
duty is made up of certain parts. These it is 
thy duty to observe, and without being dis- 
turbed or showing anger towards those whv> 



1 82 ttbougbts. [Book VI. 

are angry with thee, to go on thy way and fin- 
ish that which is set before thee. 

27. How cruel it is not to allow men to strive 
after the things which appear to them to be 
suitable to their nature and profitable! And 
yet in a manner thou dost not allow them to do 
this, when thou art vexed because they do 
wrong. For they are certainly moved towards 
things because they suppose them to be suit- 
able to their nature and profitable to them. 
But it is not so. Teach them then, and show 
them without being angry. 

28. Death is a cessation of the impressions 
through the senses, and of the pulling of the 
strings which move the appetites, and of the 
discursive movements of the thoughts, and of 
the service to the flesh (ii. 12). 

29. It is a shame for the soul to be first to 
give way in this life, when thy body does not 
give way. 

30. Take care that thou art not made into a 
Caesar, that thou art not dyed with this dye; 
for such things happen. Keep thyself then 
simple, good, pure, serious, free from affecta- 
tion, a friend of justice, a worshipper of the 
gods, kind, affectionate, strenuous in all proper 
acts. Strive to continue to be such as philoso- 
phy wished to make thee. Reverence the gods, 
and help men. Short is life. There is only 
one fruit of this terrene life — a pious disposi- 
tion and social acts. Do everything as a dis- 
ciple of Antoninus. Remember his constancy 



Book vi.] dftarcus Burelius Bntoninus* 183 

in every act which was conformable to reason, 
and his evenness in all things, and his piety, 
and the serenity of his countenance, and his 
sweetness, and his disregard of empty fame, 
and his efforts to understand things; and how 
he would never let anything pass without hav- 
ing first most carefully examined it and clearly 
understood it; and how he bore with those who 
blamed him unjustly without blaming them in 
return; how he did nothing in a hurry; and 
how he listened not to calumnies, and how ex- 
act an examiner of manners and actions he was; 
and not given to reproach people, nor timid, 
nor suspicious, nor a sophist; and with how 
little he was satisfied, such as lodging, bed, 
dress, food, servants; and how laborious and 
patient; and how he was able on account of 
his sparing diet to hold out to the evening, not 
even requiring to relieve himself by any evacu- 
ations except at the usual hour; and his firm- 
ness and uniformity in his friendships; and how 
he tolerated freedom of speech in those who 
opposed his opinions; and the pleasure that he 
had when any man showed him anything bet- 
ter; and how religious he was without super- 
stition. Imitate all this, that thou mayest 
have as good a conscience, when thy last houl 
comes, as he had (i. 16). 

31. Return to thy sober senses and call thy- 
self back; and when thou hast roused thyself 
from sleep and hast perceived that they were 
only dreams which troubled thee, now in thy 



1 84 GbOUflbtS. [iodk VI. 

waking hours look at these [the things about 
thee] as thou didst look at those [the dreams]. 

32. I consist of a little body and a soul. 
Now to this little body all things are indiffer- 
ent, for it is not able to perceive differences. 
But to the understanding those things only are 
indifferent which are not the works of its own 
activity. But whatever things are the works 
of its own activity, all these are in its power. 
And of these however only those which are 
done with reference to the present; for as to 
the future and the past activities of the mind, 
even these are for the present indifferent. 

33. Neither the labor which the hand does 
nor that of the foot is contrary to nature, so 
long as the foot does the foot's work and the 
hand the hand's. So then neither to a man as 
a man is his labor contrary to nature, so long 
as it does the things of a man. But if the 
labor is not contrary to his nature, neither is it 
an evil to him. 

34. How many pleasures have been en- 
joyed by robbers, patricides, tyrants. 

35. Dost thou not see how the handicrafts- 
men accommodate themselves up to a certain 
point to those who are not skilled in their 
craft — nevertheless they cling to the reason 
[the principles] of their art, and do not endure 
to depart from it? Is it not strange if the 
architect and the physician shall have more re- 
spect to the reason [the principles] of their 
own arts than man to his own reason, which is 
common to him and the gods ? 



Book VI.] Marcus HurelfuB Bntoninus* 185 

36. Asia, Kurope, are corners of the uni- 
verse; all the sea a drop in the universe; 
Athos a little clod of the universe: all the 
present time is a point in eternity. All things 
are little, changeable, perishable. All things 
come from thence, from that universal ruling 
power, either directly proceeding or by way of 
sequence. And accordingly the lion's gaping 
jaws, and that which is poisonous, and every 
harmful thing, as a thorn, as mud, are after- 
products of the grand and beautiful. Do not 
then imagine that they are of another kind 
from that which thou dost venerate, but form 
a just opinion of the source of all (vii. 75). 

37. He who has seen present things has 
seen all, both everything which has taken 
place from all eternity and everything which 
will be for time without end; for all things are 
of one kin and of one form. 

38. Frequently consider the connection of all 
things in the universe and their relation to one 
another. For in a manner all things are im- 
plicated with one another, and all in this way 
are friendly to one another; for one thing 
comes in order after another, and this is by 
virtue of the + active movement and mutual 
conspiration and the unity of the substance 
(ix. I). 

39. Adapt thyself to the things with which 
thy lot has been cast: and the men among 
whom thou hast received thy portion, love 
them, but do it truly [sincerely]. 



1 86 Gbougbts, [Book n 

40. Every instrument, tool, vessel, if it does 
that for which it has been made, is well, and 
yet he who made it is not there. But in the 
things which are held together by nature there 
is within, and there abides in them the power 
which made them; wherefore the more is it fit 
to reverence this power, and to think, that, if 
thou dost live and act according to its will, 
everything in thee is in conformity to intelli- 
gence. And thus also in the universe the 
things which belong to it are in conformity to 
intelligence. 

41. Whatever of the things which are not 
within thy power thou shalt suppose to be 
good for thee or evil, it must of necessity be 
that, if such a bad thing befall thee, or the loss 
of such a good thing, thou wilt not blame the 
gods, and hate men too, those who are the cause 
of the misfortune or the loss, or those who are 
suspected of being likely to be the cause; and 
indeed we do much injustice because we make 
a difference between these things [because we 
do not regard these things as indifferent +].* 
But if we judge only those things which are in 
our power to be good or bad, there remains no 
reason either for finding fault with God or 
standing in a hostile attitude to man.f 

* Gataker translates this "because we strive to get 
these things," comparing the use of duupepeodcu in v. I, 
and x. 27, and ix. 38, where it appears that his refer- 
ence should be xi. 10. He may be right in his inter- 
pretation, but I doubt. 

t Cicero, De Natura Deorum. iii. 32. 



Book VI.] /iftarcus Bureaus Bntoninus, 187 

42. We are all working together to one end, 
some with knowledge and design, and others 
without knowing what they do; as men also 
when they are asleep, of whom it is Heraclitus, 
I think, who says that they are laborers and 
co-operators in the things which take place in 
the universe. But men co-operate after differ- 
ent fashions: and even those co-operate abun 
dantly, who find fault with what happens and 
those who try to oppose it and to hinder it; for 
the universe had need even of such men as 
these. It remains then for thee to understand 
among what kind of workmen thou placest thy- 
self; for he who rules all things will certainly 
make a right use of thee, and he will receive 
thee among some part of the co-operators and 
of those whose labors conduce to one end. 
But be not thou such a part as the mean and 
ridiculous verse in the play, which Chrysippus 
speaks of/ :< 

43. Does the sun undertake to do the work 
of the rain, or Aesculapius the work of the 
Fruit-bearer [the earth] ? And how is it with 
respect to each of the stars — are they not differ- 
ent and yet they work together to the same 
end? 

44. If the gods have determined about me 
and about the things which must happen to 
me, they have determined well, for it is not 
easy even to imagine a deity without fore- 
thought; and as to doing me harm, why should 

* Plutarch, adversus Stoicos, c. 14. 



1 88 GbOligbtS, [BookVL 

they have any desire towards that ? for what 
advantage would result to them from this or to 
the whole, which is the special object of their 
providence ? But if they have not determined 
about me individually, they have certainly de- 
termined about the whole at least, and the 
things which happen by way of sequence in 
this general arrangement I ought to accept 
with pleasure and to be content with them. 
But if they determine about nothing, — which 
it is wicked to believe, or if we do believe it, 
let us neither sacrifice nor pray nor swear by 
them, nor do anything else which we do as if 
the gods were present and lived with us, — but 
if however the gods determine about none of 
the things which concern us, I am able to de- 
termine about myself, and I can inquire about 
that which is useful; and that is useful to 
every man which is conformable to his own 
constitution and nature. But my nature is 
rational and social; and my city and country, so 
far as I am Antoninus, is Rome, but so far as 
I am a man, it is the world. The things then 
which are useful to these cities are alone use- 
ful to me. 

45. Whatever happens to every man, this is 
for the interest of the universal: this might be 
sufficient. But further thou wilt observe this 
also as a general truth , if thou dost observe, 
that whatever is profitable to any man is prof- 
itable also to other men. But let the word 
profitable be taken here in the common sense 



Book VI.] /Bbarcus Bureltus Bntontnus* 189 

as said of things of the middle kind [neither 
good nor bad]. 

46. As it happens to thee in the amphitheatre 
and such places, that the continual sight of 
the same things, and the uniformity, make the 
spectacle wearisome, so it is in the whole of 
life; for all things above, below, are the same 
and from the same. How long then? 

47. Think continually that all kinds of men 
and all kinds of pursuits and of all nations are 
dead, so that thy thoughts come down even to 
Philistion and Phoebus and Origanion. Now 
turn thy thoughts to the other kinds [of men]. 
To that place then we must remove, where 
there are so many great orators, and so many 
noble philosophers, Heraclitus, Pythagoras, 
Socrates; so man}^ heroes of former days, and 
so many generals after them, and tyrants; be- 
sides these, Eudoxus, Hipparchus, Archimedes, 
and other men of acute natural talents, great 
minds, lovers of labor, versatile, confident, 
mockers even of the perishable and ephemeral 
life of man, as Menippus and such as are like 
him. As to all these consider that they have 
long been in the dust. What harm then is this 
to them; and what to those whose names are 
altogether unknown ? One thing here is worth 
a great deal, to pass thy life in truth and just- 
ice, with a benevolent disposition even to liars 
and unjust men. 

48. When thou wishest to delight thyself, 
think of the virtues of those who live with 



190 GbOUfibtS, [Book VI. 

thee; for instance, the activity of one, and the 
modesty of another, and the liberality of a 
third, and some other good quality of a fourth. 
For nothing delights so much as the examples 
of the virtues, when they are exhibited in the 
morals of those who live with us and present 
themselves in abundance, as far as is possible. 
Wherefore we must keep them before us. 

49. Thou art not dissatisfied I suppose, be- 
cause thou weighest only so many litrae and 
not three hundred. Be not dissatisfied then 
that thou must live only so many years and 
not more; for as thou art satisfied with the 
amount of substance which has been assigned 
to thee, so be content with the time. 

50. Let us try to persuade them [men]. 
But act even against their will, when the 
principles of justice lead that way. If however 
any man by using force stands in thy way, be- 
take thyself to contentment and tranquillity, 
and at the same time employ the hindrance 
towards the exercise of some other virtue; and 
remember that thy attempt was with a reser- 
vation [conditionally], that thou didst not de- 
sire to do impossibilities. What then didst 
thou desire? — Some such effort as this. — But 
thou attainest thy object, if the things to which 
thou wast moved are [not] accomplished. + 

51. He who loves fame considers another 
man's activity to be his own good; and he who 
loves pleasure, his own sensations ; but he 
who has understanding considers his own acts 
to be his own good. 



Book VI.] /nbarcus Burelius Bntonfnus* 191 

52. It is in our power to have no opinion 
about a thing, and not to be disturbed in our 
soul ; for things themselves have no natural 
power to form our judgments. 

53. Accustom thyself to attend carefully to 
what is said by another, and as much as it is 
possible, be in the speaker's mind. 

54. That which is not good for the swarm, 
neither is it good for the bee. 

55. If sailors abused the helmsman, or the 
sick the doctor, would they listen to anybody 
else ? or how could the helmsman secure the 
safety of those in the ship, or the doctor the 
health of those whom he attends? 

56. How many together with whom I came 
into the world are already gone out of it. 

57. To the jaundiced honey tastes bitter, 
and to those bitten by mad dogs water causes 
fear ; and to little children the ball is a fine 
thing. Why then am I angry? Dost thou 
think that a false opinion has less power than 
the bile in the jaundiced or the poison in him 
who is bitten by a mad dog? 

58. No man will hinder thee from living ac- 
cording to the reason of thy own nature : noth- 
ing will happen to thee contrary to the reason 
of the universal nature. 

59. What kind of people are those whom 
men wish to please, and for what objects, and 
by what kind of acts? How soon will time 
cover all things, and how many it has covered 
already. 



192 GbOUGbtS* [Book VII. 



VII. 

WHAT is badness? It is that which thou 
hast often seen. And on the occasion of 
everything which happens keep this in mind, 
that it is that which thou hast often seen. 
Everywhere up and down thou wilt find the 
same things, with which the old histories are 
filled, those of the middle ages and those of 
our own day ; with which cities and houses 
are filled now. There is nothing new: all 
things are both familiar and short-lived. 

2. How can our principles become dead, un- 
less the impressions [thoughts] which corre- 
spond to them are extinguished ? But it is in 
thy power continuously to fan these thoughts 
into a flame. I can have that opinion about 
anything which I ought to have. If I can, 
why am I disturbed? The things which are 
external to my mind have no relation at all to 
my mind. — Let this be the state of thy affects, 
and thou standest erect. To recover thy life is 
in thy power. Look at things again as thou 
didst use to look at them ; for in this consists 
the recovery of thy life. 

3. The idle business of show, plays on the 
stage, flocks of sheep, herds, exercises with 
spears, a bone cast to little dogs, a bit of bread 



•'Book TO.] dfcarcus Burelfus Sntonfnus* - 193 

into fishponds, laborings of ants and burden- 
carrying, runnings about of frightened little 
mice, puppets pulled by strings — [all alike], 
It is thy duty then in the midst of such things 
to show good humor and not a proud air; to 
understand however that every man is worth 
just so much as the things are worth about 
which he busies himself. 

4. In discourse thou must attend to what is 
said, and in every movement thou must ob- 
serve what is doing. And in the one thou 
shouldst see immediately to what end it refers, 
but in the other watch carefully what is the 
thing signified. 

5. Is my understanding sufficient for this or 
not ? If it is sufficient, I use it for the work as 
an instrument given by the universal nature. 
But if it is not sufficient, then either I retire 
from the work and give way to him who is 
able to do it better, unless there be some reason 
why I ought not to do so; or I do it as well as 
I can, taking to help me the man who with the 
aid of my ruling principle can do w T hat is now 
fit and useful for the general good. For what- 
soever either by myself or with another I can 
do, ought to be directed to this only, to that 
which is useful and well suited to society. 

6. How many after being celebrated by fame 
have been given up to oblivion ; and how many 
who have celebrated the fame of others have 
long been dead. 

7. Be not ashamed to be helped; for it is thy 

13 



194 ttbOUflbte, [Book VIL 

business to do thy duty like a soldier in the 
assault 011 a town. How then, if being lame 
thou canst not mount up on the battlements 
alone, but with the help of another it is pos- 
sible ? 

8. Let not future things disturb thee, for 
thou wilt come to them, if it shall be necessary, 
having with thee the same reason which now 
thou usest for present things. 

9 . All things are implicated with one another, 
and the bond is holy; and there is hardly any- 
thing unconnected with any other thing. 
For things have been co-ordinated, and they 
combine to form the same universe [order]. 
For there is one universe made up of all 
things, and one god who pervades all things, 
and one substance,* and one law, [one] com- 
mon reason in all intelligent animals, and one 
truth; if indeed there is also one perfection for 
all animals which are of the same stock and 
participate in the reason. 

io. Everything material soon disappears in 
the substance of the whole; and everything 
formal [causal] is very soon taken back into 
the universal reason; and the memory of every- 
thing is very soon overwhelmed in time. 

1 1 . To the rational animal the same act is 
according to nature and according to reason, 

12. Be thou erect, or be made erect (iii. 5). 

13. Just as it is with the members in those 
bodies which are united in one, so it i^ with 

* "One substance," p. 42, note 1. 



BookViL] /iftarcus Bureltus Bntontnus* 195 

rational beings which exist separate, for they 
have been constituted for one co-operation. 
And the perception of this will be more appar- 
ent to thee if thou often sayest to thyself that 
I am a member [/z£Aoc] of the system of rational 
beings. But if [using the letter r\ thou sayest 
that thou art a part \jikpoq\, thou dost not yet 
love men from thy heart ; beneficence does not 
yet delight thee for its own sake ; * thou still 
doest it barely as a thing of propriety, and not 
yet as doing good to thyself. 

14. Let there fall external!}' what will on 
the parts which can feel the effects of this fall. 
For those parts which have felt will complain, 
if they choose. But I, unless I think that 
what has happened is an evil, am not injured. 
And it is in my power not to think so. 

15. Whatever any one does or says, I must 
be good ; just as if the gold, or the emerald, or 
the purple, were always saying this. What- 
ever any one does or says, I must be emerald 
and keep my color. 

16. The ruling faculty does not disturb it- 
self ; I mean, does not frighten itself or cause 
itself pain. 4- But if any one else can frighten 
or pain it, let him do so. For the faculty it- 
self will not by its own opinion turn itself into 
such ways. Let the body itself take care, if it 
can, that it suffer nothing, and let it speak, if 

*I have used Gataker's conjecture KaralrjUTUitiQ in- 
stead of the common reading mTakrrKTiK&q : compare 
iv. 20; ix. 42. 



196 '£bOU0bt0* [Book to 

it suffers. But the soul itself, that which is 
subject to fear, to pain, which has completely 
the power of forming an opinion about these 
things, will suffer nothing, for it will never 
deviate + into such a judgment. The leading 
principle in itself wants nothing, unless it 
makes a want for itself; and therefore it is 
both free from perturbation and unimpeded, if 
it does not disturb and impede itself. 

17. Eudaemonia [happiness] is a good 
daemon, or a good thing. What then art thou 
doing here, O imagination ? Go away, I en- 
treat thee by the gods, as thou didst come, for 
I want thee not. But thou art come according 
to thy old fashion. I am not angry with thee : 
only go away. 

18. Is any man afraid of change? Why, 
what can take place without change? What 
then is more pleasing or more suitable to the 
universal nature ? And canst thou take a bath 
unless the wood undergoes a change? and 
canst thou be nourished, unless the food un- 
dergoes a change? And can anything else 
that is useful be accomplished without change? 
Dost thou not see then that for thyself also to 
change is just the same, and equally necessary 
for the universal nature ? 

19. Through the universal substance as 
through a furious torrent all bodies are carried, 
being by their nature united with and co-oper- 
ating with the whole, as the parts of our body 
with one another. How many a Chrysippus, 



Book VII.] Marcus Burelius Bntonfnus* 197 

how many a Socrates, how many an Epictetus 
has time already swallowed up ! And let the 
same thought occur to thee with reference to 
every man and thing (v. 23 ; vi. 15). 

20. One thing only troubles me, lest I should 
do something which the constitution of man 
does not allow, or in the way which it doe$ 
not allow, or what it does not allow now. 

21. Near is thy forgetfulness of all things; 
and near the forgetfulness of thee by all. 

22. It is peculiar to man to love even those 
who do wrong. And this happens, if when 
they do wrong it occurs to thee that they are 
kinsmen, and that they do wrong through 
ignorance and unintentionally, and that soon 
both of you will die ; and above all, that the 
wrong-doer has done thee no harm, for he has 
not made thy ruling faculty worse than it was 
before. 

23. The universal nature out of the universal 
substance, as if it were wax, now moulds a 
horse, and when it has broken this up, it uses 
the material for a tree, then for a man, then for 
something else ; and each of these things sub- 
sists for a very short time. But it is no hard- 
ship for the vessel to be broken up, just as 
there was none in its being fastened together 
(viii. 50). 

24. A scowling look is altogether unnatural ; 
when it is often assumed,* the result is that all 
comeliness dies away, and at last is so com- 

* This is corrupt. 



1 98 abOUGbtS, [Book VIL 

pletely extinguished that it cannot be again 
lighted up at all. Try to conclude from this 
very fact that it is contrary to reason. For if 
even the perception of doing wrong shall de- 
part, what reason is there for living any 
longer ? 

25. Nature which governs the whole will 
soon change all things thou seest, and out of 
their substance will make other things, and 
again other things from the substance of them, 
in order that the world may be ever new (xii. 

23)- 

26. When a man has done thee any wrong, 
immediately consider with what opinion about 
good or evil he has done wrong. For when 
thou hast seen this, thou wilt pity him, and 
wilt neither wonder nor be angry. For either 
thou thyself thinkest the same thing to be 
good that he does, or another thing of the same 
kind. It is thy duty then to pardon him. 
But if thou dost not think such things to be 
good or evil, thou wilt more readily be well 
disposed to him who is in error. 

27. Think not so much of what thou hast 
not as of what thou hast : but of the things 
which thou hast select the best, and then reflect 
how eagerly they would have been sought, if 
thou hadst them not. At the same time, how- 
ever, take care that thou dost not through be- 
ing vSo pleased with them accustom thyself to 
overvalue them, so as to be disturbed if ever 
thou shouldst not have them. 



Book VII.] Marcus Surelfus Bntonfnus, 199 

28. Retire into thyself. The rational prin- 
ciple which rules has this nature, that it is con- 
tent with itself when it does what is just, and 
so secures tranquillity. 

29. Wipe out the imagination. Stop the 
pulling of the strings. Confine thyself to the 
present. Understand well what happens either 
to thee or to another. Divide and distribute 
every object into the causal [formal] and the 
material. Think of thy last hour. L,et the 
wrong which is done by a man stay there where 
the wrong was done (viii. 29). 

30. Direct thy attention to w r hat is said. 
Let thy understanding enter into the things 
that are doing and the things which do them 
(vii. 4). 

31. Adorn thyself with simplicity and 
modesty, and with indifference towards the 
things which lie between virtue and vice. 
Love mankind. Follow God. The poet says 
that law rules all — -h And it is enough to re- 
member that law rules all.+* 

32. About death : whether it is a dispersion, 
or a resolution into atoms, or annihilation, it is 
either extinction or change. 

33. About pain : the pain which is intoler- 
able carries us off ; but that which lasts a long 
time is tolerable; and the mind maintains its 
own tranquillity by retiring into itself, and 
the ruling faculty is not made worse. But the 

* The end of this section is unintelligible. 



200 ftbougbta, [BookVlL 

parts which are harmed by pain, let them, if 
they can, give their opinion about it. 

34. About fame : look at the minds [of 
those who seek fame], observe what they are, 
and what kind of things they avoid, and what 
kind of things they pursue. And consider 
that as the heaps of sand piled on one another 
hide the former sands, so in life the events 
which go before are soon covered by those 
which come after. 

35. From Plato :* The man who has an ele- 
vated mind and takes a view of all time and 
of all substance, dost thou suppose it possible 
for him to think that human life is anything 
great? It is not possible, he said. — Such a 
man then will think that death also is no evil. 
— Certainly not. 

36. From Antisthenes : It is royal to do 
good and to be abused. 

37. It is a base thing for the countenance to 
be obedient and to regulate and compose itself 
as the mind commands, and for the mind not 
to be regulated and composed by itself. 

38. It is not right to vex ourselves at things, 
For they care nought about it.f 

39. To the immortal gods and us give joy. 

40. Life must be reaped like the ripe ears of 

corn. 
One man is born ; another dies. J 

* Plato, Pol. vi. 486. 

t From the Bellerophon of Euripides. 

% From the Hypsipyle of Euripides. Cicero (Tuscul. 



Book vii.] /Hbarcus Bureltue Bntoninus* 201 

41. If gods care not for me and my children, 
There is a reason for it. 

42. For the good is with me, and the just.* 

43. No joining others in their wailing, no 

violent emotion. 

44. From Plato :f But I would make this 
man a sufficient answer, which is this : Thou 
sayest not well, if thou thinkest that a man 
who is good for anything at all ought to com- 
pute the hazard of life or death, and should 
not rather look to this only in all that he does, 
whether he is doing what is just or unjust, and 
the works of a good or bad man. 

45. fFor thus it is, men of Athens, in truth: 
wherever a man has placed himself thinking it 
the best place for him, or has been placed by a 
commander, there in my opinion he ought to 
stay and to abide the hazard, taking nothing 
into the reckoning, either death or an}^thing 
else, before the baseness [of deserting his 
post]. 

46. But, my good friend, reflect whether 
that which is noble and good is not something 
different from saving and being saved; for+ as 
to a man living such or such a time, at least 
one who is really a man, consider if this is not 

iii. 25) has translated six lines from Euripides, and 
among them are these two lines, — 

" Reddenda terrae est terra: turn vita omnibus 
Metenda ut frnges: Sic jubet necessitas. ,> 
* See Aristophanes, Acharnenses, v. 661. 
t From the Apologia, c. 16. 



202 GbOU0btS, [Book vn. 

a thing to be dismissed from the thoughts : 4- 
and there must be no love of life: but as to 
these matters a man must intrust them to the 
Deity and believe what the women say, that 
no man can escape his destiny, the next in- 
quiry being how he may best live the time that 
he has to live.* 

47. Look round at the courses of the stars, 
as if thou wert going along with them ; and 
constantly consider the changes of the elements 
into one another, for such thoughts purge 
away the filth of the terrene life. 

48. This is a fine saying of Plato :f That he 
who is discoursing about men should look also 
at earthly things as if he viewed them from 
some higher place ; should look at them in 
their assemblies, armies, agricultural labors, 
marriages, treaties, births, deaths, noise of the 
courts of justice, desert places, various nations 
of barbarians, feasts, lamentations, markets, a 
mixture of all things and an orderly combina- 
tion of contraries. 

49. Consider the past, — such great changes 
of political supremacies; thou mayest foresee 
also the things which will be. For they will 

* Plato, Gorgias, c. 68 (512). In this passage the 
text of Antoninus has karkov y which is perhaps right; 
but there is a difficulty in the words [irj yap tovto [iev y 
to C,f/v biroGovdr] xpovov rdvye &C ahrjOtig avdpa karkov koriy 
kciI ov } &c. The conjecture evurkov for karkov does not 
mend the matter. 

f It is said that this is not in the extant writings of 
Plato. 



Book VIL] jflfcarcus Burelfus 2lntoninus* 203 

certainly be of like form, and it is not possible 
that they should deviate from the order of the 
chings which take place now; accordingly to 
have contemplated human life for forty years 
is the same as to have contemplated it for ten 
thousand years. For what more wilt thou 
see? 

50. That which has grown from the earth to 

the earth, 
But that which has sprung from heavenly 

seed, 
Back to the heavenly realms returns.* 
This is either a dissolution of the mutual in- 
volution of the atoms, or a similar dispersion 
of the unsentient elements. 

51. With food and drinks and cunning magic 

arts 

Turning the channel's course to 'scape 
from death. f 

The breeze which heaven has sent 

We must endure, and toil without com- 
plaining. 

52. Another may be more expert in casting 
his opponent; but he is not more social, nor 
more modest, nor better disciplined to meet all 
that happens, nor more considerate with re- 
spect to the faults of his neighbors. 

53. Where any work can be done conform- 
ably to the reason which is common to gods 

* From the Chrysippus of Euripides. 

fThe first two lines are from the Supplices of 
Euripides, v. mo. 



204 £bOU0bt0* [BookVIL 

and men, there we have nothing to fear; for 
where we are able to get profit by means of the 
activity which is successful and proceeds ac- 
cording to our constitution, there no harm is 
to be suspected. 

54. Everywhere and at all times it is in thy 
power piously to acquiesce in thy present con- 
dition, and to behave justly to those who are 
about thee, and to exert thy skill upon thy 
present thoughts, that nothing shall steal into 
them without being well examined. 

55. Do not look around thee to discover 
other men's ruling principles, but look straight 
to this, to what nature leads thee, both the uni- 
versal nature through the things which happen 
to thee, and thy own nature through the acts 
whicli must be done by thee. But every being 
ought to do that which is according to its con- 
stitution; and all other things have been con- 
stituted for the sake of rational beings, just as 
among irrational things the inferior for the 
sake of the superior, but the rational for the 
sake of one another. 

The prime principle then in man's constitu- 
tion is the social. And the second is not to 
yield to the persuasions of the body, — for it is 
the peculiar office of the rational and intelligent 
motion to circumscribe itself, and never to be 
overpowered either by the motion of the senses 
or of the appetites, for both are animal; but the 
intelligent motion claims superiority, and does 
not permit itself to be overpowered by the 



.Book TO] /Bbarcus aurelius Sntoninus* 205 

others. And with good reason, for it is formed 
by nature to use all of them. The third thing 
in the rational constitution is freedom from 
error and from deception. L,et then the ruling 
principle holding fast to these things go 
straight on, and it has what is its own. 

56. Consider thyself to be dead, and to have 
completed thy life up to the present time; and 
live according to nature the remainder which 
is allowed thee. 

57. Iyove that only which happens to thee 
and is spun with the thread of thy destiny. 
For what is more suitable ? 

.58. In everything which happens keep be- 
fore thy eyes those to whom the same things 
happened, and how they were vexed, and 
treated them as strange things, and found 
fault with them : and now where are they ? 
Nowhere. Why then dost thou too choose to 
act in the same way ? and why dost thou not 
leave these agitations which are foreign to 
nature to those who cause them and those who 
are moved by them; and why art thou not al- 
together intent upon the right way of making 
use of the things which happen to thee ? For 
then thou wilt use them well, and the}^ will be 
a material for thee [to work on]. Only attend 
to thyself, and resolve to be a good man in every 
act which thou doest : and remember . . .* 

* This section is obscure, and the conclusion is so 
corrupt that it is impossible to give any probable 
meaning to it. It is better to leave it as it is than to 
patch it up, as some critics and translators have done 



206 GbOUflbtS. [Book VII. 

59. Look within. Within is the fountain of 
good, and it will ever bubble up, if thou wilt 
ever dig. 

60. The body ought to be compact, and to 
show no irregularity either in motion or atti- 
tude. For what the mind shows in the face by 
maintaining in it the expression of intelligence 
and propriety, that ought to be required also 
in the whole body. But all these things should 
be observed without affectation. 

61. The art of life is more like the wrestler's 
art than the dancer's, in respect of this, that it 
should stand ready and firm to meet onsets 
which are sudden and unexpected. 

62. Constantly observe who those are whose 
approbation thou wishest to have, and what 
ruling principles they possess. For then thou 
wilt neither blame those who offend involun- 
tarity, nor wilt thou want their approbation, 
if thou lookest to the sources of their opinions 
and appetites. 

63. Every soul, the philosopher says, is in- 
voluntarily deprived of truth; consequently in 
the same way it is deprived of justice and tem- 
perance and benevolence and everything of the 
kind. It is most necessary to bear this con- 
stantly in mind, for thus thou wilt be more 
gentle towards all. 

64. In every pain let this thought be pres- 
ent, that there is no dishonor in it, nor does it 
make the governing intelligence worse, for it 
does not damage the intelligence either so far 



BookViL] dfcarcus Burelius Bntoninus* 207 

as the intelligence is rational* or so far as it is 
social. Indeed in the case of most pains let 
this remark of Epicurus aid thee, that pain 
is neither intolerable nor everlasting, if thou 
bearest in mind that it has its limits, and if 
thou addest nothing to it in imagination: and 
remember this too, that we do not perceive 
that many things which are disagreeable to us 
are the same as pain, such as excessive drow- 
siness, and the being scorched by heat, and 
the having no appetite. When then thou art 
discontented about any of these things, say to 
thyself that thou art yielding to pain. 

65. Take care not to feel towards the inhu- 
man as they feel towards men.f 

66. How do we know if Telauges was not 
superior in character to Socrates? For it is 
not enough that Socrates died a more noble 
death, and disputed more skilfully with the 
sophists, and passed the night in the cold with 
more endurance, and that when he was bid to 
arrest L,eonJ of Salamis, he considered it more 
noble to refuse, and that he walked in a swag- 

* The text has vTmct/, which it has been proposed to 
alter to loymf], arid this change is necessary. We shall 
then have in this section loyiar] and kolvqviktj associated, 
as we have in s. 68 "koyttd] and ^oktrmrj^ and in s. 72. 

f I have followed Gataker's conjecture ol aTravdpoTcoi 
instead of the MSS. reading ol avOporroi. 

t Leon of Salamis. See Plato, Epist 7; Apolog. c. 
20; Kpictetus, iv. 1, 160; iv. 7, 30. 



208 GbOUflbtS, [Book TO. 

gering way in the streets* — though as to this 
fact one may have great doubts if it was true. 
But we ought to inquire what kind of a soul it 
was that Socrates possessed, and if he was able 
to be content with being just towards men and 
pious towards the gods,, neither idly vexed on 
account of men's villainy, nor yet making him- 
self a slave to any man's ignorance, nor receiv- 
ing as strange anything that fell to his share 
out of the universal, nor enduring it as in- 
tolerable, nor allowing his understanding to 
sympathize with the affects of the miserable 
flesh. 

67. Nature has not so mingled+ [the intelli- 
gence] with the composition of the body, as 
not to have allowed thee the power of circum- 
scribing thyself and of bringing under subjec- 
tion to thyself all that is thy own; for it is 
very possible to be a divine man and to be 
recognized as such by no one. Always bear 
this in mind ; and another thing too, that very 
little indeed is necessary for living a happy life. 
And because thou hast despaired of becoming 
a dialectician and skilled in the knowledge of 
nature, do not for this reason renounce the 
hope of being both free and modest, and social 
and obedient to God. 

68. It is in thy power to live free from all 
compulsion in the greatest tranquillity of mind, 

* Aristophan. Nub. 362. bri (Spevdvec t' kv Talctv 
66ol<; Kal to) 6(/)da?ijuo} napa flatlet. 



Book VII.] /nbarcua Surelfus Bntoninus* 209 

even if all the world cry out against thee as 
much as they choose, and even if wild beasts 
tear in pieces the members of this kneaded 
matter which has grown around thee. For 
what hinders the mind in the midst of all this 
from maintaining itself in tranquillity and in a 
just judgment of all surrounding things and 
in a ready use of the objects which are pre- 
sented to it, so that the judgment may say to 
the thing which falls under its observation : 
This thou art in substance [reality], though in 
men's opinion thou may est appear to be of a 
different kind ; and the use shall say to that 
which falls under the hand : Thou art the thing 
that I was seeking ; for to me that which pre- 
sents itself is always a material for virtue both 
rational and political, and in a word, for the 
exercise of art, which belongs to man or God. 
For everything which happens has a relation- 
ship either to God or man, and is neither new 
nor difficult to handle, but usual and apt mat- 
ter to work on. 

69. The perfection of moral character con- 
sists in this, in passing every day as the last, 
and in being neither violently excited nor 
torpid nor playing the hypocrite. 

70. The gods who are immortal are not 
vexed because during so long a time they 
must tolerate continually men such as they are 
and so many of them bad ; and besides this, 
they also take care of them in all ways. But 
thou, who art destined to end so soon, art thou 

14 



2 IO ttbOUflbt*. [Book VII. 

wearied of enduring the bad, and this too when 
thou art one of them ? 

71. It is a ridiculous thing for a man not to 
fly from his own badness, which is indeed pos- 
sible, but to fly from other men's badness, 
which is impossible. 

72. Whatever the rational and political 
[social] faculty finds to be neither intelligent 
nor social, it properly j udges to be inferior to 
itself. 

73. When thou hast done a good act and 
another has received it, why dost thou still 
look for a third thing besides these, as fools do, 
either to have the reputation of having done a 
good act or to obtain a return ? 

74. No man is tired of receiving what is 
useful. But it is useful to act according to 
nature. Do not then be tired of receiving 
what is useful by doing it to others. 

75. The nature of the All moved to make 
the universe. But now either everything that 
takes place comes by way of consequence or 
[continuity] ; or even the chief things towards 
which the ruling power of the universe directs 
its own movement are governed by no rational 
principle. If this is remembered, it will make 
thee more tranquil in many things (vi. 44 ; 
ix. 28).* 

* It is not easy to understand this section. It has 
been suggested that there is some error in rj aldyiora, 
&c. Some of the translators have made nothing of 
the passage, and they have somewhat perverted the 



BookViL] dftarcus Bureltus Bntontnus* 211 

words. The first proposition is, that the universe was 
made by some sufficient power. A beginning of the 
universe is assumed, and a power which framed an 
order. The next question is, How are things pro- 
duced now? Or, in other words, by what power do 
forms appear in continuous succession ? The answer, 
according to Antoninus, may be this: It is by virtue 
of the original constitution of things that all change 
and succession have been effected and are effected, 
And this is intelligible in a sense, if we admit that the 
universe is always one and the same, a continuity of 
identity; as much one and the same as man is one 
and the same — which he believes himself to be, though 
he also believes, and cannot help believing, that both 
in his body and in his thoughts there is change and 
succession. There is no real discontinuity then in 
the universe; and if we say that there was an order 
framed in the beginning, and that the things which 
are now produced are a consequence of a previous ar- 
rangement, we speak of things as we are compelled to 
view them, as forming a series of succession, just as 
we speak of the changes in our own bodies and the 
sequence of our own thoughts. But as there are no 
intervals, not even intervals infinitely small, between 
any two supposed states of any one thing, so there are 
no intervals, not even infinitely small, between what 
we call one thing and any other thing which we speak 
of as immediately preceding or following it. What 
we call time is an idea derived from our notion of a 
succession of things or events, an idea which is a part 
of our constitution, but not an idea which we can sup- 
pose to belong to an infinite intelligence and power. 
The conclusion then is certain that the present and 
the past, the production of present things and the sup- 
posed original order, out of which we say that present 
things now come, are one, and the present productive 
power and the so-called past arrangement are only 
different names for one thing. I suppose then that 
Antoninus wrote here as people sometimes talk now, 



212 Zbougbte. [Bookvn. 

and that his real meaning is not exactly expressed by 
his words. There are certainly other passages from 
which I think that we may collect that he had notions 
of production something like what I have expressed. 
We now come to the alternate: "or even the chief 
things . . . principle." I do not exactly know what 
he means by rd nvpiurara, "the chief," or " the most 
excellent," or whatever it is. But as he speaks else- 
where of inferior and superior things, and of the infe- 
rior being for the use of the superior, and of rational 
beings being the highest, he may here mean rational 
beings. He also in this alternative assumes a govern- 
ing power of the universe, and that it acts by directing 
its power towards these chief objects, or making its spe- 
cial, proper motion towards them. And here he uses 
the noun (op/uy) " movement, " which contains the 
same notion as the verb (fop/iyae) "moved," which he 
used at the beginning of the paragraph, when he was 
speaking of the making of the universe. If we do not 
accept the first hypothesis, he says, we must take the 
conclusion of the second, that the "chief things to- 
wards which the ruling power of the universe directs 
its own movement are governed by no rational prin- 
ciple." The meaning then is, if there is a meaning 
in it, that though there is a governing power which 
strives to give effect to its efforts, we must conclude 
that there is no rational direction of anything, if the 
power which first made the universe does not in some 
way govern it still. Besides, if we assume that any- 
thing is now produced or now exists without the ac- 
tion of the supreme intelligence, and yet that this 
intelligence makes an effort to act, we obtain a con- 
clusion which cannot be reconciled with the nature 
of a supreme power, whose existence Antoninus al- 
ways assumes. The tranquillity that a man may gain 
from these reflections must result from his rejecting 
the second hypothesis and accepting the first — what- 
ever may be the exact sense in which the emperor un- 
derstood the first. Or, as he says elsewhere, if there 



Book VII.] /Ifcarcus Burelius Bntoninus* 213 

is no Providence which governs the world, man has 
at least the power of governing himself according to 
the constitution of his nature; and so he may be tran- 
quil if he does the best that he can. 

If there is no error in the passage, it is worth the 
labor to discover the writer's exact meaning — for I 
think that he had a meaning, though people may not 
agree what it was. (Compare ix. 28.) If I have 
rightly explained the emperor's meaning in this and 
other passages, he has touched the solution of a great 
question. 



214 GbOUgbtS, [Book VIII. 



VIII. 

THIS reflection also tends to the removal of 
the desire of empty fame, that it is no 
longer in thy power to have lived the whole of 
thy life, or at least thy life from thy youth up- 
wards, like a philosopher; but both to many 
others and to thyself it is plain that thou art 
far from philosophy. Thou hast fallen into 
disorder then, so that it is no longer easy for 
thee to get the reputation of a philosopher; and 
thy plan of life also opposes it. If then thou 
hast truly seen where the matter lies, throw 
away the thought, How thou shalt seem [to 
others], and be content if thou shalt live the 
rest of thy life in such wise as thy nature wills. 
Observe then what it wills, and let nothing 
else distract thee; for thou hast had experience 
of many wanderings without having found hap- 
piness anywhere, — not in syllogisms, nor in 
wealth, nor in reputation, nor in enjoyment, 
nor anywhere. Where is it then? In doing 
what man's nature requires. How then shall 
a man do this? If he has principles from 
which come his affects and his acts. What 
principles? Those which relate to good and 
bad: the belief that there is nothing good for 
man which does not make him just, temperate, 



Book VIII.] /Ifcarcus Burelius Bntoninus, 215 

manly, free; and that there is nothing bad 
which does not do the contrary to what has 
been mentioned. 

2. On the occasion of every act ask thyself, 
How is this with respect to me ? Shall I repent 
of it ? A little time and I am dead, and all is 
gone. What more do I seek, if what I am 
now doing is the work of an intelligent living 
being, and a social being, and one who is under 
the same law with God ? 

3. Alexander and Caius* and Pompeius, 
what are they in comparison with Diogenes 
and Heraclitus and Socrates ? For they were 
acquainted with things, and their causes 
[forms], and their matter, and the ruling prin- 
ciples of these men were the same [or conform- 
able to their pursuits]. But as to the others, 
how many things had they to care for, and to 
how many things were they slaves ! 

4. [Consider] that men will do the same 
things nevertheless, even though thou shouldst 
burst. 

5. This is the chief thing : Be not per- 
turbed, for all things are according to the 
nature of the universal ; and in a little time 
thou wilt be nobody and nowhere, like Had- 
rianus and Augustus. In the next place, hav- 
ing fixed thy eyes steadily on thy business, 
look at it, and at the same time remembering 
that it is thy duty to be a good man, and what 

* Cams is C. Julius Caesar, the dictator; and Pompe 
ius is Cn. Pompeius, named Magnus. 



216 GbOUGbtS, [Book VIII. 

man's nature demands, do that without turn- 
ing aside ; and speak as it seems to thee most 
just, only let it be with a good disposition and 
with modesty and without hypocrisy. 

6. The nature of the universal has this work 
to do, — to remove to that place the things 
which are in this, to change them, to take, 
them away hence, and to carry them there, 
All things are change, yet we need not fear 
anything new. All things are familiar [to us]; 
but the distribution of them still remains the 
same. 

7. Every nature is contented with itself 
when it goes on its way well ; and a rational 
nature goes on its way well when in its 
thoughts it assents to nothing false or uncer- 
tain, and when it directs its movements to 
social acts only, and when it confines its desires 
and aversions to the things which are in its 
power, and when it is satisfied with everything 
that is assigned to it by the common nature. 
For of this common nature every particular 
nature is a part, as the nature of the leaf is a 
part of the nature of the plant ; except that in 
the plant the nature of the leaf is part of a 
nature which has not perception or reason, 
and is subject to be impeded ; but the nature 
of man is part of a nature which is not subject 
to impediments, and is intelligent and just, 
since it gives to everything in equal portions 
and according to its worth, times, substance, 
cause [form], activity, and incident. But ex- 



Book viii. ] /ifcarcua Butelius Bntoninus* 217 

amine, not to discover that any one thing 
compared with any other single thing is equal 
in all respects, but by taking all the parts to- 
gether of one thing and comparing them with 
all the parts together of another. 

8. Thou hast not leisure [or ability] to read. 
But thou hast leisure [or ability] to check arro- 
gance: thou hast leisure to be superior to pleas- 
ure and pain: thou hast leisure to be superior 
to love of fame, and not to be vexed at stupid 
and ungrateful people, nay even to care for 
them. 

9. Let no man any longer hear thee finding 
fault with the court life or with thy own (v. 

16). 

10. Repentance is a kind of self-reproof for 
having neglected something useful; but that 
which is good must be something useful, and 
the perfect good man should look after it. But 
no such man would ever repent of having re- 
fused any sensual pleasure. Pleasure then is 
neither good nor useful. 

11. This thing, what is it in itself, in its own 
constitution ? What is its substance and mater- 
ial? And what its causal nature [or form]? 
And what is it doing in the world? And how 
long does it subsist? 

12. When thou risest from sleep with reluct- 
ance, remember that it is according to thy con- 
stitution and according to human nature to per- 
form social acts, but sleeping is common also 
to irrational animals. But that which is ac- 



2iS GbOU0btS, [Book VIII. 

cording to each individual's nature is also more 
peculiarly its own, and more suitable to its 
nature, and indeed also more agreeable (v. i). 

13. Constantly, and, if it be possible, on the 
occasion of every impression on the soul, apply 
to it the principles of Physic, of Ethic, and of 
Dialectic. 

14. Whatever man thou meetest with, im- 
mediately say to thyself: What opinions has 
this man about good and bad ? For if with re- 
spect to pleasure and pain and the causes of 
each, and with respect to fame and ignominy, 
death and life, he has such and such opinions, 
it will seem nothing w 7 onderful or strange to 
me if he does such and such things; and I shall 
bear in mind that he is compelled to do so.* 

15. Remember that as it is a shame to be 
surprised if the fig-tree produces figs, so it is to 
be surprised if the world produces such and 
such things of which it is productive; and for 
the physician and the helmsman it is a shame 
to be surprised if a man has a fever, or if the 
wind is unfavorable. 

16. Remember that to change thy opinion 
and to follow him who corrects thy error is as 
consistent with freedom as it is to persist in thy 
error. For it is thy own, the activity which is 
exerted according to thy own movement and 
judgment, and indeed according to thy own 
understanding too. 

x " Antoninus v. 16. Thucydides, iii. 10; ev yap t& 
diaXkaaacrvn rrjg yv(d\irjq ndi at diatyopal t&v epyuv KadioTavrau 



Book viii.] /ifcarcus Burelius Bntoninus* 219 

17. If a thing is in thy own power, why dost 
thou do it? but if it is in the power of another, 
whom dost thou blame, — the atoms [chance] or 
the gods? Both are foolish. Thou must 
blame nobody. For if thou canst, correct [that 
which is the cause]; but if thou canst not do 
this, correct at least the thing itself; but if thou 
canst not do even this, of what use is it to thee 
to find fault? for nothing should be done with- 
out a purpose. 

18. That which has died falls not out of the 
universe. If it stays here, it also changes here, 
and is dissolved into its proper parts, which are 
elements of the universe and of thyself. And 
these too change, and they murmur not. 

19. Everything exists for some end, — a horse, 
a vine. Why dost thou wonder? Even the 
sun will say, I am for some purpose, and the 
rest of the gods will say the same. For what 
purpose then art thou, — to enjoy pleasure? 
See if common sense allows this.' 

20. Nature has had regard in everything no 
less to the end than to the beginning and the 
continuance, just like the man who throws up 
a ball. What good is it then for the ball to be 
thrown up, or harm for it to come down, or 
even to have fallen ? and what good is it to the 
bubble while it holds together, or what harm 
when it is burst ? The same may be said of a 
light also. 

21. Turn it [the body] inside out, and see 
what kind of thing it is; and when it has 



220 GbOU0bt6* [Book VIII. 



grown old, what kind of thing it becomes, and 
when it is diseased. 

Short lived are both the praiser and the 
praised, and the rememberer and the remem- 
bered: and all this in a nook of this part of the 
world; and not even here do all agree, no, not 
any one with himself : and the whole earth too 
is a point. 

22. Attend to the matter which is before 
thee, whether it is an opinion or an act or a 
word. 

Thou sufferest this justly : for thou choosest 
rather to become good to-morrow than to be 
good to-day. 

23. Am I doing anything? I do it with 
reference to the good of mankind. Does any- 
thing happen to me ? I receive it and refer it 
to the gods, and the source of all things, from 
which all that happens is derived. 

24. Such as bathing appears to thee, — oil, 
sweat, dirt, filthy water, all things disgusting, 
— so is every part of life and everything. 

25. IyUcilla saw Verus die, and then L,ucilla 
died. Secunda saw Maximus die, and then 
Secunda died. Epitynchanus saw Diotimus 
die, and then Epitynchanus died. Antoninus 
saw Faustina die, and then Antoninus died. 
Such is everything. Celer saw Hadrianus die, 
and then Celer died. And those sharp-witted 
men, either seers or men inflated with pride, 
where are they, — for instance the sharp-witted 
men, Charax and Demetrius the Platonist, and 



Book VIIL] /Jfcarcus Burelius Bntonfnus* 221 

Eudaemon, and any one else like them ? All 
ephemeral, dead long ago. Some indeed have 
not been remembered even for a short time, 
and others have become the heroes of fables, 
and again others have disappeared even from 
fables. Remember this then, that this little 
compound, thyself, must either be dissolved, or 
thy poor breath must be extinguished, or be 
removed and placed elsewhere. 

26. It is satisfaction to a man to do the 
proper works of a man. Now it is a proper 
work of a man to be benevolent to his own kind, 
to despise the movements of the senses, to form 
a just judgment of plausible appearances, and 
to take a survey of the nature of the universe 
and of the things which happen in it. 

27. There are three relations [between thee 
and other things] : the one to the body* which 
surrounds thee ; the second to the divine cause 
from which all things come to all ; and the 
third to those who live with thee. 

28. Pain is either an evil to the body — then 
let the body say what it thinks of it — or to the 
soul ; but it is in the power of the soul to main- 
tain its own serenity and tranquillity, and not 
to think that pain is an evil. For every judg- 
ment and movement and desire and aversion is 
within, and no evil ascends so high. 

* The text has alrtov ) which in Antoninus means 
''form," "formal." Accordingly Schultz recom- 
mends either Valkenaer's emendation ayyelov, "body," 
or Cora'is' (jcoudriov. Compare xii. 13; x. 38. 



222 GbOUGbtS. [Book VIII. 

29. Wipe out thy imaginations by often 
saying to thyself: Now it is in my power to let 
no badness be in this soul, nor desire, nor any 
perturbation at all ; but looking at all things I 
see what is their nature, and I use each accord- 
ing to its value. — Remember this power which 
thou hast from nature. 

30. Speak both in the senate and to every 
man, whoever he may be, appropriately, not 
with any affectation : use plain discourse. 

31. Augustus' court, wife, daughter, de- 
scendants, ancestors, sister, Agrippa, kinsmen, 
intimates, friends; Areius,^ Maecenas, physi- 
cians, and sacrificing priests, — the whole court 
is dead. Then turn to the rest, not consider- 
ing the death of a single man [but of a whole 
race], as of the Pompeii ; and that which is in- 
scribed on the tombs, — The last of his race. 
Then consider what trouble those before them 
have had that they might leave a successor ; 
and then, that of necessity some one must be 
the last. Again, here consider the death of a 
whole race. 

32. It is thy duty to order thy life well in 
every single act ; and if every act does its duty 
as far as is possible, be content ; and no one is 
able to hinder thee so that each act shall not 
do its duty. — But something external will 
stand in the way. Nothing will stand in 

* Areius ("Apeiog) was a philosopher, who was inti- 
mate with Augustus; Sueton. Augustus, c. 89; Plu 
tarch, Antoninus, 80; D^on Cassius > 51, c. 16. 



Book VIII.] /l&arcus Bureltus Bntoninus* 223 

the way of thy acting justly and soberly 
and considerately. —But perhaps some other 
active power will be hindered. Well, but 
by acquiescing in the hindrance and by be- 
ing content to transfer thy efforts to that which 
is allowed, another opportunity of action is im- 
mediately put before thee in place of that 
which was hindered, and one which will adapt 
itself to this ordering of which we are speak- 
ing. 

33. Receive [wealth or prosperity] without 
arrogance ; and be ready to let it go. 

34. If thou didst ever see a hand cut off, or 
a foot, or a head, lying anywhere apart from 
the rest of the body, such does a man make 
himself, as far as he can, who is not content 
with what happens, and separates himself 
from others, or does anything unsocial. Sup- 
pose that thou hast detached thyself from the 
natural unity, — for thou wast made by nature 
a part, but now thou hast cut thyself off, — yet 
here there is this beautiful provision, that it is 
in thy power again to unite thyself. God has 
allowed this to no other part, after it has been 
vSeparated and cut asunder, to come together 
again. But consider the kindness by which 
he has distinguished man, for he has put it in 
his power not to be separated at all from the 
universal ; and when he has been separated, 
he has allowed him to return and to be united 
and to resume his place as a part. 

35. As the nature of the universal has given 



224 fcbOUflbte. [BookVIIL 

to every rational being all the other powers 
that it has,-f so we have received from it this 
power also. For as the universal nature con- 
verts and fixes in its predestined place every- 
thing which stands in the way and opposes it, 
and makes such things a part of itself, so also 
the rational animal is able to make every 
hindrance its own material, and f o use it for 
such purposes as it may have designed.* 

36. Do not disturb thyself by thinking of 
the whole of thy life. I^et not thy thoughts at 
once embrace all the various troubles which 
thou mayest expect to befall thee : but on 
every occasion ask thyself, What is there in 
this which is intolerable and past bearing ? for 
thou wilt be ashamed to confess. In the next 
place remember that neither the future nor the 
past pains thee, but only the present. But 
this is reduced to a very little, if thou only cir- 
cumscribest it, and chidest thy mind if it is 
unable to hold out against even this. 

37. Does Panthea or Pergamus now sit by 
the tomb of Verus ? f Does Chaurias or Dioti- 
mus sit by the tomb of Hadrianus? That 
would be ridiculous. Well, suppose they did 

* The text is corrupt at the beginning of the para- 
graph, but the meaning will appear if the second 
'AoyiKojv is changed into oIcjv: though this change alone 
will not establish the grammatical completeness of 
the text. 

f " Verus " is a conjecture of Saumaise, and per- 
haps the true reading. 



Book VIIL] /ifoarcua Hurelfus antoninus* 225 

sit there, would the dead be conscious of it ? 
and if the dead were conscious, would they be 
pleased ? and if they were pleased, would that 
make them immortal ? Was it not in the order 
of destiny that these persons too should first 
become old women and old men and then die ? 
What then would those do after these were 
dead ? All this is foul smell and blood in a 
bag. 

38. If thou canst see sharp, look and judge 
wisely, + says the philosopher. 

39. In the constitution of the rational animal 
I see no virtue which is opposed to justice; but 
I see a virtue which is opposed to love of 
pleasure, and that is temperance. 

40. If thou takest away thy opinion about 
that which appears to give thee pain, thou thy- 
self standest in perfect security. — Who is this 
self? — The reason. — But I am not reason. — Be 
it so. I^et then the reason itself not trouble 
itself. But if any other part of thee suffers, 
let it have its own opinion about itself (vii. 16). 

41. Hindrance to the perceptions of sense is 
an evil to the animal nature. Hindrance to 
the movements [desires] is equally an evil to 
the animal nature. And something else also 
is equally an impediment and an evil to the 
constitution of plants. So then that which is 
a hindrance to the intelligence is an evil to the 
intelligent nature. Apply all these things 
theti to thyself. Does pain or sensuous pleas- 
ure affect thee ? The senses will look to that. 

15 



226 GbOU0bt0, [Book VIII. 

Has any obstacle opposed thee in thy efforts 
towards an object ? If indeed thou wast mak- 
ing this effort absolutely [unconditionally, or 
without any reservation], certainly this obstacle 
is an evil to thee considered as a rational ani- 
mal. But if thou takest [into consideration] 
the usual course of things, thou hast not yet 
been injured nor even impeded. The things 
however which are proper to the understanding 
no other man is used to impede, for neither 
fire, nor iron, nor tyrant, nor abuse, touches it 
in any way. When it has been made a sphere, 
it continues a sphere (xi. 12). 

42. It is not fit that I should give myself 
pain, for I have never intentionally given pain 
even to another. 

43. Different things delight different people ; 
but it is my delight to keep the ruling faculty 
sound without turning away either from any 
man or from any of the things which happen 
to men, but looking at and receiving all with 
welcome eyes and using everything according 
to its value. 

44. See that thou secure this present time to 
thyself : for those who rather pursue posthum- 
ous fame do not consider that the men of after 
time will be exactly such as these whom they 
cannot bear now ; and both are mortal. And 
what is it in any way to thee if these men of 
after time utter this or that sound, or have this 
or that opinion about thee ? 

45. Take me and cast me where thou wilt; 



Book VIIL] /ifcarcus Bureltus Bntoninus* 227 

for there I shall keep my divine part tranquil, 
that is, content, if it can feel and act comform- 
ably to its proper constitution. Is this [change 
of place] sufficient reason why my soul should 
be unhappy and worse than it was, depressed, 
expanded, shrinking, affrighted ? and what 
wilt thou find which is sufficient reason for 
this ?* 

46. Nothing can happen to any man which 
is not a human accident, nor to an ox which is 
not according to the nature of an ox, nor to a 
vine which is not according to the nature of a 
vine, nor to a stone which is not proper to a 
stone. If then there happens to each thing 
both what is usual and natural, why shouldst 
thou complain ? For the common nature 
brings nothing which may not be borne by 
thee. 

47. If thou art pained by any external 
thing, it is not this thing that disturbs thee, 
but thy own judgment about it. And it is in thy 
power to wipe out this judgment now. But if 
anything in thy own disposition gives thee 
pain, who hinders thee from correcting thy 
opinion ? And even if thou art pained be- 
cause thou art not doing some particular thing 
which seems to thee to be right, why dost 
thou not rather act than complain ? — But some 

* opeyofievT] in this passage seems to have a passive 
sense. It is difficult to find an apt expression for it 
and some of the other words. A comparison with xi. 
12, will help to explain the meaning. 



228 XTbOUGbtS, [Book VIE 

insuperable obstacle is in the way ? — Do not be 
grieved then, for the cause of its not being 
done depends not on thee. — But it is not worth 
while to live, if this cannot be done. — Take 
thy departure then from life contentedly, just 
as he dies who is in full activity, and well 
pleased too with the things which are ob- 
stacles. 

48. Remember that the ruling faculty is in- 
vincible, when self-collected it is satisfied with 
itself, if it does nothing which it does not 
choose to do, even if it resist from mere obsti- 
nacy. What then will it be when it forms a 
judgment about anything aided by reason and 
deliberately ? Therefore the mind which is 
free from passions is a citadel, for man has no- 
thing more secure to which he can fly for 
refuge and for the future be inexpugnable. 
He then who has not seen this is an ignorant 
man ; but he who has .seen it and does not fly 
to this refuge is unhappy. 

49. Say nothing more to thyself than what 
the first appearances report. Suppose that it 
has been reported to thee that a certain person 
speaks ill of thee. This has been reported ; 
but that thou hast been injured, that has not 
been reported. I see that my child is sick. I 
do see ; but that he is in danger, I do not see. 
Thus then always abide by the first appear- 
ances, and add nothing thyself from within, 
and then nothing happens to thee. Or rather 
add something like a man who knows every- 
thing that happens in the world. 



Book VIIL] /nbarcus Burelius Antoninus* 229 

50. A cucumber is bitter — Throw it away. — 
There are briers in the road — Turn aside from 
them. — This is enough. Do not add, And 
why were such things made in the world? 
For thou wilt be ridiculed by a man who is 
acquainted with nature, as thou wouldst be 
ridiculed by a carpenter and shoemaker if thou 
didst find fault because thou seest in their 
workshop shavings and cuttings from the 
things which they make. And yet they have 
places into which they can throw these shav- 
ings and cuttings, and the universal nature has 
no external space ; but the wondrous part of 
her art is that though she has circumscribed 
herself, everything within her which appears 
to deca}^ and to grow old and to be useless she 
changes into herself, and again makes other 
new things from these very same, so that she 
requires neither substance from without nor 
wants a place into which she may cast that 
which decays. She is content then with her 
own space, and her own matter, and her own 
art. 

5 1 . Neither in thy actions be sluggish nor 
in thy conversation without method, nor wan- 
dering in thy thoughts, nor let there be in thy 
soul inward contention nor external effusion, 
nor in life be so busy as to have no leisure. 

Suppose that men kill thee, cut thee in 
pieces, curse thee. What then can these things 
do to prevent thy mind from remaining pure, 
wise, sober, just? For instance, if a man 



230 <rbOU0btS* [Book VIII. 

should stand by a limpid pure spring, and 
curse it, the spring never ceases sending up 
potable water ; and if he should cast clay into 
it or filth, it will speedily disperse them and 
wash them out, and will not be at all polluted. 
How then shalt thou possess a perpetual fount- 
ain [and not a mere well] ? By forming + thy- 
self hourly to freedom conjoined with content- 
ment, simplicity, and modesty. 

52. He who does not know what the world 
is, does not know where he is. And he who 
does not know for what purpose the world 
exists, does not know who he is, nor what the 
world is. But he who has failed in any one 
of these things could not even say for what 
purpose he exists himself. What then dost 
thou think of him who [avoids or] seeks the 
praise of those w r ho applaud, of men who know 
not either where they are or who they are ? 

53. Dost thou wish to be praised by a man 
who curses himself thrice every hour? wouldst 
thou wish to please a man who does not please 
himself? Does a man please himself who re- 
pents of nearly everything that he does? 

54. No longer let thy breathing only act in 
concert with the air which surrounds thee, but 
let thy intelligence also now be in harmony 
with the intelligence which embraces all 
things. For the intelligent power is no less 
diffused in all parts and pervades all things for 
him who is willing to draw it to him than the 
aerial power for him who is able to respire it. 



Book VIII.] /ifcarcus Bureltus Antoninus* 231 

55. Generally, wickedness does no harm at 
all to the universe ; and particularly the wick- 
edness [of one man] does no harm to another. 
It is only harmful to him who has it in his 
power to be released from it as soon as he shall 
choose. 

56. To my own free will the free will of my 
neighbor is just as indifferent as his poor 
breath and flesh. For though we are made es- 
pecially for the sake of one another, still the 
ruling power of each of us has its own office, 
for otherwise my neighbor's wickedness would 
be my harm, which God has not willed, in 
order that my unhappiness may not depend on 
another. 

57. The sun appears to be poured down, and 
in all directions indeed it is diffused, yet it is 
not effused. For this diffusion is extension: 
Accordingly its rays are called Extensions 
[d/cm>£f] because they are extended [awo rov 
eKTeiveodai]* But one may judge what kind of a 
thing a ray is, if he looks at the sun's light 
passing through a narrow opening into a dark- 
ened room, for it is extended in a right line, 
and as it were is divided when it meets with 
any solid body which stands in the way and 
intercepts the air beyond ; but there the light 
remains fixed and does not glide or fall off. 
Such then ought to be the outpouring and dif- 
fusion of the understanding, and it should in 
no way be an effusion, but an extension, and 

* A piece of bad etymology. 



232 GbOUGbtS* [Book YIIL 

it should make no violent or impetuous col- 
lision with the obstacles which are in its way ; 
nor yet fall down, but be fixed, and enlighten 
that which receives it. For a body will deprive 
'itself of the illumination, if it does not admit it. 

58. He who fears death either fears the loss 
of sensation or a different kind of sensation. 
But if thou shalt have no sensation, neither 
wilt thou feel any harm ; and if thou shalt 
acquire another kind of sensation, t>ou wilt be 
a different kind of living being and thou wilt 
not cease to live. 

59. Men exist for the sake of one another. 
Teach them then, or bear with them. 

60. In one way an arrow moves, in another 
way the mind. The mind indeed, both when 
it exercises caution and when it is employed 
about inquiry, moves straight onward not the 
less, and to its object. 

61. Enter into every man's ruling faculty; 
and also let every other man enter into thine.* 

* Compare Kpictetus, iii. 9, 12. 



Book K.] dfcarcus Burelfus Bntoninus* 233 



IX. 

HE who acts unjustly acts impiously. For 
since the universal nature has made ra- 
tional animals for the sake of one another, to 
help one another according to their deserts, 
but in no way to injure one another, he who 
transgresses her will is clearly guilty of impi- 
ety towards the highest divinity. And he too 
who lies is guilty of impiety to the same divin- 
ity; for the universal nature is the nature of 
things that are; and things that are have a re- 
lation to all things that come into existence.* 

* " As there is not any action or natural event, which 
we are acquainted with, so single and unconnected as 
not to have a respect to some other actions and events, 
so possibly each of thern, when it has not an immedi- 
ate, may yet have a remote, natural relation to other 
actions and events, much beyond the compass of this 
present world. ' ' Again : ' ' Things seemingly the most 
insignificant imaginable are perpetually observed to 
be necessary conditions to other things of the greatest 
importance, so that any one thing whatever may, for 
aught we know to the contrary, be a necessary condi- 
tion to any other." — Butler's Analogy, Chap. 7. See 
all the chapter. Some critics take ra imdpxovra in this 
passage of Antoninus to be the same as ra bvra : but if 
that were so he might have said irpbg bXkrfka instead of 
Kpbg ra vTrapxovra. Perhaps the meaning of irpbg ra 
vTrapxovra may be "to all prior things." If so, the 
translation is still correct. See vi. 38. 



234 GbOUflbte. [Book IX. 

And further, this universal nature is named 
truth, and is the prime cause of all things that 
are true. He then who lies intentionally is 
guilty of impiety, inasmuch as he acts unjustly 
by deceiving; and he also who lies uninten- 
tionally, inasmuch as he is at variance with the 
universal nature, and inasmuch as he disturbs 
the order by fighting against the nature of the 
world; for he fights against it, who is moved 
of himself to that which is contrary to truth, 
for he had received powers from nature through 
the neglect of which he is not able now to dis- 
tinguish falsehood from truth, And indeed he 
who pursues pleasure as good, and avoids pain 
as evil, is guilty of impiety. For of necessity 
such a man must often find fault with the uni- 
versal nature, alleging that it assigns things to 
the bad and the good contrary to their deserts, 
because frequently the bad are in the enjoy- 
ment of pleasure and possess the things which 
procure pleasure, but the good have pain for 
their share and the things which cause pain. 
And further, he who is afraid of pain will 
sometimes also be afraid of some of the things 
which will happen in the world, and even this 
is impiety. And he who pursues pleasure will 
not abstain from injustice, and this is plainly 
impiety. Now with respect to the things 
towards which the universal nature is equally 
affected — for it would not have made both, un- 
less it was equally affected towards both — 
towards these they who wish to follow nature 



Book IX.] dfcarcus Burelius Bntonfnus* 235 

should be of the same mind with it, and equally 
affected. With respect to pain, then, and 
pleasure, or death and life, or honor and dis- 
honor, which the universal nature employs 
equally, whoever is not equally affected is 
manifestly acting impiously. And I say that 
the universal nature employs them equally, 
instead of saying that they happen alike to 
those who are produced in continuous series 
and to those who come after them by virtue of 
a certain original movement of Providence, 
according to which it moved from a certain 
beginning to this ordering of things, having 
conceived certain principles of the things which 
were to be, and having determined powers pro- 
ductive of beings and of changes and of such 
like successions (vii. 75). 

2. It would be a man's happiest lot to depart 
from mankind without having had any taste 
of lying and hypocrisy and luxury and pride. 
However, to breathe out one's life when a man 
has had enough of these things is the next best 
voyage, as the saying is. Hast thou deter- 
mined to abide with vice, and hast not exper- 
ience yet induced thee to fly from this pesti- 
lence ? For the destruction of the understand- 
ing is a pestilence, much more, indeed, than 
any such corruption and change of this atmos- 
phere which surrounds us. For this corruption 
is a pestilence of animals so far as they are 
animals ; but the other is a pestilence of men 
so far as they are men. 



236 GbOUflbtS* [Book IX, 

3. Do not despise death, but be well content 
with it, since this too is one of those things 
which nature wills. For such as it is to be 
young and to grow old, and to increase and 
to reach maturity, and to have teeth and beard 
and gray hairs, and to beget and to be preg- 
nant and to bring forth, and all the other 
natural operations which the seasons of thy 
life bring, such also is dissolution. This, then, 
is consistent with the character of a reflecting 
man — to be neither careless nor impatient nor 
contemptuous with respect to death, but to 
wait for it as one of the operations of nature. 
As thou now waitest for the time when the 
child shall come out of thy wife's womb, so be 
ready for the time when thy soul shall fall out 
of this envelope.' 1 ' But if thou requirest also a 
vulgar kind of comfort which shall reach thy 
heart, thou wilt be made best reconciled to 
death by observing the objects from which 
thou art going to be removed, and the morals 
of those with whom thy soul will no longer be 
mingled. For it is no way right to be offended 
with men, but it is thy duty to care for them 
and to bear with them gently; and yet to re- 
member that thy departure will not be from 
men who have the same principles as thyself. 
For this is the only thing, if there be any, 
which could draw us the contrary way and at- 
tach us to life, — to be permitted to live with 
those who have the same principles as our- 

* Note 1 of the Philosophy, p. 76. 



Book IX.] dibarcus Bureltus Bntontnus* 237 

selves. But now thou seest how great is the 
trouble arising from the discordance of those 
who live together, so that thou mayst say, 
Come quick, O death, lest perchance I, too, 
should forget myself. 

4. He who does wrong does wrong against 
himself. He who acts unjustly acts unjustly to 
himself, because he makes himself bad. 

5. He often acts unjustly who does not do a 
certain thing; not only he who does a certain 
thing. 

6. Thy present opinion founded on under- 
standing, and thy present conduct directed to 
social good, and thy present disposition of con- 
tentment with everything which happens^- — 
that is enough. 

7. Wipe out imagination; check desire: ex- 
tinguish appetite: keep the ruling faculty in its 
own power. 

8. Among the animals which have not reason 
one life is distributed; but among reasonable 
animals one intelligent soul is distributed: just 
as there is one earth of all things which are of 
an earthly nature, and we see by one light, and 
breathe one air, all of us that have the faculty 
of vision and all that have life. 

9. All things which participate in anything 
which is common to them all, move towards 
that which is of the same kind with themselves. 
Everything which is earthy turns towards the 
earth, everything which is liquid flows to- 
gether, and everything which is of an aerial 



238 Gbouabte. [Book ix. 

kind does the same, so that they require some- 
thing to keep them asunder, and the applica- 
tion of force. Fire indeed moves upwards on 
account of the elemental fire, but it is so ready 
to be kindled together with all the fire which 
is here, that even every substance which is 
somewhat dry is easily ignited, because there 
is less mingled with it of that which is a hin- 
drance to ignition. Accordingly, then, every- 
thing also which participates in the common 
intelligent nature moves in like manner to- 
wards that which is of the same kind with 
itself, or moves even more. For so much as it 
is superior in comparison with all other things, 
in the same degree also is it more ready to min- 
gle with and to be fused with that w^hich is 
akin to it. Accordingly among animals devoid 
of reason we find swarms of bees, and herds of 
cattle, and the nurture of young birds, and in 
a manner, loves; for even in animals there are 
vSouls, and that power which brings them to- 
gether is seen to exert itself in a superior de- 
gree, and in such a way as never has been 
observed in plants nor in stones nor in trees. 
But in rational animals there are political com- 
munities and friendships, and families and 
meetings of people; and in wars, treaties, and 
armistices. But in the things which are still 
-superior, even though they are separated from 
ane another, unity in a manner exists, as in the 
stars. Thus the ascent to the higher degree is 
able to produce a sympathy even in things 



Book IX.] dftarcus Bureltus Bntonfnus* 239 

which are separated. See then, what now 
takes place; for only intelligent animals have 
now forgotten this mutual desire and inclina- 
tion, and in them alone the property of flowing 
together is not seen. But still, though men 
strive to avoid [this union], they are caught 
and held by it, for their nature is too strong for 
them; and thou wilt see what I say, if thou 
only observest. Sooner, then, will one find 
anything earthy which comes in contact with 
no earthy thing, than a man altogether sepa- 
rated from other men. 

10. Both man and God and the universe pro- 
duce fruit ; at the proper seasons each produces 
it. But and if usage has especially fixed these 
terms to the vine and like things, this is noth- 
ing. Reason produces fruit both for all and for 
itself, and there are produced from it other 
things of the same kind as reason itself. 

11. If thou art able, correct by teaching 
those who do wrong ; but if thou canst not, re- 
member that indulgence is given to thee for 
this purpose. And the gods, too, are indulgent 
to such persons; and for some purposes they 
even help them to get health, wealth, reputa- 
tion; so kind they are. And it is in thy power 
also; or say, who hinders thee? 

12. Labor not as one who is wretched, nor 
yet as one who would be pitied or admired ; 
but direct thy will to one thing only — to put 
thyself in motion and to check thyself, as the 
social reason requires. 



2J.O GbOU0bt6* [Book IX. 



13. To-day I have got out of all trouble, or 
rather I have cast out all trouble, for it was not 
outside, but within and in my opinions. 

14. All things are the same, familiar in ex- 
perience, and ephemeral in time, and worthless 
in the matter. Everything now is just as it 
was in the time of those whom we have buried. 

15. Things stand outside of us, themselves 
by themselves, neither knowing aught of them- 
selves, nor expressing any judgment. What 
is it, then, which does judge about them ? 
The ruling faculty. 

16. Not in passivity but in activity lie the 
evil and the good of the rational social animal, 
just as his virtue and his vice lie not in pas- 
sivity but in activity.* 

17. For the stone which has been thrown up 
it is no evil to come down, nor indeed any good 
to have been carried up (viii. 20). 

18. Penetrate inwards into men's leading 
principles, and thou wilt see what judges thou 
art afraid of, and what kind of judges they are 
of themselves. 

19. All things are changing : and thou thy- 
self art in continuous mutation and in a man- 
ner in continuous destruction, and the whole 
universe too. 

20. It is thy duty to leave another man's 
wrongful act there where it is (vii. 29; ix. 38). 

21. Termination of activity, cessation from 

* Virtutis omnis laus in actione consistit. — Cicero, 
De Off., 1. 6. 



Book ix.] Marcus Sureltus Bntontnus* 241 

movement and opinion, and in a sense their 
death, is no evil. Turn thy thoughts now to 
the consideration of thy life, thy life as a child, 
as a youth, thy manhood, thy old age, for in 
these also every change was a death. Is this 
anything to fear? Turn thy thoughts now to 
thy life under thy grandfather, then to thy life 
under thy mother, then to thy life under thy 
father ; and as thou findest many other differ- 
ences and changes and terminations, ask thy- 
self, Is this anything to fear? In like manner, 
then, neither are the termination and cessation 
and change of thy whole life a thing to be 
afraid of. 

22. Hasten [to examine] thy own ruling 
faculty and that of the universe and that of thy 
neighbor : thy own, that thou mayst make it 
just : and that of the universe, that thou mayst 
remember of what thou art a part; and that of 
thy neighbor, that thou mayst know T whether 
he has acted ignorantly or with knowledge, 
and thou mayst also consider that his ruling 
faculty is akin to thine. 

23. As thou thyself art a component part of 
a social system, so let every act of thine be a 
component part of social life. Whatever act 
of thine then has no reference either immedi- 
ately or remotely to a social end, this tears 
asunder thy life, and does not allow it to be 
one, and it is of the nature of a mutiny, just as 
when in a popular assembly a man acting by 
himself stands apart from the general agreement. 

16 



242 GbOUflbtS. [Book IX. 

24. Quarrels of little children and their 
sports, and poor spirits carrying about dead 
bodies [such is everything]; and so what is 
exhibited in the representation of the mansions 
of the dead* strikes our eyes more clearly. 

25. Examine into the quality of the form of 
an object, and detach it altogether from its 
material part, and then contemplate it; then 
determine the time, the longest which a thing 
of this peculiar form is naturally made to en- 
dure. 

26. Thou hast endured infinite troubles 
through not being contented with thy ruling 
faculty when it does the things which it is con- 
stituted by nature to do. But enough + [of 
this]. 

27. When another blames thee or hates thee, 
or when men say about thee anything injurious, 
approach their poor souls, penetrate within, 
and see what kind of men they are. Thou 
wilt discover that there is no reason to take 
any trouble that these men may have this or 
that opinion about thee. However thou must 
be well disposed towards them, for by nature 
they are friends. And the gods too aid them 
in all ways, by dreams, by signs, towards the 
attainment of those things on which they set 
a value. + 

* rb rfjq TXeicviag may be, as Gataker conjectures, a 
dramatic representation of the state of the dead. 
Schultz supposes that it may be also a reference to the 

Shuv/a of the Odyssey (lib. xi.). 



Book IX.] Marcus Burelfus Bntonfnus* 243 

28. The periodic movements of the universe 
are the same, up and down from age to age. 
And either the universal intelligence puts it- 
self in motion for every separate effect, and if 
this is so, be thou content with that which is 
the result of its activity; or it puts itself in 
motion once, and everything else comes by 
way of sequence* in a manner; or indivisible 
elements are the origin of all things. — In a 
word, if there is a god, all is well; and if 
chance rules, do not thou also be governed by 
it (vi. 44; vii. 75). 

Soon will the earth cover us all: then the 
earth, too, will change, and the things also 
which result from change will continue to 
change forever, and these again forever. For 
if a man reflects on the changes and transfor- 
mations which follow one another like wave 
after wave and their rapidity, he will despise 
everything which is perishable (xii. 21). 

29. The universal cause is like a winter 
torrent: it carries everything along with it. 
But how worthless are all these poor people 
who are engaged in matters political, and, as 
they suppose, are playing the philosopher ! 
All drivellers. Well then, man: do what na- 
ture now requires. Set thyself in motion, if it 
is in thy power, and do not look about thee to 
see if any one will observe it; nor yet expect 

* The words which immediately follow /car' kTrano- 
lovdrjciv are corrupt. But the meaning is hardly 
doubtful. (Compare vii. 75.) 



244 GbOUflbtS. [Book IX. 

Plato's Republic:* but be content if the small- 
est thing goes on well, and consider such an 
event to be no small matter. For who can 
change men's opinions? and without a change 
of opinions what else is there than the slavery 
of men who groan while they pretend to obey ? 
Come now and tell me of Alexander and 
Philippus and Demetrius of Phalerum. They 
themselves shall judge whether they discovered 
what the common nature required, and trained 
themselves accordingly. But if they acted like 
tragedy heroes, no one has condemned me to 
imitate them. Simple and modest is the work 
of philosophy. Draw me not aside to insolence 
and pride. 

30. Look down from above on the countless 
herds of men and their countless solemnities, 
and the infinitely varied voyagings in storms 
and calms, and the differences among those 
who are born, who live together, and die. 
And consider, too, the life lived by others in 
olden time, and the life of those who will live 
after thee, and the life now lived among bar- 
barous nations, and how many know not even 
thy name, and how many will soon forget it, 
and how they who perhaps now are prais- 
ing thee will very soon blame thee, and that 
neither a posthumous name is of any value, 
nor reputation, nor anything else. 

* Those who wish to know what Plato's Republic is 
may now study it in the accurate translation of Davies 
and Vaughan. 



Book ix.] dfcarcus Burelius Bntontnus* 245 

31. L,et there be freedom from perturbations 
with respect to the things which come from the 
external cause; and let there be justice in the 
things done by virtue of the internal cause, 
that is, let there be movement and action ter- 
minating in this, in social acts, for this is ac- 
cording to thy nature. 

32. Thou canst remove out of the way many 
useless things among those which disturb thee, 
for they lie entirely in thy opinion; and thou 
wilt then gain for thyself ample space by com- 
prehending the whole universe in thy mind, 
and by contemplating the eternity of time, and 
observing the rapid change of every several 
thing, how short is the time from birth to dis- 
solution, and the illimitable time before birth 
as well as the equally boundless time after dis- 
solution ! 

33. All that thou seest will quickly perish, 
and those who have been spectators of its dis- 
solution will very soon perish too. And he 
who dies at the extremest old age will be 
brought into the same condition with him who 
died prematurely. 

34. What are these men's leading principles, 
and about what kind of things are they busy, 
and for what kind of reasons do they love and 
honor? Imagine that thou seest their pool 
souls laid bare. When they think that they 
do harm by their blame or good by their praise, 
what an idea ! 

35. L,oss is nothing else than change. Bui 



246 Gbougbts, [Book IX. 

the universal nature delights in change, and in 
obedience to her all things are now done well, 
and from eternity have been in like form, and 
will be such to time without end. What, then, 
dost thou sa}^,--that all things have been and 
all things always will be bad, and that no power 
has ever been found in so many gods to rectify 
these things, but the world has been condemned 
to be bound in never ceasing evil (iv. 45, vii. 
18)? 

36. The rottenness of the matter which is 
the foundation of everything ! water, dust, 
bones, filth: or again, marble rocks, the callos- 
ities of the earth; and gold and silver, the sed- 
iments; and garments, only bits of hair; and 
purple dye, blood; and everything else is of 
the same kind. And that which is of the na- 
ture of breath is also another thing of the same 
kind, changing from this to that. 

37. Enough of this wretched life and mur- 
muring and apish tricks. Why art thou dis- 
turbed? What is there new in this? What 
unsettles thee ? Is it the form of the thing ? 
Look at it. Or is it the matter ? Look at it. 
But besides these there is nothing. Towards 
the gods then, now become at last more simple 
and better. It is the same whether we exam- 
ine these things for a hundred years or three. 

38. If a man has done wrong the harm is his 
own. But perhaps he has not done wrong. 

39. Either all things proceed from one intel- 
ligent source and come together as in one body, 



Book IX.] dftarcus Burelfus Bntoninus* 247 

and the part ought not to find fault with what 
is done for the benefit of the whole ; or there 
are only atoms, and nothing else than mixture 
and dispersion. Why, then, art thou disturbed ? 
Say to the ruling faculty, Art thou dead, art 
thou corrupted, art thou playing the hypocrite, 
art thou become a beast, dost thou herd and 
feed with the rest ?* 

40. Either the gods have no power or they 
have power. If, then, they have no power, 
why dost thou pray to them ? But if they have 
power, why dost thou not pray for them to give 
thee the faculty of not fearing any of the things 
which thou fearest, or of not desiring any of the 
things which thou desirest, or not being 
pained at anything, rather than pray that any 
of these things should not happen or hap- 
pen ? for certainly if they can co-operate with 
men, they can co-operate for these purposes. 
But perhaps thou wilt say the gods have placed 
them in thy power. Well, then, is it not bet- 
ter to use what is in thy power like a free man 
than to desire in a slavish and abject way what 
is not in thy power ? And who has told thee 
that the gods do not aid us, even in the things 
which are in our power? Begin, then, to pray 
for such things, and thou wilt see. One man 

* There is some corruption at the end of this section, 
but I think that the translation expresses the em- 
peror's meaning. Whether intelligence rules all 
things or chance rules, a man must not be disturbed. 
He must use the power that he has and be tranquil. 



248 GbOU0bt6. [Book IX. 

prays thus: How shall I be able to lie with that 
woman ? Do thou pray thus: How shall I not 
desire to lie with her? Another prays thus: 
How shall I be released from this ? Pray 
thou : How shall I not desire to be released ? 
Another thus: How shall I not lose my little 
son ? Thou thus: How shall I not be afraid to 
lose him ? In fine, turn thy prayers this way, 
and see what comes. 

41. Epicurus says, In my sickness my con- 
versation was not about my bodily sufferings, 
nor, says he, did I talk on such subjects to 
those who visited me; but I continued to dis- 
course on the nature of things as before, keep- 
ing to this main point, how the mind, while 
participating in such movements as go on in 
the poor flesh, shall be free from perturbations 
and maintain its proper good. Nor did I, he 
says, give the physicians an opportunity of put- 
ting on solemn looks, as if they were doing 
something great, but my life went on well and 
happily. Do, then, the same that he did both 
in sickness, if thou art sick, and in any other 
circumstances; for never to desert philosophy 
in any events that may befall us, nor to hold 
trifling talks either with an ignorant man or 
with one unacquainted with nature, is a prin- 
ciple of all schools of philosophy; but to be 
intent only on that which thou art now doing 
and on the instrument by which thou doest it. 

42. When thou art offended with any man's 
shameless conduct, immediately ask thyself, 



Book IX.] /ifcarcus Burelfus Bntonfnus* 249 

Is it possible, then, that shameless men should 
not be in the world ? It is not possible. Do 
not, then, require what is impossible. For 
this man also is one of those shameless men 
who must of necessity be in the world. L,et 
the same considerations be present to thy mind 
in the case of the knave, and the faithless man, 
and of every man who does wrong in any way. 
For at the same time that thou dost remind 
thyself that it is impossible that such kind of 
men should not exist, thou wilt become more 
kindly disposed towards every one individually. 
It is useful to perceive this, too, immediately 
when the occasion arises, what virtue nature 
has given to man to oppose to every wrongful 
act. For she has given to man, as an antidote 
against the stupid man, mildness, and against 
another kind of man some other power. And 
in all .cases it is possible for thee to correct by 
teaching the man who is gone astray; for every 
man who errs misses his object and is gone 
astray. Besides, wherein hast thou been in- 
jured? For thou wilt find that no one among 
those against whom thou art irritated has done 
anything by which thy mind could be made 
worse; but that which is evil to thee and harm- 
ful has its foundation only in the mind. And 
what harm is done or what is there strange, if 
the man who has not been instructed does the 
acts of an uninstructed man? Consider 
whether thou shouldst not rather blame thy- 
self, because thou didst not expect such a man 



250 abouflbts* [Book IX. 

to err in such a way. For thou hadst means 
given thee by thy reason to suppose that it 
was likely that he would commit this error, 
and yet thou hast forgotten and art amazed 
that he has erred. But most of all when thou 
blamest a man as faithless or ungrateful, turn 
to tlryself. For the fault is manifestly thy own, 
whether thou didst trust that a man who had 
such a disposition would keep his promise, or 
when conferring thy kindness thou didst not 
confer it absolutely, nor yet in such way as to 
have received from thy very act all the profit. 
For what more dost thou want when thou hast 
done a man a service ? art thou not content that 
thou hast done something conformable to thy 
nature, and dost thou seek to be paid for it? 
just as if the eye demanded a recompense for 
seeing, or the feet for walking. For as these 
members are formed for a particular purpose, 
and by working according to their several con- 
stitutions obtain what is their own;* so also as 
man is formed by nature to acts of benevolence, 
when he has done anything benevolent or in 
any other way conducive to the common inter- 
est, he has acted conformably to his constitu- 
tion, and he gets what is his own. 

* 'A7r&x ei r ° Ifaov. This sense of airexuv occurs in 
xi. 1, and iv. 49; also in St. Matthew, vi. 2, aizexovat 
rbv fzcodov, and in Kpictetus. 



BookX.] dfcarcus Bureaus Bntontnus* 2 <u 



X. 

WILT thou, then, my soul, never be good 
and simple and one and naked, more 
manifest than the body which surrounds thee ? 
Wilt thou never enjoy an affectionate and con- 
tented disposition? Wilt thou never be full 
and without a want of any kind, longing for 
nothing more, nor desiring anything, either 
animate or inanimate, for the enjoyment of 
pleasures? nor yet desiring time wherein thou 
shalt have longer enjoyment, or place, or 
pleasant climate, or society of men with whom 
thou mayst live in harmony ? but wilt thou be 
satisfied with thy present condition, and 
pleased with all that is about thee, and wilt 
thou convince thyself that thou hast every- 
thing, and that it comes from the gods, that 
everything is well for thee, and will be well 
whatever shall please them, and whatever they 
shall give for the conservation of the perfect 
living being,* the good and just and beautiful, 
which generates and holds together all things, 
and contains and embraces all things which 
are dissolved for the production of other like 
things? Wilt thou never be such that thou 

* That is, God (iv. 40), as he is defined by Zeno. 
But the confusion between gods and God is strange. 



252 GbOUflbtS. [Book! 

shalt so dwell in community with gods and 
men as neither to find fault with them at all, 
nor to be condemned by them ? 

2. Observe what thy nature requires, so far 
as thou art governed by nature only: then do 
it and accept it, if thy nature, so far as thou art 
a living being, shall not be made worse by it. 
And next thou must observe what thy nature 
requires so far as thou art a living being. And 
all this thou mayst allow thyself, if thy nature, 
so far as thou art a rational animal, shall not 
be made worse by it. But the rational animal 
is consequently also a political [social] animal. 
Use these rules, then, and trouble thyself about 
nothing else. 

3. Everything which happens either happens 
in such wise as thou art formed by nature to 
bear it, or as thou art not formed by nature to 
bear it. If, then, it happens to thee in such 
way as thou art formed by nature to bear it, do 
not complain, but bear it as thou art formed by 
nature to bear it. But if it happens in such 
wise as thou art not formed by nature to bear 
it, do not complain, for it will perish after it 
has consumed thee. Remember, however, that 
thou art formed by nature to bear everything, 
with respect to which it depends on thy own 
opinion to make it endurable and tolerable, by 
thinking that it is either thy interest or thy 
duty to do this. 

4. If a man is mistaken, instruct him kindly 
and show him his error. But if thou art not 
able, blame thyself, or blame not even thyself. 



BookX.] d&arcus aurelius Bntoninug* 253 

5. Whatever may happen to thee, it was pre- 
pared for thee from all eternity; and the impli- 
cation of causes was from eternity spinning the 
thread of thy being, and of that which is inci- 
dent to it (iii. 11; iv. 26). 

6. Whether the universe is [a concourse of] 
atoms, or nature [is a system], let this first be 
established, that I am a part of. the whole 
which is governed by nature; next, I am in a 
manner intimately related to the parts which 
are of the same kind with myself. For re- 
membering this, inasmuch as I am a part, I 
shall be discontented with none of the things 
which are assigned to me out of the whole; for 
nothing is injurious to the part if it is for the 
advantage of the whole. For the whole con- 
tains nothing which is not for its advantage; 
and all natures indeed have this common prin- 
ciple, but the nature of the universe has this 
principle besides, that it cannot be compelled 
even by any external cause to generate any- 
thing harmful to itself. By remembering, then, 
that I am a part of such a whole, I shall be 
content with everything that happens. And 
inasmuch as I am in a manner intimately re- 
lated to the parts which are of the same kind 
with myself, I shall do nothing unsocial, but I 
shall rather direct myself to the things which 
are of the same kind with myself, and I shall 
turn all my efforts to the common interest, and 
divert them from the contrary. Now, if these 
things are done so, life must flow on happily, 



254 GbOUflbtS. [Book X, 

just as thou mayst observe that the life of a 
citizen is happy, who continues a course of 
action which is advantageous to his fellow- 
citizens, and is content with whatever the state 
may assign to him. 

7. The parts of the whole, everything, I 
mean, which is naturally comprehended in the 
universe, must of necessity perish; but let this 
be understood in this sense, that they must un- 
dergo change. But if this is naturally both an 
evil and a necessity for the parts, the whole 
would not continue to exist in a good condi- 
tion, the parts being subject to change and 
constituted so as to perish in various ways. 
For whether did Nature herself design to do 
evil to the things which are parts of herself, 
and to make them subject to evil and of neces- 
sity fall into evil, or have such results happened 
without her knowing it ? Both these supposi- 
tions, indeed, are incredible. But if a man 
should even drop the term Nature [as an effi- 
cient power], and should speak of these things 
as natural, even then it would be ridiculous to 
affirm at the same time that the parts of the 
whole are in their nature subject to change, 
and at the same time to be surprised or vexed 
as if something were happening contrary to na- 
ture, particularly as the dissolution of things is 
into those things of which each thing is com- 
posed. For there is either a dispersion of the 
elements out of which everything has been 
compounded, or a change from the solid to the 



BookX.] iiibarcus Burelfua Sntontnus* 255 

earthy and from the airy to the aerial, so that 
these parts are taken back into the universal 
reason, whether this at certain periods is con- 
sumed by fire or renewed by eternal changes. 
And do not imagine that the solid and the airy 
part belong to thee from the time of generation. 
For all this received its accretion only yester- 
day and the day before, as one may say, from 
the food and the air which is inspired. This, 
then, which has received [the accretion], 
changes, not that which thy mother brought 
forth. But suppose that this [which thy mother 
brought forth] implicates thee vety much with 
that other part, which has the peculiar quality 
[of change], this is nothing in fact in the way 
of objection to what is said.* 

8. When thou hast assumed these names, 
good, modest, true, rational, a man of equa- 
nimity, and magnanimous, take care that thou 
dost not change these names; and if thou 
shouldst lose them, quickly return to them. 
And remember that the term Rational was in- 
tended to signify a discriminating attention 

* The end of this section is perhaps corrupt. The 
meaning is very obscure. I have given that meaning 
which appears to be consistent with the whole argu- 
ment. The emperor here maintains that the essential 
part of man is unchangeable, and that the other parts, 
if they change or perish, do not affect that which 
really constitutes the man. See the Philosophy of 
Antoninus, p. 56, note 2. Schultz supposed "thy 
mother" to mean nature, rj <pvot£. But I doubt about 
that. 



256 GbOU0bt0* [BookX. 

to every several thing, and freedom from neg- 
ligence; and that Equanimity is the voluntary 
acceptance of the things which are assigned to 
thee by the common nature; and that Mag- 
nanimity is the elevation of the intelligent part 
above the pleasurable or painful sensations of 
the flesh, and above that poor thing called fame, 
and death, and all such things. If, then, thou 
maintainest thyself in the possession of these 
names, without desiring to be called by these 
names by others, thou wilt be another person 
and wilt enter on another life. For to continue 
to be such as thou hast hitherto been, and to be 
torn in pieces and defiled in such a life, is the 
character of a very stupid man and one over- 
fond of his life, and like those half-devoured 
fighters with wild beasts, who though covered 
with wounds and gore, still intreat to be kept 
to the following day, though they will be ex- 
posed in the same state to the same claws and 
bites. * Therefore fix thyself in the possession 
of these few names: and if thou art able to 
abide in them, abide as if thou wast removed to 
certain islands of the Happy, f But if thou 

*See Seneca, Epp. 70, on these exhibitions which 
amused the people of those days. These fighters were 
the Bestiarri, some of whom may have been criminals; 
but even if they were, the exhibition was equally 
characteristic of the depraved habits of the spectators. 

t The islands of the Happy, or the Fortunatae Insu- 
iae, are spoken of by the Greek and Roman writers. 
They were the abode of Heroes, like Achilles and 



BookX.] Marcus Hurelius Hntonfnus* 257 

shalt perceive that thou fallest out of them and 
dost not maintain thy hold, go courageously 
into some nook where thou shalt maintain 
them, or even depart at once from life, not in 
passion, but with simplicity and freedom and 
modesty, after doing this one [laudable] thing 
at least in thy life, to have gone out of it thus. 
In order, however to the remembrance of these 
names, it will greatly help thee if thou remem- 
berest the gods, and that they wish not to be 
flattered, but wish all reasonable beings to be 
made like themselves; and if thou remember- 
est that what does the work of a fig-tree is a 
fig-tree, and that what does the work of a dog 
is a dog, and that what does the work of a bee 

Diomedes, as we see in the Scolion of Harmodius and 
Aristogiton. Sertorius heard of the islands at Cadiz 
from some sailors who had been there, and he had a 
wish to go and live in them and rest from his troubles 
(Plutarch, Sertorius, c. 8). In the Odyssey, Proteus 
told Menelaus that he should not die in Argos, but be 
removed to a place at the boundary of the earth where 
Rhadamanthus dwelt (Odyssey, iv. 565): — 

" For there in sooth man's life is easiest: 
Nor snow nor raging storm nor rain is there 
But ever gently breathing gales of Zephyr 
Oceanus sends up to gladden man." 

It is certain that the writer of the Odyssey only fol- 
lows some old legend, without having any knowledge 
of any place which corresponds to his description. 
The two islands which Sertorius heard of may be Ma- 
deira and the adjacent island. Compare Pindar, Ol. 
ii. 129. 

l 7 



258 ttbOUflbtS. [Book X. 

is a bee, and that what does the work of a man 
is a man. 

9. Mimi,* war, astonishment, torpor, slavery, 
will daily wipe out those holy principles of 
thine. 4- How many things without studying 
nature dost thou imagine, and how many dost 
thou neglect ? f But it is thy duty so to look 
on and so to do everything, that at the same 
time the power of dealing with circumstances 
is perfected, and the contemplative faculty is 
exercised, and the confidence which comes 
from the knowledge of each several thing is 
maintained without showing it, but yet not 
concealed. For when wilt thou enjoy sim- 
plicity, when gravity, and when the knowledge 
of every several thing, both what it is in sub- 
stance, and what place it has in the universe, 
and how long it is formed to exist, and of what 
things it is compounded, and to whom it can 
belong, and who are able both to give it and 
take it away ? 

10. A spider is proud when it has caught a 
fly, and another when he has caught a poor 
hare, and another when he has taken a little 
fish in a net, and another when he has taken 
wild boars, and another when he has taken 
bears, and another when he has taken Sar- 

* Corais conjectured juigoc ''hatred" in place of 
Mimi, Roman plays in which action and gesticulation 
Were all or nearly all. 

t This is corrupt. See the addition of Schultz. 



Book X.] Marcus Burelius Bntoninus* 259 

matians. Are not these robbers, if thou ex- 
aminest their opinions ? * 

11. Acquire the contemplative way of seeing 
how all things change into one another, and 
constantly attend to it, and exercise thyself 
about this part [of philosophy]. For nothing 
is so much adapted to produce magnanimity. 
Such a man has put off the body, and as he 
sees that he must, no one knows how soon, go 
away from among men and leave everything 
here, he gives himself up entirely to just doing 
in all his actions, and in everything else that 
happens he resigns himself to the universal 
nature. But as to what any man shall say or 
think about him or do against him, he never 
even thinks of it, being himself contented with 
these two things — with acting justly in what 
he now does, and being satisfied with what is 
now assigned to him; and he lays aside all dis- 
tracting and busy pursuits, and desires nothing 
else than to accomplish the straight course 
through the law,t and by accomplishing the 
straight course to follow God. 

12. What need is there of suspicious fear, 
since it is in thy power to inquire what ought 
to be done ? And if thou seest clear, go by 

* Marcus means to say that conquerors are robbers. 
He himself warred against Sarmatians, and was a rob- 
ber, as he says, like the rest. But compare the life of 
Avidius Cassius, c. 4, by Vulcatius. 

f By the law he means the divine law. obedience to 
the will of God. 



260 GbOU0bt0, [Book X. 

this way content, without turning back; but 
if thou dost not see clear, stop and take the 
best advisers. But if any other things oppose 
thee, go on according to thy powers with due 
consideration, keeping to that which appears 
to be just. For it is best to reach this object, 
and if thou dost fail, let thy failure be in at- 
tempting this. He who follows reason in all 
things is both tranquil and active at the same 
time, and also cheerful and collected. 

13. Inquire of thyself as soon as thou wakest 
from sleep whether it will make any difference 
to thee if another does what is just and right. 
It will make no difference (vi. 32; viii. 55). 

Thou hast not forgotten, I suppose, that 
those who assume arrogant airs in bestowing 
their praise or blame on others are such as 
they are at bed and at board, and thou hast 
not forgotten what they do, and what they 
avoid, and what they pursue, and how they 
steal and how they rob, not with hands and 
feet, but with their most valuable part, by 
means of which there is produced, when a man 
chooses, fidelity, modesty, truth, law, a good 
daemon [happiness] (vii. 17)? 

14. To her who gives and takes back all, to 
nature, the man who is instructed and modest 
says, Give what thou wilt; take back what 
thou wilt. And he says this not proudly, but 
obediently, and well pleased with her. 

15. Short is the little which remains to thee 
of life. Live as on a mountain. For it makes 



BookX.] /ifcarcus Burelius Bntonfnus* 261 

no difference whether a man lives there or 
here, if he lives everywhere in the world as in 
a state [political community]. Let me see, let 
them know a real man who lives according to 
nature. If they cannot endure him, let them 
kill him. For that is better than to live thus 
[as men do]. 

16. No longer talk at all about the kind of 
man that a good man ought to be, but be such. 

17. Constantly contemplate the whole of time 
and the whole of substance, and consider that 
all individual things as to substance are a grain 
of a fig, and as to time the turning of a gimlet. 

■18. Look at everything that exists, and ob- 
serve that it is already in dissolution and in 
change, and as it were putrefaction or dis- 
persion, or that everything is so constituted by 
nature as to die. 

19. Consider what men are when they are eat- 
ing, sleeping, generating, easing themselves, 
and so forth. Then what kind of men they are 
when they are imperious + and arrogant, or 
angry and scolding from their elevated place. 
But a short time ago to how many they were 
slaves and for what things; and after a little 
time consider in what a condition they will be. 

20. That is for the good of each thing, which 
the universal nature brings to each. And it is 
for its good at the time when nature brings it. 

21. "The earth loves the shower;" and 
"the solemn ether loves;" and the universe 
loves to make whatever is about to be. I say 



262 {Tbougbta, [BookL 

then to the universe, that I love as thou lovest. 
And is not this too said that ' ' this or that 
loves [is wont] to be produced ?"* 

22. Either thou livest here and hast already 
accustomed thyself to it, or thou art going 
away, and this was thy own will; or thou art 
dying and hast discharged thy duty. But be- 
sides these things there is nothing. Be of 
good cheer, then. 

23. Let this always be plain to thee, that 
this piece of land is like any other ; and that 
all things here are the same with things on the 
top of a mountain, or on the sea-shore, or 
wherever thou choosest to be. For thou wilt 
find just what Plato says, Dwelling within the 
walls of a city as in a shepherd's fold on a 
mountain. [The three last words are omitted 
in the translation. ]f 

* These words are from Euripides. They are cited 
by Aristotle, Ethic. Nicorn. viii. 1. Athenaeus (xiii. 
296) and Stobaeus quote seven complete lines begin- 
ning kpg, fiev b/LLppov yaia. There is a similar fragment 
of Aeschylus, Danaides, also quoted by Athenaeus. 

It was the fashion of the Stoics to work on the 
meanings of words. So Antoninus here takes the 
verb (pt'Aei, " loves," which has also the sense of "is 
wont," "uses," and the like. He finds in the com- 
mon language of mankind a philosophical truth, and 
most great truths are expressed in the common 
language of life; some understand them, but most 
people utter them without knowing how much they 
mean. 

f Plato, Theaet. 174 D. E. But compare the orig- 
inal with the use that Antoninus has made of it. 



Boot X.] Marcus ButeUus Bntoninus, 263 

24. What is my ruling faculty now to me ? 
and of what nature am I now making it ? and 
for what purpose am I now using it? is it void 
of understanding ? is it loosed and rent asun- 
der from social life ? is it melted into and mixed 
with the poor flesh so as to move together 
with it ? 

25. He who flies from his master is a runa- 
way; but the law is master, and he who breaks 
the law is a runaway. And he also who is 
grieved or. angry or afraid, + is dissatisfied be- 
cause something has been or is or shall be of 
the things which are appointed b}^ him who 
rules all things, and he is L,aw and assigns to 
every man what is fit. He then who fears or 
is grieved or is angry is a runaway.* 

26. A man deposits seed in a womb and goes 
away, and then another cause takes it and 
labors on it, and makes a child. What a thing 
from such a material ! Again, the child passes 
food down through the throat, and then an- 
other cause takes it and makes perception and 
motion, and in fine, life and strength and other 
things; how many and how strange ! Observe 
then the things which are produced in such a 
hidden way, and see the power, just as we see 
the power which carries things downwards and 
upwards, not with the eyes, but still no less 
plainly (vii. 85). 

* Antoninus is here playing on the etymology, of 
v6fiog 1 law, assignment, that which assigns (vejuec) to 
every man his portion. 



264 GbOUflbte. [Book X. 

27. Constantly consider how all things such 
as they now are, in time past also were; and 
consider that they will be the same again. 
And place before thy eyes entire dramas and 
stages of the same form, whatever thou hast 
learned from thy experience or from older 
history; for example, the whole court of 
Hadrianus, and the whole court of Antoninus, 
and the w T hole court of Philippus, Alexander, 
Croesus; for all those were such dramas as we 
see now, only with different actors. . 

28. Imagine every man who is grieved at 
anything or discontented to be like a pig which 
is sacrificed and kicks and screams. 

Like this pig also is he who on his bed in 
silence laments the bonds in which we are held. 
And consider that only to the rational animal 
is it given to follow voluntarily what happens; 
but simply to follow is a necessity imposed on 
all. 

29. Severally on the occasion of everything 
that thou dost, pause and ask thyself if death 
is a dreadful thing because it deprives thee of 
this. 

30. When thou art offended at any man's 
fault, forthwith turn to thyself and reflect in 
what like manner thou dost err thyself; for 
example, in thinking that money is a good 
thing, or pleasure, or a bit of reputation, and 
the like. For by attending to this thou wilt 
quickly forget thy anger, if this consideration 
fc,bo is added, that the man is compelled: for 



Book X.] Marcus Burelfus Sntontnus* 265 

what else could lie do? or, if thou art able, 
take away from him the compulsion. 

31. When thou hast seen Satyron* the So- 
cratic,+ think of either Eutyches or Hymen, 
and when thou hast seen Euphrates, think of 
Eutychion or Silvanus, and when thou hast 
seen Alciphron think of Tropaeophorus, and 
when thou hast seen Xenophon, think of 
Critof or Severus, and when thou hast looked 
on thyself, think of any other Caesar, and in 
the case of every one do in like manner. Then 
let this thought be in thy mind, Where then 
are those men? Nowhere, or nobody knows 
where. For thus continuously thou wilt look 
at human things as smoke and nothing at all; 
especially if thou reflectest at the same time 
that what has once changed will never exist 
again in the infinite duration of time. But 
thou, in what a brief space of time is thy ex- 
istence? And why art thou not content to 
pass through this short time in an orderly way ? 
What matter and opportunity [for thy activity] 

* Nothing is known of Satyron or Satyrion; nor, I 
believe, of Kutyches or Hymen. Euphrates is honor- 
ably mentioned by Epictetus (iii. 15, 8; iv. 8, 17). 
Pliny (Kpp. i. 10) speaks very highly of him. He ob- 
tained the permission of the Emperor Hadrian to 
drink poison, because he was old and in bad health 
(Dion Cassius, 69, c. 8). 

t Crito is the friend of Socrates ; and he was, it ap- 
pears, also a friend of Xenophon. When the em- 
peror says "seen " (ld6v) } he does not mean with the 
eyes. 



266 GbOU0btS, [Book X. 

art thou avoiding ? For what else are all these 
things, except exercises for the reason, when it 
has viewed carefully and by examination into 
their nature the things which happen in life ? 
Persevere then until thou shalt have made 
these things thy own, as the stomach which is 
strengthened makes all things its own, as the 
blazing fire makes flame and brightness out 
of everything that is thrown into it. 

32. Let it not be in an}' man's power to say 
truly of thee that thou are not simple or that 
thou art not good; but let him be a liar who- 
ever shall think anything of this kind about 
thee; and this is altogether in thy power. For 
who is he that shall hinder thee from being 
good and simple? Do thou only determine 
to live no longer unless thou shalt be such. 
For neither does reason allow [thee to live], if 
thou art not such.* 

33. What is that which as to this material 
[our life] can be done or said in the way most 
conformable to reason ? For whatever this 
may be, it is in thy power to do it or to say it, 
and do not make excuses that thou art hindered. 
Thou wilt not cease to lament till thy mind is 
in such a condition that what luxury is to 
those who enjoy pleasure, such shall be to 
thee, in the matter which is subjected and pre- 
sented to thee, the doing of the things which 
are conformable to man's constitution ; for a 

* Compare Epictetus, i. 29, 28. 



Book x.] /nbatcue XHureltus Bntoninus* 267 

man ought to consider as an enjoyment every- 
thing which it is in his power to do according to 
his own nature. And it is in his power every- 
where. Now, it is not given to a cylinder to 
move everywhere by its own motion, nor yet to 
water nor to fire, nor to anything else which is 
governed by nature or an irrational soul, for 
the things which check them and stand in the 
way are many. But intelligence and reason 
are able to go through everything that opposes 
them, and in such manner as they are formed 
by nature and as they choose. Place before 
thy eyes this facility with which the reason 
will be carried through all things, as fire up- 
wards, as a stone downwards, as a cylinder 
down an inclined surface, and seek for nothing 
further. For all other obstacles either affect 
the body only, which is a dead thing; or, ex- 
cept through opinion and the yielding of the 
reason itself, they do not crush nor do any 
harm of any kind; for if they did, he who felt 
it would immediately become bad. Now, in 
the case of all things which have a certain con- 
stitution, whatever harm may happen to any 
of them, that which is so affected becomes con- 
sequently worse; but in the like case, a man 
becomes both better, if one may say so, and 
more worthy of praise by making a right use 
of these accidents. And finally remember that 
nothing harms him who is really a citizen, 
which does not harm the state; nor yet does 
anything harm the state, which does not 



268 GbOUGbtS, [BookX. 

harm law [order]; and of these things which 
are called misfortunes not one harms law. 
What then does not harm law does not harm 
either state or citizen. 

34. To him who is penetrated by true prin- 
ciples even the briefest precept is sufficient, and 
any common precept, to remind him that he 
should be free from grief and fear. For ex- 
ample: — 

" I/eaves, some the wind scatters on the ground — 
So is the race of men." * 

Leaves, also, are thy children; and leaves, too, 
are they who cry out as if they were worthy of 
credit and bestow their praise, or on the con- 
trary curse, or secretly blame and sneer; and 
leaves, in like manner, are those who shall re- 
ceive and transmit a man's fame to after-times. 
For all such things as these "are produced in 
the season of spring," as the poet says; then 
the wind casts them down; then the forest 
produces other leaves in their places. But a 
brief existence is common to all things, and yet 
thou avoidest and pursuest all things as if they 
would be eternal. A little time, and thou 
shalt close thy eyes; and him who has attended 
thee to thy grave another soon will lament. 

35. The healthy eye ought to see all visible 
things and not to say, I wish for green things; 
for this is the condition of a diseased eye. 

* Homer, II., vi. 146. 



BookX.] /ifoarcus Burelius Sntoninus* 269 

And the healthy hearing and smelling ought 
to be ready to perceive all that can be heard 
and smelled. And the healthy stomach ought 
to be with respect to all food just as the mill 
with respect to all things which it is formed to 
grind. And accordingly the healthy under- 
standing ought to be prepared for everything 
which happens; but that which says, Let my 
dear children live, and let all men praise what- 
ever I may do, is an eye which seeks for green 
things, or teeth which seek for soft things. 

36. There is no man so fortunate that there 
shall not be by him when he is dying some 
who are pleased with what is going to happen.* 
Suppose that he was a good and wise man, will 
there not be at least some one to say to him- 
self, L,et us at last breathe freely, being relieved 
from this schoolmaster ? It is true that he was 
harsh to none of us, but I perceived that he 
tacitly condemns us. — This is what is said of a 
good man. But in our own case how many 
other things are there for which there are many 
who wish to get rid of us? Thou wilt con- 
sider this, then, when thou art dying, and thou 
wilt depart more contentedly by reflecting thus: 
I am going away from such a life, in which 
even my associates in behalf of whom I have 
striven so much, prayed, and cared, themselves 

* He says naaov, but as he affirms in other places 
that death is no evil, he must mean what others may 
call an evil, and he means only " what is going to 
happen." 



270 GbOUflbtS* [Book X. 

wish me to depart, hoping perchance to get 
some little advantage by it. Why then should 
a man cling to a longer stay here? Do not, 
however, for this reason go away less kindly 
disposed to them, but preserving thy own 
character, and friendly and benevolent and 
mild, and on the other hand not as if thou wast 
torn away; but as when a man dies a quiet 
death, the poor soul is easily separated from 
the body, such also ought thy departure from 
men to be, for nature united thee to them and 
associated thee. But does she now dissolve the 
union ? Well, I am separated as from kins- 
men, not however dragged resisting, but with- 
out compulsion ; for this, too, is one of the 
things according to nature. 

37. Accustom thyself as much as possible on 
the occasion of anything being done by any 
person to inquire with thyself, For what ob- 
ject is this man doing this ? But begin with 
thyself, and examine thyself first. 

38. Remember that this which pulls the 
strings is the thing which is hidden within : 
this is the power of persuasion, this is life, this, 
if one may so say, is man. In contemplating 
thyself never include the vessel which sur- 
rounds thee and these instruments which are 
attached about it. For they are like to an 
axe, differing only in this, that they grow to 
the body. For indeed there is no more use in 
these parts without the cause which moves 
and checks them than in the weaver's shut- 



BookX.] /ifearcus Bureliua Sntoninus* 271 

tie, and the writer's pen, and the driver's 
whip.* 

* See the Philosophy of Antoninus, p. 72, note. 



272 GbOU0bt6, [Book XL 



XL 

THESE are the properties of the rational 
soul: it sees itself, analyzes itself, and 
makes itself such as it chooses; the fruit which 
it bears itself enjoys— for the fruits of plants 
and that in animals which corresponds to fruits 
others enjoy — it obtains its own end, wherever 
the limit of life may be fixed. Not as in a 
dance and in a play and in such like things, 
where the whole action is incomplete if any- 
thing cuts it short; but in every part, and 
wherever it may be stopped, it makes what 
has been set before it full and complete, so that 
it can say, I have what is my own. And fur- 
ther it traverses the whole universe, and the 
surrounding vacuum, and surveys its form, and 
it extends itself into the infinity of time, and 
embraces and comprehends the* periodical 
renovation of all things, and it comprehends 
that those who come after us will see nothing 
new, nor have those before us seen anything 
more, but in a manner he who is forty years 
old, if he has any understanding at all, has 
vSeen by virtue of the uniformity that prevails 
all things which have been and all that will be. 
This too is a property of the rational soul, love 

* Tyv TreptodiKT/v 7raXiyyeveGiav. See v. 13, 32 ; x. 7. 



Book XL] dfcarcus Hurelius Bntonftius* 273 

of one's neighbor, and truth and modesty, and 
to value nothing more than itself, which is also 
the property of Law.* Thus the right reason 
differs not at all from the reason of justice. 

2. Thou wilt set little value on pleasing 
song and dancing and the pancratium, if thou 
wilt distribute the melody of the voice into its 
several sounds, and ask thyself as to each, if 
thou art mastered by this; for thou wilt be 
prevented b}^ shame from confessing it : and in 
the matter of dancing, if at each movement 
and attitude thou wilt do the same; and the 
like also in the matter of the pancratium. In 
all things, then, except virtue and the acts of 
virtue, remember to apply thyself to their sev- 
eral parts, and by this division to come to 
value them little: and apply this rule also to 
thy whole life. 

3. What a soul that is which is ready, if at 
any moment it must be separated from the 
body, and ready either to be extinguished or 
dispersed or continue to exist ; but so that this 
readiness comes from a man's own judgment, 
not from mere obstinacy, as with the Chris- 
tians, f but considerately and with dignity and 
in a way to persuade another, without tragic 
show. 

4. Have I done something for the general 

* Law is the order by which all things are governed. 

t See the Life of Antoninus. This is the only pas- 
sage in which the emperor speaks of the Christians. 
Kpictetus (iv. 7, 6) names them Galilaei. 
IS 



274 GbOU0bt6. [Book XL 

interest? Well then, I have had my reward. 
Let this always be present to thy mind, and 
never stop [doing such good]. 

5. What is thy art? To be good. And 
how is this accomplished well except by gen- 
eral principles, some about the nature of the 
universe, and others about the proper constitu- 
tion of man ? 

6. At first tragedies were brought on the 
stage as means of reminding men of the things 
which happen to them, and that it is according 
to nature for things to happen so, and that, if 
you are delighted with what is shown on the 
stage, you should not be troubled with that 
which takes place on the larger stage. For 
you see that these things must be accom- 
plished thus, and that even they bear them 
who cry out,* l O Cithaeron." And, indeed, 
some things are said well by the dramatic 
writers, of which kind is the following es- 
pecially: — 

' ' Me and my children if the gods neglect, 
This has its reason too."f 

And again, — 

"We must not chafe and fret at that which happens." 
And,— 

" Life s harvest reap like the wheat's fruitful ear.' 
And other things of the same kind. 

* Sophocles, Oedipus Rex. f See vii. 41, 38, 40. 



Book XL] /ifcarcus Bureltus Bntoninus* 275 

After tragedy the old comedy was intro- 
duced, which had a magisterial freedom of 
speech, and by its very plainness of speaking 
was useful in reminding men to beware of in- 
solence; and for this purpose too Diogenes used 
to take from these writers. 

But as to the middle comedy, which came 
next, observe what it was, and again, for what 
object the new comedy was introduced, which 
gradually sank down into a mere mimic arti- 
fice. That some good things are said even by 
these writers, everybody knows: but the whole 
plan of such poetry and dramaturgy, to what 
end does it look ? 

7. How plain does it appear that there is not 
another condition of life so well suited for phil- 
osophizing as this in which thou now happen- 
est to be. 

8. A branch cut off from the adjacent branch 
must of necessity be cut off from the whole 
tree also. So too a man when he is separated 
from another man has fallen off from the whole 
social community. Now as to a branch, an- 
other cuts it off; but a man by his own act sep- 
arates himself from his neighbor when he hates 
him and turns away from him, and he does 
not know that he has at the same time cut 
himself off from the whole social system. Yet 
he has this privilege certainly from Zeus, who 
framed society, for it is in our power to grow 
again to that which is near to us, and again to 
become a part which helps to make up the 



276 GbOU0bt0. [Book XL 

whole. However, if it often happens, this kind 
of separation, it makes it difficult for that 
which detaches itself to be brought to unity 
and to be restored to its former condition. Fi- 
nally, the branch, which from the first grew 
together with the tree, and has continued to 
have one life with it, is not like that wdiich 
after being cut off is then ingrafted, for this is 
something like what the gardeners mean when 
they say that it grows with the rest of the tree, 
but+ that it has not the same mind with it. 

9. As those who try to stand in thy way 
w^hen thou art proceeding according to right 
reason will not be able to turn thee aside from 
thy proper action, so neither let them drive 
thee from thy benevolent feelings toward them, 
but be on thy guard equally in both matters, 
uot only in the matter of steady judgment and 
action, but also in the matter of gentleness to 
those who try to hinder or otherwise trouble 
thee. For this also is a weakness, to be vexed 
at them, as well as to be diverted from thy 
course of action and to give way through fear ; 
lor both are equally deserters from their post, — 
the man who does it through fear, and the man 
who is alienated from him who is by nature a 
kinsman and a friend. 

10. There is no nature which is inferior to 
art, for the arts imitate the natures of things. 
But if this is so, that nature which is the most 
perfect and the most comprehensive of all 
natures, cannot fall short of the skill of art 



Book XL] dftarcus BureHua Bntonfnus* 277 

Now all arts do the inferior things for the sake 
of the superior; therefore the universal nature 
does so too. And, indeed, hence is the origin 
of justice, and in justice the other virtues have 
their foundation: for justice will not be ob- 
served, if we either care for middle things 
[things indifferent], or are easily deceived and 
careless and changeable (v. 16. 30; vii. 55). 

11. If the things do not come to thee, the 
pursuits and avoidances of which disturb thee, 
still m a manner thou goest to them. Let then 
thy judgment about them be at rest, and they 
will remain quiet, and thou wilt not be seen 
either pursuing or avoiding. 

12. The spherical form of the soul maintains 
its figure when it is neither extended towards 
any object, nor contracted inwards, nor dis- 
persed, nor sinks down, but is illuminated by 
light, by which it sees the truth, — the truth of 
all things and the truth that is in itself (viii. 
41, 45; xii. 3). 

13. Suppose any man shall despise me. Let 
him look to that himself. But I will look to 
this, that I be not discovered doing or saying 
anything deserving of contempt. Shall any 
man hate me? Let him look to it. But I will 
be mild and benevolent towards every man, 
and ready to show even him his mistake, not 
reproachfully, nor yet as making a display of 
my endurance, but nobly and honestly, like the 
great Phocion, unless indeed he only assumed 
it. For the interior [parts] ought to be such, 



27S ttbOUflbtS. [Book XL 

and a man ought to be seen by the gods neither 
dissatisfied with anything nor complaining. 
For what evil is it to thee, if thou art now doing 
what is agreeable to thy own nature, and art 
satisfied with that which at this moment is suit- 
able to the nature of the universe, since thou 
art a human being placed at thy post in order 
that what is for the common advantage may be 
done in some way? 

14. Men despise one another and flatter one 
another; and men wish to raise themselves 
above one another, and crouch before one an- 
other. 

15. How unsound and insincere is he who 
says, I have determined to deal with thee in a 
fair way! — What are thou doing, man? There 
is no occasion to give this notice. It will soon 
show itself by acts. The voice ought to be 
plainly written on the forehead. Such as a 
man's character is,+ he immediately shows it 
in his eyes, just as he who is beloved forthwith 
reads everything in the eyes of lovers. The 
man who is honest and good ought to be ex- 
actly like a man who smells strong, so that the 
bystander as soon as he comes near him must 
smell whether he choose or not. But the af- 
fectation of vSimplicity is like a crooked stick.* 

* Instead of GK&Xjuq Saumaise reads ana/iffi. There is 
a Greek proverb, GKa/ufibv tjvhov ovdeTcoT' bpOdv : " You 
cannot make a crooked stick straight." 

The wolfish friendship is an allusion to the fable of 
the sheep and the wolves. 



Book XI.] Marcus aureltus 2lntontnu0* 279 

Nothing is more disgraceful than a wolfish 
friendship [false friendship]. Avoid this most 
of all. The good and simple and benevolent 
show all these things in the eyes, and there is 
no mistaking. 

16. -As to living in the best way, this power 
is in the soul, if it be indifferent to things 
which are indifferent. And it will be indiffer- 
ent, if it looks on each of these things sepa- 
rately and all together, and if it remembers 
that not one of them produces in us an opinion 
about itself, nor comes to us; but these things 
remain immovable, and it is we ourselves who 
produce the judgments about them, and, as we 
may say, write them in ourselves, it being in 
our power not to write them, and it being in 
our power, if perchance these judgments have 
imperceptibly got admission to our minds, to 
wipe them out; and if we remember also that 
such attention will only be for a short time, 
and then life will be at an end. Besides, what 
trouble is there at all in doing this? For if 
these things are according to nature, rejoice in 
them and they will be easy to thee: but if con- 
trary to nature, seek what is conformable to 
thy own nature, and strive towards this, even 
if it bring no reputation; for every man is 
allowed to seek his own good. 

17. Consider whence each thing is come, 
and of what it consists, + and into what it 
changes, and what kind of a thing it will be 
when it has changed, and that it will sustain 
no harm. 



28o Cbougbts, [Book XI 

18. [If any have offended against thee, con- 
sider first]: What is my relation to men, and 
that we are made for one another; and in an- 
other respect I was made to be set over them, 
as a ram over the flock or a bull over the herd. 
But examine the matter from first principles, 
from this. If all things are not mere atoms, it 
is nature which orders all things: if this is so, 
the inferior things exist for the sake of the 
superior, and these for the sake of one another 
(ii. i; ix. 39; v. 16; iii. 4). 

Second, consider what kind of men they are 
at table, in bed, and so forth; and particularly, 
under what compulsions in respect of opinions 
they are; and as to their acts, consider with 
what pride they do what they do (viii. 14; 
ix. 34). 

Third, that if men do rightly what they do, 
we ought not to be displeased: but if they do 
not right, it is plain that they do so involunta- 
rily and in ignorance. For as every soul is 
unwillingly deprived of the truth, so also is it 
unwillingly deprived of the power of behaving 
to each man according to his deserts. Accord- 
ingly men are pained when they are called un- 
just, ungrateful, and greedy, and in a word 
wrong-doers to their neighbors (vii. 62, 63; ii. 
1; vii. 26; viii. 29). 

Fourth, consider that thou also doest many 
things wrong, and that thou art a man like 
others; and even if thou dost abstain from cer- 
tain faults, still thou hast the disposition to 



Book XI] dfcarcus Burelfus Bntonfnus* 281 

commit them, though either through coward- 
ice, or concern about reputation, or some such 
mean motive, thou dost abstain from such 
faults (i. 17). 

Fifth, consider that thou dost not even 
understand whether men are doing wrong or 
not, for many things are done with a certain 
reference to circumstances. And in short, a 
man must learn a great deal to enable him to 
pass a correct judgment on another man's acts 
(ix. 38; iv. 51). 

Sixth, consider when thou art much vexed 
or grieved, that man's life is only a moment, 
and after a short time we are all laid out dead 
(vii. 58; iv. 48). 

Seventh, that it is not men's acts which 
disturb us, for those acts have their foundation 
in men's ruling principles, but it is our own 
opinions which disturb us. Take away these 
opinions then, and resolve to dismiss thy judg- 
ment about an act as if it were something 
grievous, and thy anger is gone. How then 
shall I take away these opinions ? By reflect- 
ing that no wrongful act of another brings 
shame on thee: for unless that which is shame- 
ful is alone bad, thou also must of necessity do 
many things wrong, and become a robber and 
everything else (v. 25; vii. 16). 

Eighth, consider how much more pain is 
brought on us by the anger and vexation 
caused by such acts than by the acts them- 
selves, at which we are angry and vexed (iv. 
39, 49; vii. 24). 



282 GbOU0btS, [Book XL 

Ninth, consider that a good disposition is 
invincible if it be genuine, and not an affected 
smile and acting a part. For what will the 
most violent man do to thee, if thou continuest 
to be of a kind disposition towards him, and if, 
as opportunity offers, thou gently admonishest 
him and calmly correctest his errors at the 
very time when he is trying to do thee harm, 
sa}nng, Not so, my child: we are constituted 
by nature for something else: I shall certainly 
not be injured, but thou art injuring thyself, 
my child. — And show him with gentle tact and 
by general principles that this is so, and that 
even bees do not do as he does, nor any ani- 
mals which are formed by nature to be gre- 
garious. And thou must do this neither with 
any double meaning nor in the way of re- 
proach, but affectionately and without any 
rancor in thy soul; and not as if thou wert 
lecturing him, nor yet that any bystander may 
admire, but either when he is alone, and if 
others are present ... * 

Remember these nine rules, as if thou hadst 
received them as a gift from the Muses, and 
begin at last to be a man while thou livest. 
But thou must equally avoid flattering men 
and being vexed at them, for both are un- 
social and lead to harm. And let this truth 
be present to thee in the excitement of 
anger, that to be moved by passion is not 
manly, but that mildness and gentleness, as 

* It appears that there is a defect in the text here. 



Book XL] /Ifoarcus Bureltus Bntoninus* 283 

they are more agreeable to human nature, so 
also are they more manly; and he who pos- 
sesses these qualities possesses strength, nerves, 
and courage, and not the man who is subject to 
fits of passion and discontent. For in the same 
degree in which a man's mind is nearer to free- 
dom from all passion, in the same degree also 
is it nearer to strength: and as the sense of pain 
is a characteristic of weakness, so also is anger. 
For he who yields to pain and he who yields' 
to anger, both are wounded and both submit. 

But if thou wilt, receive also a tenth present 
from the leader of the Muses [Apollo], and it 
is this, — that to expect bad men not to do 
wrong is madness, for he who expects this de- 
sires an impossibility. But to allow men to be- 
have so to others, and to expect them not to do 
thee any wrong, is irrational and tyrannical. 

19. There are four principal aberrations of 
the superior faculty against which thou shouldst 
be constantly on thy guard, and when thou 
hast detected them, thou shouldst wipe them 
out and say on each occasion thus: This 
thought is not necessary: this tends to destroy 
social union: this which thou art going to say 
comes not from the real thoughts; for thou 
shouldst consider it among the most absurd of 
things for a man not to speak from his real 
thoughts. But the fourth is when thou shalt 
reproach thyself for anything, for this is an evi- 
dence of the diviner part within thee being 
overpowered and yielding to the less honorable 



284 GbOU0bt0* [Book XL 

and to the perishable part, the body, and to its 
gross pleasures (iv. 24; ii. 16). 

20. Thy aerial part and all the fiery parts 
which are mingled in thee, though by nature 
they have an upward tendency, still in obe- 
dience to the disposition of the universe they are 
overpowered here in the compound mass [the 
body]. And also the whole of the earthy part 
in thee and the watery, though their tendency 
is downward, still are raised up and occupy a 
position which is not their natural one. In this 
manner then the elemental parts obey the uni- 
versal; for when they have been fixed in any 
place, perforce they remain there until again 
the universal shall sound the signal for dissolu- 
tion. Is it not then strange that thy intelli- 
gent part only should be disobedient and dis- 
contented with its own place? And yet no 
force is imposed on it, but only those things 
which are conformable to its nature: still it 
does not submit, but is carried in the opposite 
direction. For the movement towards injustice 
and intemperance and to anger and grief and 
fear is nothing else than the act of one who de- 
viates from nature. And also when the ruling 
faculty is discontented with anything that hap- 
pens, then too it deserts its post: for it is con- 
stituted for piety and reverence towards the 
gods no less than for justice. For these qual- 
ities also are comprehended under the generic 
term of contentment with the constitution of 



Book XL] dftarcua Butelfus Bntontnus* 285 

things, and indeed they are prior* to acts of 
justice. 

21. He who has not one and always the 
same object in life, cannot be one and the same 
all through his life. But what I have said is 
not enough, unless this also is added, what 
this object ought to be. For as there is not the 
same opinion about all the things which in 
some way or other are considered by the ma- 
jority to be good, but only about some certain 
things, that is, things which concern the com- 
mon interest, so also ought we to propose to 

* The word 7rpec>f3vT£pa } which is here translated 
" prior," may also mean "superior ;" but Antoninus 
seems to say that piety and reverence of the gods pre- 
cede all virtues, and that other virtues are derived 
from them, even justice, which in another passage 
(xi. 10) he makes the foundation of all virtues. The 
ancient notion of justice is that of giving to every one 
his due. It is not a legal definition, as some have 
supposed, but a moral rule which law cannot in all 
cases enforce. Besides, law has its own rules, which 
are sometimes moral and sometimes immoral; but it 
enforces them all simply because they are general 
rules, and if it did not or could not enforce them, so 
far Law would not be Law. Justice, or the doing 
what is just, implies a universal rule and obedience to 
it ; and as we all live under universal Law, which 
commands both our body and our intelligence, and is 
the law of our nature, that is, the law of the whole 
constitution of a man, we must endeavor to discover 
what this supreme Law is. It is the will of the power 
that rules all. By acting in obedience to this will, we 
do justice, and by consequence everything else that 
we ought to do. 



2 S6 GbOUflbtS* [Book XL 

ourselves an object which shall be of a common 
kind [social] and political. For he who directs 
all his own efforts to this object, will make all 
his acts alike, and thus will always be the 
same. 

22. Think of the country mouse and of the 
town mouse, and of the alarm and trepidation 
of the town mouse.* 

23. Socrates used to call the opinions of the 
many by the name of Lamiae, — bugbears to 
frighten children. 

24. The Lacedaemonians at their public 
spectacles used to set seats in the shade for 
strangers, but themselves sat down anywhere. 

25. Socrates excused himself to Perdiccasf 
for not going to him, saying, It is because I 
would not perish by the worst of all ends; that 
is, I would not receive a favor and then be un- 
able to return it. 

26. In the writings of the [EphesiansJJ there 
w T as this precept, constantly to think of some 
one of the men of former times who practiced 
virtue. 

27. The Pythagoreans bid us in the morning 
look to the heavens that we may be reminded 

* The story is told by Horace in his Satires (ii. 6), 
and by others since but not better. 

t Perhaps the emperor made a mistake here, for 
other writers say that it was Archelaus, the son of 
Perdiccas, who invited Socrates to Macedonia. 

X Gataker suggested 'E7rinovpelc)v for 'E^ecrtaw. 



Book XL] /Bbarcus Bureliu6 Bntomnus, 287 

of those bodies which continually do the 
same things and in the same manner perform 
their work, and also be reminded of their pur- 
ity and nudity. For there is no veil over a 
star. 

28. Consider what a man Socrates was when 
he dressed himself in a skin, after Xanthippe 
had taken his cloak and gone out, and what 
Socrates said to his friends who were ashamed 
of him and "drew back from him when they 
saw him dressed thus. 

29. Neither in writing nor in reading wilt 
thou be able to lay down rules for others before 
thou shalt have first learned to obey rules thy- 
self. Much more is this so in life. 

30. A slave thou art : free speech is not for thee. 

31. And my heart laughed within. 

Odyssey , ix. 413. 

32. And virtue they will curse, speaking harsh 
words. Hksiod, Works and Days, 184. 

33. To look for the fig in winter is a mad- 
man's act: such is he who looks for his child 
when it is no longer allowed (Epictetus, iii. 
24, 87). 

34. When a man kisses his child, said 
Epictetus, he should whisper to himself, "To- 
morrow perchance thou wilt die." — But those 
are words of bad omen. — "No word is a word 
of bad omen," said Epictetus, "which ex- 
presses any work of nature; or if it is so, it is 



288 GbOUflbtS. [Book XL 

also a word of bad omen to speak of the ears 
of corn being reaped ■ ' (Epictetus, iii. 24, 88). 

35. The unripe grape, the ripe bunch, the 
dried grape, are all changes, not into nothing, 
but into something which exists not yet 
(Epictetus, iii. 24). 

36. No man can rob us of our free will 
(Epictetus, iii. 22, 105). 

37. Epictetus also said, a man must discover 
an art [or rules] with respect to giving his as- 
sent; and in respect to his movements he must 
be careful that they be made with regard to 
circumstances, that they be consistent with 
social interests, that they have regard to the 
value of the object; and as to sensual desire, 
he should altogether keep away from it; and 
as to avoidance [aversion], he should not show 
it with respect to any of the things which are 
not in our power. 

38. The dispute then, he said, is not about 
any common matter, but about being mad or 
not. 

39. Socrates used to say, What do you want, 
souls of rational men or irrational ? — Souls of 
rational men. — Of what rational men, sound 
or unsound? — Sound. — Why then do you not 
seek for them ? — Because we have them. — Why 
then do you fight and quarrel? 



Book XIL] /Iibarcu6 Burelius Bntoninus* 289 



XII. 

Alylv those things at which thou wishest to 
arrive by a circuitous road thou canst have 
now, if thou dost not refuse them to thyself. 
And this means, if thou wilt take no notice of 
all the past, and trust the future to providence, 
and direct the present only conformably to 
piety and justice. Conformably to piety that 
thou mayest be content with the lot which 
is assigned to thee, for nature designed it 
for thee and thee for it. Conformably to 
justice, that thou mayst always speak the 
truth freely and without disguise, and do 
the things which are agreeable to law and ac- 
cording to the worth of each. And let neither 
another man's wickedness hinder thee, nor 
opinion nor voice, nor yet the sensations of the 
poor flesh which has grown about thee; for the 
passive part will look to this. If, then, what- 
ever the time may be when thou shalt be near 
to thy departure, neglecting everything else 
thou shalt respect only thy ruling faculty and 
the divinity within thee, and if thou shalt be 
afraid not because thou must some time cease 
to live, but if thou shalt fear never to have be- 
gun to live according to nature — then thou 
wilt be a man worthy of the universe which 
has produced thee, and thou wilt cease to be a 
*9 



290 GbOU0bt0, [Book XII 

stranger in thy native land, and to wonder at 
things which happen daily as if they were 
something unexpected, and to be dependent on 
this or that. 

2. God sees the minds [ruling principles] of 
all men bared of the material vesture and rind 
and impurities. For with his intellectual part 
alone he touches the intelligence only which 
has flowed and been derived from himself into 
these bodies. And if thou also usest thyself to 
do this, thou wilt rid thyself of thy much 
trouble. For he who regards not the poor flesh 
which envelops him, surely will not trouble 
himself by looking after raiment and dwelling 
and fame and such like externals and show. 

3. The things are three of which thou art 
composed: a little body, a little breath [life], 
intelligence. Of these the first two are thine, 
so far as it is thy duty to take care of them; 
but the third alone is properly thine. There- 
fore if thou shalt separate from thyself, that 
is, from thy understanding, whatever others do 
or say, and whatever thou hast done or said 
thyself, and whatever future things trouble 
thee because they may happen, and whatever 
in the body which envelops thee or in the 
breath [life], which is by nature associated 
with the body, is attached to thee independent 
of thy will, and whatever the external circum- 
fluent vortex whirls round, so that the intel- 
lectual power exempt from the things of fate 
can live pure and free by itself, doing what is 



Book XIL] jflfcarcus Bureltus Bntoninus* 291 

just and accepting what happens and saying 
the truth: if thou wilt separate, I say, from 
this ruling faculty the things which are at- 
tached to it by the impressions of sense, and the 
things of time to come and of time that is past, 
and wilt make thyself like Empedocles' sphere, 

11 All round and in its joyous rest reposing ;"'* 

and if thou shalt strive to live only what 
is really thy life, that is, the present, — 
then thou wilt be able to pass that portion of 
life which remains for thee up to the time of 
thy death free from perturbations, nobly, and 
obedient to thy own daemon [to the god that 
is within thee] (ii. 13, 17; iii. 5, 6; xi. 12). 

4. I have often wondered how it is that 
every man loves himself more than all the rest 
of men, but yet sets less value on his own 
opinion of himself than on the opinion of 
others. If then a god or a wise teacher should 
present himself to a man and bid him to think 
of nothing and to design nothing which he 
would not express as soon as he conceived it, 
he could not endure it even for a single day.f 
So much more respect have we to what our 
neighbors shall think of us than to what we 
shall think of ourselves. 

* The verse of Bmpedocles is corrupt in Antoninus. 
It has been restored by Peyron from a Turin manu- 
script, thus : — 

2(j)aZpog KVtikoreprjg juovlrj TreptyrjOel yaiuv, 

t iii. 4. 



292 abotiflbts, [Book XII. 

5. How can it be that the gods, after having 
arranged all things well and benevolently for 
mankind, have overlooked this alone, that 
some men, and very good men, and men who, 
as we may say, have had most communion 
with the divinity, and through pious acts and 
religious observances have been most intimate 
with the divinity, when they have once died 
should never exist again, but should be com- 
pletely extinguished ? 

But if this is so, be assured that if it ought 
to have been otherwise, the gods would have 
done it. For if it were just, it would also be 
possible; and if it were according to nature, 
nature would have had it so. But because it 
is not so, if in fact it is not so, be thou con- 
vinced that it ought not to have been so: for 
thou seest even of thyself that in this inquiry 
thou art disputing with the Deity; and we 
should not thus dispute with the gods, unless 
they were most excellent and most just; but if 
this is so, they would not have allowed any- 
thing in the ordering of the universe to be ne- 
glected unjustly and irrationally. 

6. Practise thyself even in the things which 
thou despairest of accomplishing. For even 
the left hand, which is ineffectual for all other 
things for want of practice, holds the bridle 
more vigorously than the right hand; for it 
has been practised in this. 

7. Consider in what condition both in body 
and soul a man should be when he is overtaken 



Book XII.] /iRarcua Burelius Bntoninus, 293 

by death; and consider the shortness of life, 
the boundless abyss of time past and future, 
the feebleness of all matter. 

8. Contemplate the formative principles 
[forms] of things bare of their coverings; the 
purposes of actions; consider what pain is, what 
pleasure is, and death, and fame; who is to him- 
self the cause of his uneasiness; how no man is 
hindered by another; that everything is opinion. 

9. In the application of thy principles thou 
must be like the pancratiast, not like the gladi- 
ator; for the gladiator lets fall the sword which he 
uses and is killed; but the other always has his 
hand, and needs to do nothing else than use it. 

10. See what things are in themselves, 
dividing them into matter, form, and purpose. 

11. What a power man has to do nothing 
except what God will approve, and to accept 
all that God may give him. 

12. With respect to that which happens con- 
formably to nature, we ought to blame neither 
gods, for they do nothing wrong either volun- 
tarily or involuntarily, nor men, for they do 
nothing wrong except involuntarily. Conse- 
quently we should blame nobody (ii. 11, ]2, 13; 
vii. 62; 18 viii. 17). 

13. How ridiculous and what a stranger he 
is who is surprised at anything which happens 
in life. 

14. Either there is a fatal necessity and in- 
vincible order, or a kind providence, or a con- 
fusion without a purpose and without a direc- 



294 GbOUgbte, [Book XII. 

tor (iv. 27). If then there is an invincible ne- 
cessity, why dost thou resist? But if there is 
a providence which allows itself to be propiti- 
ated, make thyself worthy of the help of the 
divinity. But if there is a confusion without 
a governor, be content that in such a tempest 
thou hast in thyself a certain ruling intelli- 
gence. And even if the tempest carry thee 
aw T ay, let it carry away the poor flesh, the poor 
breath, everything else; for the intelligence at 
least it will not carry away. 

15. Does the light of the lamp shine without 
losing its splendor until it is extinguished ? and 
shall the truth which is in thee and justice and 
temperance be extinguished [before thy death] ? 

16. When a man has presented the appear- 
ance of having done wrong [say], How then 
do I know if this is a wrongful act ? And even 
if he has done wrong, how do I know that he 
has not condemned himself? And so this is 
like tearing his own face. Consider that he 
who would not have the bad man do wrong, is 
like the man who would not have the fig-tree 
to bear juice in the figs, and infants to cry, and 
the horse to neigh, and whatever else must of 
necessity be. For what must a man do who 
has such a character? If then thou art irri- 
table, + curelhis man's disposition.* 

*The interpreters translate yopydg by the words 
" acer, validusque," and "skilful." But in Kpictetus 
(ii. 16, 20; iii. 12, 10) yopy6g means " vehement, " 
"prone to anger," "irritable." 



Book XII.] Marcus Burelius Bntoninus* 295 

17. If it is not right, do not do it: if it is not 
true, do not say it. [For let thy efforts be — ]* 

18. In everything always observe what the 
thing is which produces for thee an appear- 
ance, and resolve it by dividing it into the 
formal, the material, the purpose, and the time 
within which it must end. 

19. Perceive at last that thou hast in thee 
something better and more divine than the 
things which cause the various affects, and as 
it were pull thee by the strings. What is 
there now in my mind, — is it fear, or suspicion, 
or desire, or anything of the kind (v. 11)? 

20. First, do nothing inconsiderately, nor 
without a purpose. Second, make thy acts 
refer to nothing else than to a social end. 

21. Consider that before long thou wilt be 
nobody and nowhere, nor will any of the 
things exist which thou now seest, nor any of 
those who are now living. For all things are 
formed by nature to change and be turned and 
to perish, in order that other things in contin- 
uous succession may exist (ix. 28). 

22. Consider that everything is opinion, and 
opinion is in thy power. Take away then, 
when thou choosest, thy opinion, and like a 
mariner who has doubled the promontory, 
thou wilt find calm, everything stable, and a 
waveless bay. 

23. Any one activity, whatever it may be, 
when it has ceased at its proper time, suffers 

* There is something wrong here, or incomplete. 



296 abougbts* [Book xa , 

no evil because it has ceased; nor he who has 
done this act, does he suffer any evil for this 
reason, that the act has ceased. In like man- 
ner then the whole, which consists of all 
the acts, which is our life, if it cease at its 
proper time, suffers no evil for this reason, that 
it has ceased; nor he who has terminated this 
series at the proper time, has he been ill dealt 
with. But the proper time and the limit na- 
ture fixes, sometimes as in old age the peculiar 
nature of man, but always the universal nature, 
by the change of whose parts the whole uni- 
verse continues ever young and perfect.* And 
evetything which is useful to the universal is 
always good and in season. Therefore the 
termination of life for every man is no evil, be- 
cause neither is it shameful, since it is both 
independent of the will and not opposed to the 
general interest, but it is good, since it is sea- 
sonable, and profitable to and congruent with 
the universal. For thus too he is moved by 
the Deity who is moved in the same manner 
with the Deity, and moved towards the same 
thing in his mind. 

24. These three principles thou must have in 
readiness: In the things which thou doest, do 
nothing either inconsiderately or otherwise 
than as justice herself would act; but with re- 
spect to what may happen to thee from with- 
out, consider that it happens either by chance 
or according to providence, arvcJ, thou must 

*vii. 25. 



Bookxn.] Zfoarcus Burelius Hntoninus* 297 

neither blame chance nor accuse providence. 
Second, consider what every being is from the 
seed to the time of its receiving a soul, and 
from the reception of a soul to the giving back 
of the same, and of what things every being 
is compounded, and into what things it is 
resolved. Third, if thou shouldst suddenly 
be raised up above the earth, and shouldst 
look down on human things, and observe 
the variety of them how great it is, and at 
the same time also shouldst see at a glance 
how great is the number of beings who dwell 
all around in the air and the ether, consider 
that as often as thou shouldst be raised up, 
thou wouldst see the same things, sameness 
of form and shortness of duration. Are these 
things to be proud of? 

25. Cast away opinion: thou art saved. 
Who then hinders thee from casting it away ? 

26. When thou art troubled about anything, 
thou hast forgotten this, that all things happen 
according to the universal nature; and forgotten 
this, that a man's wrongful act is nothing to 
the.e; and further thou hast forgotten this, that 
everything which happens, always happened 
so and will happen so, and now happens so 
everywhere; forgotten this too, how close is the 
kinship between a man and the whole human 
race, for it is a community, not of a little blood 
or seed, but of intelligence. And thou hast 
forgotten this too, that every man's intelli- 
gence is a god and is an efflux of the Deity ;* 

* See Epictetus, ii. 8, 9, etc. 



298 GbOVLQbtB. [Book XII 

and forgotten this, that nothing is a man's 
own, but that his child and his body and his 
very soul came from the Deity; forgotten this, 
that everything is opinion; and lastly thou 
hast forgotten that every man lives the present 
time only, and loses only this. 

27. Constantly bring to thy recollection 
those who have complained greatly about any- 
thing, those who have been most conspicuous 
by the greatest fame or misfortunes or enmities 
or fortunes of any kind: then think where are 
they all now ? Smoke and ash and a tale, or 
not even a tale. And let there be present to 
thy mind also everything of this sort, how 
Fabius Catellinus lived in the country, and 
Lucius Lupus in his gardens, and Stertinius at 
Briae, and Tiberius at Capreae, and Velius 
Rufus [or Rufus at Velia]; and in fine think of 
the eager pursuit of anything conjoined with 
pride ;* and how worthless everything is after 
which men violently strain; and how much 
more philosophical it is for a man in the op- 
portunities presented to him to show himself 
just, temperate, obedient to the gods, and. to 
do this with all simplicity: for the pride which 
is proud of its want of pride is the most intol- 
erable of all. 

28. To those who ask, Where hast thou seen 
the gods, or how dost thou comprehend that 
they exist and so worshippest them, I answer, 
in the first place, they may be seen even with 

* fier y olfoetog. Olrjotg not rv(j>oq ) E)pict. i. 8, 6. 



Book xn.] Marcus Bureltus Bntoninua* 299 

the eyes;* in the second place, neither have I 
seen even my own soul, and yet I honor it. 
Thus then with respect to the gods, from what 
I constantly experience of their power, from 
this I comprehend that they exist, and I vene- 
rate them. 

29. The safety of life is this, to examine 
everything all through, what it is itself, that is 
its material, what the formal part; with all thy 
soul to do justice and to say the truth. What 

*"Seen even with the eyes." It is supposed that 
this may be explained by the Stoic doctrine, that the 
universe is a god or living being (iv. 40), and that the 
celestial bodies are gods (viii. 19). But the emperor 
may mean that we know that the gods exist, as he 
afterwards states it, because we see what they do ; as 
we know that man has intellectual powers, because we 
see what he does, and in no other way do we know it. 
This passage then will agree with the passage in the 
Epistle to the Romans (i. v. 20), and with the Kpistle 
to the Colossians (i. v. 15), in which Jesus Christ^ is 
named "the image of the invisible god;" and with 
the passage in the Gospel of St. John (xiv. v. 9). 

Gataker, whose notes are a wonderful collection of 
learning, and all of it sound and good, quotes a pas- 
sage of Calvin which is founded on St. Paul's language 
(Rom. i. v. 20): "God by creating the universe [or 
world, mundum], being himself invisible, has pre- 
sented himself to our eyes conspicuously in a certain 
visible form." He also quotes Seneca (De Benef. iv. 
c. 8): " Quocunque te flexeris, ibi ilium videbis occur - 
rentem tibi : nihil ab illo vacat, opus suum ipse im- 
plet." Compare also Cicero, De Senectute (c. 22), 
Xenophon's Cyropaedia (viii. 7), and Mem. iv. 3 ; 
also Bpictetus, i. 6, de Providentia. I think that my 
interpretation of Antoninus is right. 



3 oo GbOUflbtS. [Book XIL 

remains, except to enjoy life by joining one 
good thing to another so as not to leave even 
the smallest intervals between ? 

30. There is one light of the sun, though it 
is interrupted by walls, mountains, and other 
things infinite. There is one common sub- 
stance,* though it is distributed among count- 
less bodies which have their several qualities. 
There is one soul, though it is distributed 
among infinite natures and individual circum- 
scriptions [or individuals]. There is one intel- 
ligent soul, though it seems to be divided. 
Now in the things which have been mentioned, 
all the other parts, such as those which are air 
and matter, are without sensation and have no 
fellowship: and yet even these parts the intelli- 
gent principle holds together and the gravita- 
tion towards the same. But intellect in a pecu- 
liar manner tends to that which is of the same 
kin, and combines with it, and the feeling for 
communion is not interrupted. 

31. What dost thou wish — to continue to 
exist? Well, dost thou wish to have sensa- 
tion, movement, growth, and then again to 
cease to grow, to use thy speech, to think ? 
What is there of all these things which seems 
to thee worth desiring? But if it is easy to set 
little value on all these things, turn to that 
which remains, which is to follow reason and 
God. But it is inconsistent with honoring 
reason and God to be troubled because by death 
a man will be deprived of the other things. 

* iv. 40. 



Book XIL] /Ifearcus Burelius Bntonfnus* 301 

32. How small a part of the boundless and 
unfathomable time is assigned to every man, 
for it is very soon swallowed up in the eternal! 
And how small a part of the whole substance; 
and how small a part of the universal soul; 
and on what a small clod of the whole earth 
thou creepest! Reflecting on all this, consider 
nothing to be great, except to act as thy na- 
ture leads thee, and to endure that which the 
common nature brings. 

33. How does the ruling faculty make use 
of itself? for all lies in this. But everything 
else, whether it is in the power of thy will or 
not, is only lifeless ashes and smoke. 

34. This reflection is most adapted to move 
us to contempt of death, that even those who 
think pleasure to be a good and pain an evil 
still have despised it. 

35. The man to whom that only is good 
which comes in due season, and to whom it is 
the same thing whether he has done more or 
fewer acts conformable to right reason, and to 
whom it makes no difference whether he con- 
templates the world for a longer or a shorter 
time — for this man neither is death a terrible 
thing (iii. 7; vi. 23; x. 20; xii. 23). 

36. Man, thou hast been a citizen in this 
great state [the world] ;* what difference does 
it make to thee whether for five years [or 
three] ? for that which is conformable to the 
laws is just for all. Where is the hardship 

*ii. 16; iii. n ; iv. 29. 



302 ftbOUGbtS* [Book XII. 

then, if no tyrant nor yet an unjust judge sends 
thee away from the state, but nature, who 
brought thee into it ? the same as if a praetor 
who has employed an actor dismisses him from 
the stage.* — " But I have not finished the five 
acts, but only three of them." — Thou sayest 
well, but in life the three acts are the whole 
drama; for what shall be a complete drama is 
determined by him who was once the cause of 
its composition, and now of its dissolution : 
but thou art the cause of neither. Depart 
then satisfied, for he also who releases thee is 
satisfied. 

*iii. 8; xi. i. 



INDEXES. 



INDEX OF TERMS. 



adia&opa (indifferentia, Cicero, Seneca, E)pp. 82) ; 

things indifferent, neither good nor bad ; the same 

as jiteaa. 
alaxpog (turpis, Cic), ugly ; morally ugly. 
atria, cause. 
alriudeg, ainov, r6, the formal or formative principle, 

the cause. 
aKOLv&vrjTog, unsocial. 

avatyopa, reference, relation to a purpose. 
avv7ret;acpeTG)c } unconditionally. 
airoppoia, efflux. 
aTtpoaipera, ra, the things which are not in our will or 

power. 
apXV, a first principle. 
arojuot (corpora individua, Cic), atoms. 
avrdpKeia est quae parvo contenta omne id respuit quod 

abundat (Cic.) ; contentment. 
avrdpK7]g y sufficient in itself; contented. 
a(popfiai y means, principles. The word has also other 

significations in Epictetus. Index ed. Schweig. 
yiyvdfieva, ra, things which are produced, come into 

existence. 
6aifxo)v } god, god in man, man's intelligent principle. 
dtadsoLQ, disposition, affection of the mind. 
diaipeaig, division of things into their parts, dissection, 

resolution, analysis. 
dtaleKTtKTj, ars bene disserendi et vera ac falsa dijudic- 

andi (Cic). 
dialvGtg, dissolution, the opposite of avyKptotq. 

20 (305) 



306 ITnDex. 

di&vota, uuderstaiiding ; sometimes, the mind generally, 
the whole intellectual power. 

66y[xara (decreta, Cic.), principles. 

divauig voepd, intellectual faculty. 

hjKpareia, temperance, self-restraint. 

eldog in divisione formae sunt, quas Graeci eldrj vocant ; 
nostri, si qui haec forte tractant, species appellant 
( Cic. ). But eldog is used by Epictetus and Antoninus 
less exactly and as a general term, like genus. 
Index Hpict. ed. Schweig. — *£lg de ye at Trptirat ovaiai 
irpbg ra aKka exovotv, ovtcj not to eldog rrpbg to yevog exei' 
vTTOKelTai yap to eldog tQ> yevet; (Aristot. Cat. c. 5.) 

eljuapjuev?] (fetalis necessitas, fatum, Cic), destiny, 
necessity. 

enKkioetg, aversions, avoidance, the turning away from 
things ; the opposite of bpe^eig. 

efLipvxa, tcl, things which have life. 

hepyeta, action, activity. 

evvoia, evvotat, notio, notiones (Cic), or " notitiae 
rerum ;" notions of things. (Notionem appello 
quam Graeci turn evvoiav, turn irpok^iv, Cic). 

evoGig, y, the unity. 

eTTtoTpocf)?}, attention to an object. 

evdv/Liia, animi tranquillitas (Cic). 

ehfieveg, to, evfievehi, benevolence ; evjievrjg sometimes 
means well-contented. 

evvoia, benevolence. 

k^ovoia, power, faculty. 

t7raKo?ioWr/aiv, naTa, by way of sequence. 

r/ye/ioviKov, to, the ruling faculty or part ; principatus 
(Cic). 

Oeopr/fj.aTa, percepta (Cic), things perceived, general 
principles. 

KaOyntiv, to, duty, "ofncium." 

\m/6r, beautiful. 

KaTfiArpfjcr, comprehension ; cognitio, perceptio, com- 
prehensio (Cic). 

KaTurynevrj, constitution. 



1TnDe£, 307 

mTopducetg, Karop66juara ; recta, recte facta (Cic.) ; right 
acts, those acts to which we proceed by the right or 
straight road. 

noo/iog, order, world, universe. 

KOGfiog, 6 b/iog y the universe, that which is the One and 
the all (vi. 25). 

Kpi/ua y a judgment. 

Kvpievov, to evdov, that which rules within (iv. 1), the 
same as to r/yejuoviKov . Diogenes Iyaertius vii., Zeno. 
rjyefioviKov de elvat to KvpcuTaTov Tfjg ipvxfjg. 

loyim y tcl, the things which have reason. 

loywog, rational. 

loyog, reason. 

"koyog GirepfzaTiKog, seminal principle. 

/leva, t&, things indifferent, viewed with respect to 
virtue. 

voepog, intellectual. 

vdfiog, law. 

vovg, intelligence, understanding. 

olrjoig, arrogance, pride. It sometimes means in An- 
toninus the same as Tvtyog ; but it also means " opin- 
ion." 

otKovofiia (dispositio, ordo, Cic.) has sometimes the 
peculiar sense of artifice, or doing something with 
an apparent purpose different from the real purpose. 

6/W, to, the universe, the whole : rj t&v bXcov tyvaig. 

bvTa y t&, things which exist ; existence, being. 

bpegig, desire of a thing, which is opposed to entOuctg, 
aversion. 

6pjuy } movement towards an object, appetite ; appetitio, 
naturalis appetitus, appetitus animi (Cic). 

ovoia, substance (vi. 49). Modern writers sometimes 
incorrectly translate it " essentia." It is often used 
by Bpictetus in the same sense as vkq. Aristotle 
(Cat. c. 5) defines ovaia y and it is properly translated 
" substantia " (ed. Jul. Pacius). Porphyrius (Isag. 
C. 2) : rj ovata avoT&TO) ova a Tti juqdev irpb avTfjg yivog rjv 
to yeviKGJTaTov. 



308 IFnDej, 

irapaKoXovfhjTiKT) dbvafug, ?), the power which enables us 

to observe and understand. 
TTEloic;, passivity, opposed to cvepyeia : also, affect. 
TTEpiGTaceig, circumstances, the things which surround 

us ; troubles, difficulties. 
ireTTpafiivq, ?/, destiny. 

Tpoaipectg, purpose, free will (Aristot. Rhet. i. 13). 
Trpoaipera, rd } things which are within our will or power. 
TrpoacpeTLKOv, ro y free will. 
TTpoOtuig, a purpose, proposition. 
izp6voia (providentia, Cic. ), providence. 
GKOTzog, object, purpose. 
OToixziov, element. 
ovyKarddeGcg (assensio, approbatio, Cic), assent; Gvynara- 

OeGsig (probationes, Gellius, xix. 1). 
GvyKpijLLara, things compounded (ii. 3). 
GvynpLGLQ y the act of combining elements out of which 

a body is produced, combination. 
cvvdeGig, ordering, arrangement (compositio). 
cvGT7]{ia } system, a thing compounded of parts which 

have a certain relation to one another. 
vkrii matter, material. 
vTilkov, to } the material principle. 
vTre^aipeGtg, exception, reservation ; jited' viregaipeGecog, 

conditionally. 
vnodeGLQ, material to work on ; thing to employ the 

reason on ; proposition, thing assumed as matter for 

argument and to lead to conclusions. (Quaestionum 

duo sunt genera ; alteram infinitum, definitum 

alteram. Definitum est, quod vtcoQeglv Graeci, nos 

causam : infinitum, quod Oeglv illi appellant, nos 

propositum possumus nominare. Cic. See Aristot. 

Anal. Post. i. c. 2). 
ifiroiceifiepa, ra, things present or existing, vi. 4 ; or 

things which are a basis or foundation. 
vTTo/jpbi.c, opinion. 
tooorcung, basis, substance, being, foundation (x. 5). 

Epictetus has to vkogtcltlkov nal ovGL&deg. ( Justinus 

ad Diogn. c. 2.) 



1TnDe£* 309 

vQiGraodai, to subsist, to be. 

<j>avTaGtai (visus, Cic.) ; appearances, thoughts, impres- 
sions (visa animi, Gellius, xix. i) : ^avraaia tori 

<j)dvTaGjua y seems to be used by Antoninus in the same 
sense as tyavraoia. Epictetus uses only ^avraoia. 

(pavrcLGTov, that which produces a <\>avTaaia : (bavraarbv rd 
r£7TGC7/Kbg rrjv tyavraaiav alodrjTov. 

(pvcrig, nature. 

ififjoig y tqv 6Xo)v ) the nature of the universe. 

^vxv, soul, life, living principle. 

fvxv %oycKy y voepa, a rational soul, an intelligent soul 



GENERAL INDEX. 



*#* The paragraphs (par.) and lines (1.) are those of the sections. 



Active, man is by nature, ix. 16. 

Advice from the good to be taken, vii. 21; viii. 16. 

Affectation, vii. 60; viii. 30; xi. 18 (par. 9), 19. 

Anger discouraged, vi. 26, 27; xi. 18. 

Anger, offenses of, ii. 10. 

Anger, uselessness of, v. 28; viii. 4. 

Appearances not to be regarded, v. 36; vi. 3, 13. 

Astonishment should not be felt at any thing that hap- 
pens, viii. 15; xii. 1 (sub fine), 13. 

Attainment, what is within every one's, vii. 67; viii. 8. 

Attention to what is said or done, vi. 53; vii. 4, 30; 
viii. 22. 

Bad, the, ii. 1. 
Beautiful, the, ii. 1. 

Casual. See Formal. 

Change keeps the world ever new, vii. 25; viii 50 (1. 

13); xii. 23 (1. 10). 
Change, law of, iv. 3 (sub f.), 36, v. 13, 23; vi. 4, 15, 

36; vii. 18; viii. 6; ix. 19, 28 (par. 2), 35; x. 7, 18; 

xii. 21. 
Change, no evil in, iv. 42. 
Christians, the xi. 3. 
Circle, things come round in a, ii. 14. 
Comedy, new, xi. 6. 

(3") 



3i2 General 1Tn&ej, 



Comedy, Old, xi. 6. 

Complaining, uselessness of, viii. 17, 50. 

Connection. See Universe. 

Conquerers are robbers, x. 10. 

Contentment. See Resignation. 

Co-operation. See Mankind and Universe. 

Daemon, the, ii. 13, 17; iii. 6 (1. 8), 7, 16 (1. 18); v. 10 

(sub f.) 27; xii. 3 (sub. f. ). 
Death, ii. II, 12, 17; iii. 3, 7; iv. 5; v. 33; vi. 2, 24, 28; 

vii. 32; viii. 20, 58; ix. 3, 21; x. 36; xii. 23, 34, 35. 
Death inevitable, iii. 3; iv. 3 (1. 22), 6, 32, 48, 50; v. 

33; vi. 47; viii. 25, 31. 
Desire, offenses of, ii. 10. 
Destiny, iii. 11 (1. 19); iv. 26; v. 8 (1. 13, etc.), 24; 

vii. 57; x. 5. 
Discontent. See Resignation. 

Doubts discussed, vi. 10; vii. 75; ix. 28, 39; xii. 5, 14. 
Duty, all-importance of, vi. 2, 22; x. 22. 

Earth, insignificance of the, iii. 10; iv. 3 (par. 1, sub 

f.); vi. 36; viii. 21; xii. 32. 
Earthly things, transitory nature of, ii. 12, 17; iv. 32, 

33, 35, 48; v. 23; vi. 15, 36; vii. 21, 34; viii. 21, 25; 

x. 18, 31; xii. 27, 
Earthly things, worthlessness of, ii. 12; v. 10, 33; vi. 

15; vii. 3; ix. 24, 36; xi. 2; xii. 27. 
Equanimity, x. 8. 

Example, we should not follow bad, vi. 6; vii. 65. 
Existence, meanness of, viii. 24. 
Existence, the object of, v. 1; viii. 19. 
External things cannot really harm a man, or affect 

the soul, ii, 11 (1. 22); iv. 3 (par. 2, sub f.); 8, 39, 49 

(par. 2); v. 35; vii. 64; viii. 1 (sub f.); 32, 51 (par. 

2); ix. 31; x. 33. 

Failure, x. 12. 

Fame, worthlessness of, iii. 10; iv. 3 (1. 45), 19, 33 (1. 
10); v. 33; vi. 16, 18; vii. 34; viii. 1, 44; ix. 30. 



©eneral 1Tn&es* 313 



Fear, what we ought to, xii. i (1. 18). 

Fellowship. See Mankind. 

Few things necessary for a virtuous and happy life, 

ii. 5; iii. 10; vii. 67; x. 8 (1. 22). 
Flattery, xi. 18 (par. 10). 
Formal, the, and the material, iv. 21 (par. 2); v. 13; 

vii. 10, 29: viii. 11; ix. 25; xii. 8, 10, 18. 
Future, we should not be anxious about the, vii. 8; 

viii. 11; ix. 25; xii. 1. 

Gods, perfect justice of the, xii. 5 (par. 2). 
Gods, the, vi. 44; xii. 28. 
Gods, the, cannot be evil, ii. 11; vi. 44. 
Good, the, ii. 1. 

Habit of thought, v. 16. 

Happiness, what is true, v. 9 (sub f.), 34; viii. 1; x. 

33- 
Help to be accepted from others, xii. 7. 
Heroism, true, xi. 18 (par. 10). 

Ignorance. See Wrong-doing. 

Independence. See Self-reliance. 

Indifferent things, ii. 11 (sub f.); ix. 39; vi. 32; ix. 1; 

(1. 30). 
Individual, the. See Interests. 
Infinity. See Time. 
Ingratitude. See Mankind. 
Injustice, ix. 1. 
Intelligent soul, rational beings participate in the 

same, iv. 40; ix. 8, 9; x. 1 (1. 15); xii. 26, 30. 
Interests of the whole and the individual identical, iv. 

23; v. 8 (1. 34); vi. 45, 54; x. 6, 20, 33 (sub f.); xii. 

23 (1. 12). 

Justice, v. 34; x. 11; xi. 10. 

Justice and reason identical, xi. 1 (sub f.). 

Justice prevails everywhere, iv. 10. 



314 ©enetal f tides* 



Leisure, we ought to have some, viii. 51. 

Life, a good, everywhere possible, v. 16. 

Life can only be lived once, ii. 14; x. 31 (1. n). 

Life, shortness of, ii. 4, 17; iii. 10, 14; iv. 17, 48 (sub 

f.), 50; vi. 15,36, 56; x. 31, 34. 
Life to be made a proper use of, without delay, ii. 4; 

iii. 1, 14; iv. 17, 37; vii. 56; viii. 22; x. 31 (1. 14); 

xli 1 (1. 18). 
Life, whether long or short, matters not, vi. 49; ix. 33; 

xii. 36. 

Magnanimity, x. 8. 

Mankind, co-operation and fellowship of, one with 
another; ii. 1 (I. 11), 16; iii. 4 (sub f.); 11 (sub f.); 
iv. 4, 33 (sub f.); v. 16 (1. 11), 20; vi. 7, 14 (sub f.), 
23, 39; vii. 5, 13, 22, 55; viii. 12, 26, 34, 43, 59; ix. I, 
9 (sub f.), 23, 31, 42 (sub. f.); x. 36,(1. .16); xi. 8, 21; 
xii. 20. 

Mankind, folly and baseness of, v. 10 (1. 9); ix. 2, 3 
(1. 13), 29; x. 15, 19. 

Mankind, ingratitude of, x. 36. 

Material, the. See Formal. 

Nature, after products of, iii. 2; vi. 36. 

Nature, bounds fixed by, v. 1. 

Nature, man formed by, to bear all that happens to 

him, v. 18; viii. 46. 
Nature, nothing evil, which is according to, ii. 17 (sub 

f.); vi. 33. 
Nature of the universe. See Universe, nothing that 

happens is contrary to the nature of the. 
Nature, perfect beauty of, iii. 2; vi. 36. 
Nature, we should live according to, iv. 48 (sub. f.), 51; 

v. 3, 25; vi. 16 (1. 12); vii. 15, 55; viii. 1, 54; x.33^ 
New, nothing, under the sun, ii. 14 (1. 11); iv. 44; vi. 

37, 46; vii. 1, 49; viii. 6; ix. 14; x. 27; xi. 1. 

Object, we should always act with a view to some, ii 
7, 16 (1. 12) ; iii. 4 ; iv. 2 ; viii. 17 ; x. 37 ; xi. 21 ; 
xii. 20. 



General 1TnDe£* 315 

Obsolete, all things become, iv. 33. 

Omissions, sins of, ix. 5. 

Opinion, iv. 3 (par. 2) (sub f.), 7, 12, 39; vi. 52, 57; 

vii. 2, 14, 16, 26, 68; viii. 14, 29, 40, 47, 49; ix. 13, 

29 (1. 12), 32, 42 (1. 21); x. 3 ; xi. 16, 18 ; xii. 22, 25. 
Others' conduct not to be inquired into, iii. 4 ; iv. 18 ; 

v. 25. 
Others, opinion of, to be disregarded, viii. 1 (1. 12); x. 

8 (1. 12), 11 ; xi. 13 ; xii. 4. 
Others, we should be lenient towards, ii. 13 (sub f.); 

iii. 11 (sub f.) ; iv. 3 (1. 16) ; v. 33 (1. 17) ; vi. 20, 27 ; 

vii. 26, 62, 63, 70; ix. 11, 27 ; x. 4; xi. 9, 13, 18; 

xii. 16. 
Others, we should examine the ruling principles of s 

iv. 38 ; ix. 18, 22, 27, 34. 
Ourselves often to blame for expecting men to act 

contrary to their nature, ix. 42 (1. 31). 
Ourselves, reformation should begin with, xi. 290 
Ourselves, we should judge, x. 30 ; xi. 18 (par. 4). 

Pain, vii. 33, 64 ; viii. 28. 

Perfection not to be expected in this world, ix. 29 

(1. 7). 
Perseverance, v. 9 ; x. 12. 
Persuasion, to be used, vi. 50. 
Perturbation, vi. 16 (sub f.) ; viii. 58; ix. 31. 
Pessimism, ix. 35. 

Philosophy, v. 9 ; vi. 12 ; ix. 41 (1. 15). 
Pleasure, he who pursues, is guilty of impiety, ix. I 

(1. 24). 
Pleasures are enjoyed by the bad, vi. 34 ; ix. 1 (1. 30). 
Power, things in our own, v. 5, 10 (sub f.) ; vi. 32, 41, 

52, 58 ; vii. 2, 14, 54, 68 ; x. 32, 33. 
Power, things not in our own, v. 33 (sub f.) ; vi. 41. 
Practice is good, even in things which we despair of 

accomplishing, xii. 6. 
Praise, worthlessness of, iii. 4 (sub £) ; iv. 20 : vi. 16, 

59 ; vii. 62 ; viii. 52, 53 . ix. 34. 
Prayer, the right sort of, v. 7 ; ix. 40. 



316 General fndes* 



Present time the only thing a man really possesses, ii. 

14; iii. 10; viii. 44; xii. 3 (sub f. ;. 
Procrastination. See Life to be made a proper use of, 

etc. 
Puppet pulled by strings of desire, ii. 3 ; iii. 16 ; vi. 

16, 28 ; vii. 3, 29 ; xii. 19. 

Rational soul. See Ruling part. 

Rational soul, spherical form of the, viii. 41 (sub f.) ; 
xi. 12 ; xii. 3 (and see Ruling part). 

Reason, all-prevailing, v. 32; vi. 1, 40. 

Reason and nature identical, vii. 11. 

Reason, the, can adapt everything that happens to its 
own use, v. 20 ; vi. 8 ; vii. 68 (1. 16) ; viii. 35 ; x. 31 
(sub f.). 

Reason, we should live according to. See Nature. 

Repentance does not follow renouncement of pleas- 
ure, viii. 10. 

Resignation and contentment, iii. 4 (1. 27, etc.), 16 (1. 
10, etc.) ; iv. 23, 31, 33 (sub f.), 34 ; v. 8 (sub f.), 33 
(1. 16); vi. 16 (sub f.), 44, 49 \ vii. 27, 57 ; ix. 37 • x. 
1, II, 14, 25, 28, 35. 

Revenge, best kind of, vi. 6. 

Rising from bed, v. 1; viii. II. 

Ruling part, the, ii. 2; iv. II, 19, 21, 26; vi. 14, 35; 
vii. 16, 55 (par. 2); viii. 45, 48, 56, 57, 60, 61; ix. 15, 
26; x. 24, 33 (1. 21), 38; xi. 1, 19, 20; xii. 3, 14. 

Self-reliance and steadfastness of soul, iii. 5 (sub f.), 

12 ; iv. 14, 29 (1. 5), 49 (par. 1) ; v. 3, 34 (1. 5); vi. 

44 (1. 15); vii. 12, 15; ix. 28 (1. 8), 29 (sub f.); xii. 14. 
Self-restraint, v. 33 (sub f.). 
Self, we should retire into, iv. 3 (1. 4 and par. 2) ; 

vii. 28, 33, 59; viii. 48. 
Senses, movements of the, to be disregarded, v. 31 (1. 

10) ; vii. 55 (par. 2) ; viii. 26, 39 ; x. 8 (1. 13) ; xi. 

19; xii. 1 (1. 18). 
Sickness, behavior in, ix. 41. 
Social. See Mankind. 



(Seneval IfnDej* 317 



Steadfastness of soul. See Self-reliance. 

Substance, the universal, iv. 40 ; v. 24 ; vii. 19, 23 ; 

xii. 30. 
Suicide, v. 29 ; viii. 47 (sub f.) ; x. 8 (1. 35). 

Time compared to a river, iv. 43. 

Time, infinity of, iv. 3 (1. 35), 50 (sub f.) ; v. 24 ; ix. 

32 ; xii. 7, 32. 
Tragedy, xi. 6. 
Tranquillity of soul, iv. 3 ; vi. 11 ; vii. 68 ; viii. 28. 

Ugly, the, ii. 1. 

Unintelligible things, v. 10. 

Universe, harmony of the, iv. 27, 45 ; v. 8 (1. 14). 

Universe, intimate connection and co-operation of all 

things in the, one with another, ii. 3, 9 ; iv. 29 ; v. 

8, 30 ; vi. 38, 42, 43 ; vii. 9, 19, 68 (sub f.) ; viii. 7 ; 

ix. 1 ; x. 1. 
Universe, nothing that dies falls out of the, viii, 18, 

50 (1. 13) : x. 7 (1. 25). 
Universe, nothing that happens is contrary to the 

nature of the, v. 8, 10 (sub f.) ; vi. 9, 58; viii. 5; 

xii. 26. 
Unnecessary things, v. 45. 
Unnecessary thoughts, words, and actions, iii. 4 ; iv. 

24. 

Vain professions, x. 16 ; xi. 15. 

Virtue, vi. 17. 

Virtue its own reward, v. 6 ; vii. 73 ; ix. 42 (1. 47) ; 

xi. 4. 
Virtue, omnipotence of, iv. 16. 
Virtue, pleasure in contemplating, vi. 48. 

Whole, integrity of the, to be preserved, v. 8 (sub f.). 
Whole, the. See Interests. 
Wickedness has always existed, rii. 1. 
Wickedness must exist in the world, viii. 15, 50 ; ix, 
42 ; xi. 18 (par. ii) ; xii. 16. 



3iS General fnftes* 



Worst evil, the, ix. 2 (1. 9.) 

Worth and importance, things of real, iv. 33 (sub f.) ; 
v. 10 (1. 16) ; vi. 16, 30 (1. 7), 47 (sub f.) ; vii. 20, 44, 
46, 58, 66; viii. 2, 3, 5; ix. 6, 12; x. 8 (1. 27), 11; xii 

ij 2 7, 3i, 33- 
Wrong-doing cannot really harm any one, vii. 22; 

viii. 55; ix. 42 (1. 25); x. 13 (par. i)-^ xi. 18 (par. 7). 
Wrong-doing injures the wrong-doer, iv. 26; ix. 4, 38^ 

xi. 18 (par. 3). 
Wrong-doing owing to ignorance, ii. 1, 13 ; vi. 27 ; 

vii. 22, 26, 62, 63 ; xi. 18 (par. 3); xii. 22. # 
Wrong-doing to be left where it is, vii. 29 ; ix. 20. 

THE end. 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



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